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THE INFLUENCE OF CONGRESSIONAL
VOTING BLOCS ON IMMIGRATION REFORM:
THE IMMIGRATION REFORM AND CONTROL ACT, 1986

A Thesis
Presented to the
Faculty of
California State University,
San Bernardino

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts
in
Social Science

by
Jennifer Mobley-VanHeerde

December 1997


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ABSTRACT

On November 6, 1986, President Reagan signed into law the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA). This paper is an in-depth study of the enactment of IRCA. Specifically, this paper accounts for the voting behavior on the IRCA vote of three key voting blocs within the House of Representatives: the Hispanic Caucus, the Black Caucus, and liberal Democrats. The paper demonstrates how the split within the Hispanic Caucus provided the model for members of the Black Caucus and liberal Democrats who took their cue on this issue from the Hispanic Caucus. Using a roll call analysis, the paper accounts for the voting behavior of the three key groups using Lambda and Yule's Q to measure two variables associated with the individual representative (ideological liberalism and tenure), and two variables associated with their district (whom the district voted for in the 1984 presidential election and the total minority population as a percentage of the whole in the district). It shows that the variables do associate with the votes on IRCA for the Hispanic Caucus, however, the pattern holds but to a weaker degree for the Black Caucus and liberal Democrats.

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I. Introduction

Every few years, immigration law reform reemerges as a pivotal issue in American politics. The political debate that surrounds immigration reform is often intense, and creates cleavages in public opinion. Immigration, "like other 'wedge' issues, encourages rhetorical excess, often involving serious misperceptions and misinterpretations of historical fact and contemporary research" (Passel and Fix 1994, 151).

The debate on immigration reform takes place in a public arena where conflict over basic American values clash. Much like race, taxes and crime, debates on immigration reform evokes racial, cultural, and economic anxieties (Passel and Fix 1994, 151). Immigration affects all areas of life- social, economic, political, and cultural. It is no surprise, therefore, that immigration policy remains a salient issue in American politics today, particularly in those states most seriously affected by legal and illegal immigration.

On November 6, 1986, President Reagan signed into law the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA). He declared its objective, "to establish a reasonable, fair, orderly, and secure system of immigration into this country

and not to discriminate against particular nations or peoples" (Montweiler 1987, 22). IRCA was an attempt to deal with the problem of illegal immigration by attacking the most significant "pull factor," the U.S. economy. Through economic sanctions on U.S. employers, IRCA intended to "demagnetize" the pull of a comparatively prosperous U.S. economy (LeMay 1994, 27). Feeling satisfied, Congress felt that IRCA "solved the problem of illegal immigration once and for all" (Mehlman 1994, 25).

Like its predecessors and the many immigration reform bills after it, IRCA neither completely failed nor succeeded despite its good intentions.¹ As a result of IRCA's failure to solve the problem of illegal immigration, several bills since 1986 have been debated in the House and Senate and been sent on to the president for his signature. The Immigration Act of 1990 is but one example of the successive bills that have attempted to deal with the recurring problems of legal and illegal immigration.

While a majority of the debate on immigration has taken place at the national level, states have joined the political debate on immigration reform as well. The states of Texas, California, and Florida have filed suits in their respective federal district courts challenging national policy and seeking financial redress for the "failure" of

the central government to control the nation's borders. California Governor Pete Wilson (R) has filed two suits against the federal government. Governor Wilson is appealing a federal court's decision to reject his initial suit. His latest suit contends President Clinton is violating a law he signed to relieve states of the burden of incarcerating illegal immigrant prisoners (The Los Angeles Times, March 6, 1996, A-3, A-12).

California's most recent mid-term election (1994) shows a change in the dominant political party in California and perhaps across the nation. Immigration reform at the national level can be expected given the significant shift to the right as a result of those elections. Moreover, the recent recession of 1990-91 goes far to explain California's initiative Proposition 187. While most of the country was on the road to recovery in 1992, California, the last to feel the crunch of the recession, was also the last to recover from it. The severe decline in jobs due to defense cutbacks was particularly devastating to defense contractors and the aerospace industry. The persistence of budget deficits in California focused attention on rising welfare expenditures, particularly AFDC and Medicaid. Politicians succeeded with voters in making illegal aliens appear to be the major source of those problems.

California again finds itself in the middle of the political debate over Proposition 187, the "Save Our State" initiative. In November 1994, California voters overwhelmingly approved Proposition 187, which authorized the state to enact sweeping changes in restricting health, welfare, and education benefits to illegal aliens.² Proposition 187 was immediately challenged in the federal district court and ruled unconstitutional in all but a few minor aspects.³ The state of California is appealing that case to the United States Supreme Court.

The effects of California's Proposition 187 have rippled throughout the nation. The passage of Proposition 187 sent a clear message to Congress, which reacted with a spate of bills designed to restrict immigration. A Congressional Task Force on Immigration and the new Republican majority are both pushing for sweeping and increasingly restrictive revisions to current immigration law.⁴

In the Senate, Alan Simpson, (R.-WY.) introduced his bill, S269, entitled "Immigration Control and Financial Responsibility Act of 1995," and in the House, a companion bill, "Immigration in the National Interests Act," was sponsored by Lemar Smith (R.-TX.), influential chair of the

immigration subcommittee. Among the provisions of these key bills were the following:

- Cut legal immigration by 2005, from the present average of about 800,000 to 535,000 a year;
- Cap the number of minor children and spouses of immigrants granted permanent residency at 85,000;
- Sharply increase the financial requirements for a U.S. citizen to sponsor an immigrant;
- Establish a national registry of Social Security and of alien registration numbers and requires companies to use it to verify the legal status of all job applicants;
- Set the limit of refugees at 50,000 annually and require the President to seek Congressional approval to increase it;
- Increase the difficulty for U.S. companies to recruit foreign workers;
- Eliminate some important categories of immigrants with automatic entry, including brothers/sisters of legal residents and children over 21 (The New York Times, September 25, 1995, A-1, A-2).

The final version of this bill known as H.R. 2022,

"Immigration in the National Interest Act," was

substantively altered through the legislative process. Key provisions in the final version included: (1) Enhanced border enforcement through additional training, technology, and resources; (2) Criminally prosecuting those who engage in alien smuggling and cracking down on document fraud, including visa and passport fraud; (3) H.R. 2022 streamlines the procedures for removing illegal aliens; (4) H.R. 2022

attempts to eliminate the "pull" of the U.S. economy by limiting the number of acceptable "right to work" documents to six, and seeks to protect the integrity of birth/death certificates, Social Security cards, and state drivers licenses and identification cards; and (5) H.R. 2022 embraces the idea that immigrants should be self-sufficient by denying public benefits to illegal immigrants (Adapted from Congressional Digest 1996, 141-142).

Moreover, the Clinton Administration, following the suggestions of its Commission on Immigration Reform, introduced its own reform proposals that included significant restrictions over current law. Both liberal and conservative groups have proposed increasingly restrictionist laws, not as a result of their consensus on the issue, but as a response to growing public pressure for tighter immigration policies.

The Immigration and Naturalization Service has also joined the reform bandwagon by enacting a program imposing charges from \$4.00 to \$32.00 for six different border crossing documents to fund entry improvements at various land border ports. In 1994, the INS spent nearly \$160 million dollars on "Operation Gatekeeper," designed to crackdown on illegal immigration near El Paso, Texas, using new technology and enhanced border patrol resources to

tighten controls along the 2,000 mile U.S./Mexican border (The New York Times, June 8, 1995, B-10).

Over a decade ago, the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 sought to deal with the problem of illegal immigration once and for all. Despite its intentions, IRCA failed to do so, and, as a result, successive bills have followed attempting to effectively deal with the immigration question. The policy strategies of many of the bills that followed IRCA contain similar provisions to those of IRCA. The successful provisions have been adapted, while the less successful have been eliminated. Therefore, IRCA is a significant law from which lessons about future policy making can be learned.

Immigration reform legislation passed in the 1980s and 1990s, including IRCA and the 1990 Immigration Act, reflected the growing concern for immigration policy reform that moved immigration policy to the forefront of American politics. Debate over immigration policy may subside as more pressing issues surface, yet it always resurfaces to dominate the national agenda.

II. Scope of Paper/Methodology

This paper is an in-depth study of congressional voting behavior on IRCA. Particular attention is given to the role

of traditional voting blocs within the House and their impact on issue outcomes. Specifically, this paper accounts for the voting behavior on the IRCA vote of three key voting blocs within the House of Representatives: the Hispanic Caucus, the Black Caucus, and liberal Democrats. Key compromises on several controversial provisions of IRCA split the various voting blocs in Congress, facilitating the passage of IRCA.

In the Senate, the passage of IRCA was aided by the work of several key senators, specifically the bill's sponsor, Senator Alan Simpson (R-WY.). Simpson and others worked tirelessly in mending the House and Senate versions of the bill and were important in negotiations between houses to reach key compromises which enabled the passage of IRCA. In an effort to persuade colleagues and secure votes for IRCA, Simpson found himself fighting the opposition led by Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D-MA.).

The paper demonstrates how the split within the House Hispanic Caucus provided the model for members of the Black Caucus and liberal Democrats who took their cue on this issue from the Hispanic Caucus. Using a roll call analysis, the paper accounts for the voting behavior of the three key groups using Lambda and Yule's Q to measure two variables associated with the individual representative (ideological

liberalism and tenure) and two variables associated with their district (whom the district voted for in the 1984 presidential election and the total minority population as a percentage of the whole in the district).

While one would expect the Hispanic Caucus to be opposed to IRCA, this opposition may be weaker in districts where: (1) the total minority population as a percent of the whole is less than 25 percent; (2) the district voted for Reagan in the 1984 presidential race; (3) the individual representative has been in office for less than four terms; and, (4) the individual representative's degree of ideological liberalism scores less than 80 on an index of indicators. One might also expect less opposition to IRCA from members of the Black Caucus and liberal Democrats where these conditions exist. The paper shows that the variables do associate with the votes on IRCA and that as one moves from the original split of the Hispanic Caucus, the pattern holds but to a weaker degree for the Black Caucus and liberal Democratic blocs.

To understand the passage of IRCA completely, it is necessary to look at its historical roots, the political debate it generated, and its economic impact. Finally, consideration is given to an evaluation of IRCA in achieving

its stated goals and what lessons can be learned from both its successes and failures.

III. Legislative History of IRCA

The first restrictions on immigration came late in the 19th century. Formal efforts to count immigrants began in 1819 when a legislative act required "the captain or master of a vessel to deliver to the local collector of customs a list or manifest of all passengers taken on board" (Bouvier and Gardner 1986, 9). Since then, the Congress has enacted numerous laws in an attempt to maintain the delicate balance between the "nation of immigrants" ideal and legal/illegal immigration.

In the 1890s, the U.S. experienced a surge in immigration lasting until 1920, with the peak decade of 1905-1914 showing over 10 million immigrants (Ibid, 9). In 1882, Congress passed the Chinese Exclusion Act, which barred the immigration of laborers from China for ten years; although Congress renewed the Act in 1892 and 1902, Congress rescinded it in 1943, when the U.S. and China were wartime allies (Bouvier and Gardner 1986, 11).

The Chinese Exclusion Act remains significant for various reasons. The most important, however, is the "precedent of this act as the first exclusion of a national

group was more important than its impact on immigrant numbers; at their peak, Chinese arrivals amounted only to 35,579, in 1882, compared to more than 250,000 from Germany in the same year, which was also Germany's peak year" (Bouvier and Gardner 1986, 11). In the same vein, Congress passed the Quota Act of 1921 and the 1924 National Origins Act that went far to limit the number of immigrants based on nationality and region from which they emigrated. The cumulative effect of these restrictive policies, coupled with the worldwide Depression of the 1930s, contributed to the overall decline of immigration to the United States.

Immigration picked up after World War II, but it was becoming clear that the nation's immigration laws were becoming more and more out of date as the U.S. had no system to deal separately with refugees (Bouvier and Gardner 1986, 11-12). In the wake of World War II, a wave of refugees from the devastation in Europe appealed for entry to the United States. Under the 1948 Displaced Persons Act, "Congress set up a refugee system separate from the apparatus that governed immigration, which over the next four years admitted 400,000 refugees" (Cited in Immigration Policy, The CQ Researcher 1993, 11).

Great changes in immigration policy were not in order in the 1950s. In 1952, Congress passed the Immigration and

Naturalization Act, a bill designed to maintain the status-quo of the quota system. The 1952 bill essentially "codified existing legislation, in some cases making the quota system even more rigid, although it granted a token quota to those nations in what is defined as the Asian Pacific Triangle'" (LeMay 1987, 104). However, as social concerns began to dominate the national agenda in the early 60s, immigration policy followed the trend by enacting legislation that relaxed many of the stricter policies of previous decades.

In 1965, responding to the more favorable attitude towards immigration, Congress passed The Immigration and Naturalization Act. The 1965 Act abolished the national origins quota system and the Asian Pacific Triangle provision and revised the previous preference categories into a new system of preferences favoring relatives of permanent resident aliens.⁵

Almost too soon, however, the 1965 Act became outdated in its provisions for refugees. During this period, the quota for refugees was 10,200, an adequate number. However, "events in Cuba, Vietnam, and Haiti soon outstripped the ability of that limit to begin to cope with the demand for entry based on refugee status" (LeMay 1987, 114). In addition, what constituted a "refugee" was troublesome as

well. Refugees from Cuba and Vietnam, or "political refugees" far outnumbered the "economic refugees" from Haiti and other similar countries. As economic refugees held to be fleeing dire economic conditions, not political repression, the Haitians were not allowed in under the refugee category (LeMay 1987, 116).

As problems worsened in these countries, the refugee and illegal alien problem in the United States reached greater numbers. Conflicts worldwide increased the number of war refugees dramatically. In an effort to absorb the number of refugees and deal with inadequate policy, Congress passed two measures, the 1976 Amendment to the Immigration and Naturalization Act and the 1980 Refugee Act. The 1976 Amendment modified the preference system to include migration from the Western Hemisphere, along with a 20,000 annual limit for each nation (Ibid, 115). The 1980 Refugee Act amended the 1965 act by "redefining 'refugee' to include those from anywhere in the world, not just communist countries or Middle Eastern nations" (Ibid, 115). Moreover, it expanded the "annual limit for refugees to 50,000 and raised total immigration from 290,000 to 320,000," as well as "strengthened the refugee procedures and gave the president greater powers to deal with emergency situations" (LeMay 1987, 115).

With the refugee problem seemingly handled by the 1980 law, Congress could now focus its attention on illegal immigration, a growing problem made more obvious by the changing influx of immigrants. In the late 1970s, the Carter Administration, in response to the growing influx of illegal immigrants and refugees to the United States, proposed new legislation calling for employer sanctions on those employers who knowingly hire illegal immigrants, an amnesty program to legalize those illegal aliens already in the U.S., and an increase in the enforcement capabilities of the nation's southern border. Critics of the proposed legislation, however, blasted the Carter Administration for "its failure to support its proposals with facts and adequately explore alternatives to illegal immigration" (Montweiler 1987, 4; LeMay 1994, 34).

The growing public anxiety over the estimated 500,000 to 1 million undocumented aliens who had entered the United States illegally by the end of the decade (1970-80) prompted Congress to establish a committee to study the refugee and illegal immigration problem (LeMay 1987, 115). The Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy (SCIRP) issued its first report in 1981 calling for "immediate action" on immigration reform. The SCIRP report, however, was not issued in consensus by the blue ribbon commission. Arizona

Governor Bruce Babbitt (R) declared, "The badly divided Select Commission's preliminary recommendations reflect a mixture of contradictory solutions, uneasy compromises, and old ideas" (Cited in U.S. Immigration Policy 1984, 125).

The SCIRP Commission's report was contradictory and unsettling for many reasons. Not only had the U.S. experienced over a century of immigration but it was also once again faced with an increasing size and changing composition of the immigrant population. Questions arose over how to deal with the largely Hispanic influx of illegal immigrants.

"The ending of the Bracero program in 1964 did not eliminate the cheap labor demand in the United States" (Bean et al. 1989, 10). Many Hispanic workers, a majority of whom were Mexican, entered the U.S. illegally to find jobs in agriculture or manufacturing. The rise in illegal immigration was attributed in part to the ending of the Bracero program itself. Undocumented workers were found in nearly every industry including agricultural work as well as some even at work refurbishing the Statue of Liberty (Bean et al. 1989, 10).

It is estimated that there are well over 20 million "Hispanics" living in the United States today. This catch-all phrase designates all people of Spanish descent without

regard to national origin. However, a 1990 Census Bureau report designates Hispanics as follows: Mexicans, 63%; Puerto Ricans, 12%; Central and South Americans, 12%; Cubans, 5%; and all Other Spanish Speaking, 8% (Adapted from LeMay 1994, 23). Facing a growing number of suspected illegal Hispanics in the U.S. prompted the SCIRP's inquiry.

Several possible explanations exist as to the large number of Hispanics entering the country illegally. This phenomenon can best be understood by looking at the economic, political, and social conditions at the U.S.-Mexican border since the early 1970s. "Although push and pull factors have always been involved in the immigration process, push factors seem to have played a more significant role in recent years" (LeMay 1994, 24). One of the most significant push factors has been the rapidly growing population in Mexico, Central and South America. The final report of the SCIRP committee suggested:

"One of the greatest pressures for international migration is and will be the world population. Projections of this growth show more than a 50 percent increase from 1975 to the year 2000, from 4 billion to 6.35 billion. It has been estimated that 92 percent of this growth will take place in countries whose resources are least able to accommodate the needs of new population...World economic and political instability would be threatened by the sudden, large scale population moves which could result from widespread political or economic chaos in developing nations". (1981a, 19-20) (Cited in LeMay 1994, 24).

The population boom in these countries has significantly contributed to the rise in illegal immigration to the U.S. The push factors, sputtering economies, lack of infrastructure, political upheaval, and social unrest, have sent immigrants to the U.S. border in larger numbers. However, the push factors alone are insufficient. The number one pull factor, the allure of the U.S. economy, still plays a central role in immigrants' decision to enter the country illegally.

Illegal immigration increased in part because of economic incentives between employers and workers. An important consideration for U.S. employers was that U.S. law specifically "exempted the employment of undocumented or illegal aliens from the category of illegal acts" (Bean et al. 1989, 20). Immigration policy in the U.S. at the time declared "it was illegal for an alien to take a job without proper documents, but not illegal for an employer to hire an undocumented migrant" (Bean et al. 1989, 20). Free from criminal charges, U.S. employers exploited the opportunity to produce goods at lower costs, due in large part to lower labor costs. The undocumented migrant, in return, enjoyed the benefits of a higher paying job, an opportunity not readily available in his or her own country. Perhaps the greatest of these benefits, a higher salary, made it

possible for illegal immigrants not only to support themselves here in the U.S., but also to support family back home with much of the money earned.

As a consequence of the growing rate of illegal immigration, one concern of U.S. citizens was whether illegal immigrants drove down wages and working conditions. "Some economists argued that illegal immigrants filled an 'economic wage' niche; that is, their jobs paid wages low enough to allow the employer to make a profit" and is therefore beneficial to the U.S. economy (LeMay 1994, 26). A sharp decline in the supply or availability of cheap labor could cause those businesses to leave the area in search of cheaper labor, replace the workers with machines, or simply go out of business (LeMay 1994, 26). And, moreover, some economists argue that illegal immigrants take jobs that U.S. citizens wouldn't take because of the low wage earned. Cheap labor keeps the price of many goods and services at levels U.S. citizens enjoy and they therefore benefit from the presence of illegal aliens in the work force.⁶

Another consequence of the growing influx and changing composition of illegal immigrants was the crisis of border control. The attention of U.S. citizens focused on the U.S.-Mexico border where control and order seemed impossible. The underfunded and understaffed INS couldn't

keep up with the number of immigrants needing their service. "Problems of corruption flowed naturally from the tremendous pressures for immigration coupled with restrictions on legal immigration and the inefficiency of the INS" (LeMay 1994, 25). A lack of resources combined with the sense of lost control led the INS to "engage in more secondary enforcement activities to locate illegal aliens: stopping traffic at checkpoints; watching air, bus, and train terminal passengers; checking ranches and other areas of employment that have had traditionally high level of illegal aliens; and, following up on specific leaks" (LeMay 1994, 25-26).

The influx of illegal Hispanic and Latino immigrants gave rise to social concerns among U.S. citizens as well. Among the concerns were bilingualism, assimilation, and costs for benefits from social programs. Many U.S. citizens feared the slow cultural assimilation and language accumulation process (i.e. learning to speak, read and write English) of immigrants would hurt U.S. cultural processes, especially for young children. Fear that immigrants were increasingly unable or unwilling to assimilate only furthered U.S. concerns (LeMay 1994, 27).

Collectively, these factors help explain why immigration reform was forced on the public agenda by the

growing concerns expressed by U.S. citizens over the economic, social, and political consequences of the rise in illegal immigration. This growing concern set the stage for the six-year political debate that eventually yielded the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. IRCA's provisions have a long and detailed history stemming from the SCIRP Commission's report in 1981.

IV. Preliminary Proposals and IRCA's Provisions

The road to enactment was long and strenuous for those Senators and Representatives most directly involved. The final version of IRCA passed in the House on October 15, 1986 by a vote of 238 to 173. The Senate then approved it on October 17, by a 63 to 24 vote, and it was signed into law by then President Reagan on November 6, 1986. IRCA was a "significant shift in public policy, marked by the long, difficult legislative maneuvering on the issue" (LeMay 1994, 29). To understand how IRCA arrived at its final version, it is necessary to briefly examine some of the various bills and proposals that led up to the enactment of IRCA.

The Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy (SCIRP) issued its final report in January 1981 and provided the first step towards an overhaul of U.S. immigration policy. The crux of the SCIRP report

recommended "closing the back door to undocumented immigration while opening slightly the front door to accommodate more legal immigration" (LeMay 1994, 35). To achieve this end, the SCIRP report suggested the "enforcement of existing immigration laws through the imposition of employer sanctions, increased law enforcement, an amnesty program, and a restructuring of legal immigration" (LeMay 1994, 36). As Governor Babbitt pointed out, most of these ideas had been proposed before. The importance of the work of the commission was the way in which all of these proposals were linked together. "The impact of the SCIRP report was to legitimize the duality of the employer sanctions and legalization approach; in essence, you cannot have one without the other" (LeMay 1994, 36). The U.S. couldn't hope to be successful in solving the problem of illegal immigration by employing one or two of these proposals at a time; one had to combine all of them for optimal results, in spite of the contradictions among them.

On July 30, 1981, the Reagan Administration responded to the SCIRP report by announcing its immigration proposals. The administration proposed that illegal aliens who arrived before January 1, 1980, be granted a status of "renewable term temporary resident." After 10 years of continuous

residence in the U.S., "a temporary resident could apply for permanent status if he/she could demonstrate English speaking capabilities" (Cited in U.S. Immigration Policy, Hofstetter 1984, 126).

The second major provision proposed by the Reagan Administration was sanctions against employers of unauthorized workers. Unlike the SCIRP report that couldn't agree on the type of identity card which would enable an employer to verify the legality of a worker, the Reagan plan called for "the employer to examine any two pieces of identification--including birth certificate, driver's license, and Social Security card" (Cited in U.S. Immigration Policy, Hofstetter 1984, 127). The Reagan plan also called for a guest worker program allowing 50,000 Mexicans annually to come and work temporarily, increasing the budget of the INS by 50 percent, adding 1,500 officers to the Border Patrol to enhance the enforcement of immigration and labor laws, and allowing 600,000 new immigrants to the U.S. annually (LeMay 1994, 37).

The lead in immigration reform was taken by the chairmen of the House and Senate Judiciary subcommittees, Representative Romano Mazzoli (D.-KY) and Senator Alan Simpson (R.-WY). Simpson and Mazzoli "translated the recommendations of the SCIRP commission and the Reagan

Administration into legislative proposals they considered to contain the essential provisions to serve as incentives for the competing groups to cooperate" (LeMay 1994, 38).

Simpson and Mazzoli conducted the first joint hearings on immigration reform in 35 years and in 1982 they introduced their first joint comprehensive bill which: 1) imposed harsh sanctions (fines and jail time) for employers who knowingly hired illegal aliens, 2) granted permanent resident status for aliens living in the U.S. since January 1, 1978, and 3) broadened the H-2 program for foreign agricultural workers (Montweiler 1987, 6; LeMay 1994, 37-48). Their reform bill contained many of the same ideas proposed by the Carter Administration in 1979 and, like it, received almost immediate criticism from business groups, such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce--which opposed employer sanctions as costly and unworkable--and from Hispanic and civil rights groups who feared the bill was potentially discriminatory. Critics of the employer sanctions approach, led by Sen. Edward M. Kennedy, argued that employer sanctions would lead to increased discrimination against Hispanics, who would be denied jobs on the sole basis of their appearance and names by employers who were fearful of the sanctions provision (Montweiler 1987, 7; LeMay 1994, 40).

Despite Kennedy's opposition, the bill passed in the Senate by a wide margin but was defeated in the House, where it lacked support for its controversial provisions. By the time the Simpson-Mazzoli bill reached the floor in the House, over 300 amendments had been filed, showing the strong opposition the bill faced in that forum (LeMay 1994, 41). The opposition came mostly from Hispanics who feared additional discrimination from employers, given the employer sanctions provision.

Simpson and Mazzoli tried again in 1983 by reintroducing similar versions of their bills that had been passed in the Senate or House Judiciary committee in 1982. Again, the bill passed in the Senate but failed to pass in the House, suffering from opposition by various Hispanic organizations. The ever-growing opposition gained enough support to prompt House Speaker Tip O'Neill to block the bill from reaching the floor in 1983 (Montweiler 1987, 8).

What became the final effort of Senator Simpson began in 1985. In May, Sen. Simpson introduced a new version of his bill without the co-sponsorship of Rep. Mazzoli who "declined to sponsor the bill without the support of the Democratic House leadership and from the Black and Hispanic Caucuses, who strenuously opposed it" (LeMay 1994, 46). A second bill, sponsored by Representative Peter Rodino (D.-

NJ) and Rep. Mazzoli, provided for civil and criminal penalties for employers who knowingly hired illegal aliens and established an amnesty for aliens who had immigrated to the U.S. before 1982. "To discourage discrimination against Hispanics, it created the Office of Special Counsel in the Justice Department that was empowered to investigate and prosecute civil rights violators" (LeMay 1994, 47-78).

The final version of IRCA contained a number of controversial provisions that significantly delayed its passage. It is important to look at them in some detail before analyzing the events leading to the split within the Hispanic Caucus that served as a cue to the Black Caucus and liberal Democrats to vote for IRCA. (The following summary is adapted from those listed in Montweiler 1987, 24-28, and LeMay 1994, 55-57).

Employer Sanctions

- IRCA prohibits employers from knowingly or unknowingly hiring, recruiting, or referring for a fee aliens not authorized to work in the United States.
- Employees must attest under penalty of perjury that they verified and can provide copies of appropriate documentation confirming the right to work using such acceptable forms as a U.S. passport, certificate of U.S.

citizenship, resident alien card, social security card, driver's license, or U.S. birth certificate.

- Employees must attest, on a form provided and retained by the employer, their legal right to work in the U.S..
- Sanctions apply to all employers equally, regardless of size. Penalties range from \$250 to \$2,000 for the first offense for each alien involved, to \$3,000 to \$10,000 for a third offense and criminal penalties up to six months in prison for a pattern of violations.
- During the first six months of enactment, no sanctions would be levied, and during the next year a citation would be levied.
- Sanctions will terminate if after three years the Comptroller General has determined they resulted in discrimination or caused employers unnecessary burden.

Antidiscrimination Provisions

- IRCA prohibits discrimination based on national origin and barred employers from discriminating against permanent resident aliens.
- IRCA created an Office of Special Counsel in the Department of Justice to enforce antidiscrimination provisions.

- Employers of three or less employees are exempt from the anti-discrimination provisions.
- Complaints must be filed within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory action, and the special counsel is directed to investigate each charge within 120 days of receipt.
- The anti-discrimination provision will be terminated if the sanctions are repealed by joint congressional resolution.

Legalization

- IRCA establishes a procedure for granting temporary status to aliens who entered the U.S. illegally prior to January 1, 1982, and who have resided continuously in the country since.
- Aliens must apply for legalization during a 12-month period beginning no later than six months after the bill's November 6, 1986 enactment.
- Funds totaling \$1 billion for each of four fiscal years will be appropriated to reimburse states for the costs resulting from the legalization program.
- Newly legalized aliens will be ineligible for most forms of public assistance for a five-year period.

Temporary Farmworkers

- Program: IRCA changes the existing H-2 program, which provides for the admission of foreign workers to perform temporary labor when a shortage of labor exists.
- Special Agricultural Workers Program (SAW): IRCA provides a new agricultural program that gives temporary resident status to a maximum of 350,000 illegal aliens who can prove they have worked in perishable agriculture for at least 90 days in the last three years.

V. Legislative Strategy and Intent

Before moving to an evaluation of IRCA, it is necessary to outline briefly the legislative strategy and intent behind IRCA. A better understanding of the intent of the bill, can only aid in an evaluation of its goals. Each of the provisions in IRCA had been heavily debated as to the merits and demerits of its inclusion. The final bill was a compromise, and it had to be in order to secure enough votes for enactment. Therefore, "discerning the implied theory or legislative intent of the policymakers helps us when analyzing policy to focus on the relationship among the problem definition, policy enactment, implementation, and policy results or impact on the environment" (LeMay 1994, 71).

As stated before, many of the ideas in IRCA were not new. They have been tried and debated before, but the unique quality of IRCA is that it "represents a law that embodies immigration policy, as well as employment, agricultural labor, civil rights, welfare, and federal reimbursement policies" (LeMay 1994, 71). This holistic approach to solving the problem of illegal immigration is exactly what legislators intended with a bill such as IRCA.

IRCA's primary purpose was to "de-magnetize" the pull of a comparatively prosperous U.S. economy. In passing IRCA, Congress increased the number and scope of targets. IRCA "created conditions that made it more problematic for undocumented aliens already in the country to remain, and, for those still in sending nations, to be less ready to come" (LeMay 1994, 71). Through economic sanctions, IRCA sought to reduce the incentive of U.S. employers looking for cheap labor. In theory, if employers were less willing to hire undocumented aliens, aliens would be less likely to cross the border.

IRCA is a unique law in that it is both time-bound and contingent legislation (Ibid, 71). The amnesty programs included in IRCA "were designed for a one time grant of amnesty, all phases of which were to have been completed by September 1990" (LeMay 1994, 71). And finally, the employer

sanctions provisions were contingent upon no findings of discrimination against foreign-born individuals. Employer sanctions "could be terminated after three years by a joint Congressional resolution if the General Accounting Office were to find that they had caused a widespread pattern of discrimination" (Ibid, 71).

Supporters of IRCA made several assumptions on which they based their support for the provisions in IRCA. IRCA was written to deal with five areas of contention. (The following summary is adapted from LeMay 1994, 72-73).

1. The problem was "primarily of economic factors pulling immigrants into the United States rather than political or economic conditions in the sending countries that acted to push citizens out".
2. A second problem was "derived from a sort of legal formalism that sought to ensure that U.S. laws were consistent with each other and that practice generally reflected the intent of such laws". This was especially important in the case of IRCA. With regards to the employer sanctions and antidiscrimination provisions, supporters felt that the actual practice of employers and government agencies reflected the intent of the law.

3. IRCA was simply a "jobs bill" for some legislators that protected the employment of native born and legal American workers from illegal ones.

4. IRCA's proponents also "saw limits on continuing to rely solely on traditional border and interior enforcement aimed at apprehending and deporting illegal aliens". Improvement in these areas required increases in enforcement personnel.

5. "Finally, as with most U.S. immigration law, a nativist sentiment also shaped the manner in which policymakers defined the problem they were addressing".

IRCA assumed that the employer sanctions provision would impose only minimal costs on employers. IRCA established "an educational period of six months during which time the INS would inform U.S. companies of their new obligations under IRCA" (LeMay 1994, 76). IRCA also allowed employers to retain undocumented workers obtained before IRCA's enactment without the penalty of fines or criminal prosecution. Finally, IRCA set up a system of "affirmative defense" for employers. This meant that employers were not responsible to verify the validity of acceptable documents; they just had to keep records showing the type of identification used to prove legal right to work in the U.S. (Ibid, 71).

Finally, IRCA was enacted with the understanding that the INS would assume a substantial majority of the work created by IRCA. This was a reasonable expectation in that the duties fell under the INS' umbrella, but little consideration is given to the fact that the INS was strained as is. The INS has a notorious reputation for inefficiency. For example, one journalistic account called the INS the "worst managed, least effective federal agency in Washington" (Cited in LeMay 1994, 77). A lack of funding, resources, and personnel made the INS' job already difficult, not counting the new burdens of IRCA. According to McDonnell and Hill:

"In sum, Congressional efforts to shape IRCA's implementing context were largely confined to its choice of the INS as the major implementing agency, and its imposition of implementation constraints in the form of the GAO reports and expedited procedures for employer sanctions and the limited time frame for legalization. It gave little consideration to questions of organizational capacity, and quite explicitly decided to allow inconsistencies across provisions within IRCA; its inattention to possible interaction between IRCA and other policies was less purposeful" (Cited in LeMay 1994, 78).

VI. Drawing and Re-Drawing the Battle Ground on IRCA

The final passage of IRCA was preceded by a number of compromises on key provisions among members of Congress. The main goal of the bill was directed at reducing illegal immigration; however, "a legalization program was required

by advocates of ethnic and religious groups whose supporters in Congress were strong enough to prohibit an employer sanctions bill unless it contained such a program" (Bean et al. 1989, 25). As IRCA moved closer to enactment, it underwent a series of metamorphoses. Congressional compromises were essential to resurrect the bill from the morgue. In 1982 and 1983, similar versions of the bill passed in the Senate, but IRCA did not enjoy the same result in the House. IRCA needed and got congressional compromise, which "resulted in a multi-faceted bill with implications that exceeded control of illegal immigration" (Bean et al. 1989, 25).

In late September, IRCA appeared to be headed for defeat again, this time on a deadlock over the temporary farmworkers provision. The controversial program was designed to "assure Western growers, who have historically relied on an illegal workforce, that they will have an adequate supply of labor to harvest crops" (Cohodas 1986, 2595). The farmworker program would provide temporary resident status for up to 350,000 foreigners who could prove they have worked in perishable agriculture for at least 90 days (Cohodas 1986, 2595).

The compromise on the temporary farm worker provision was made possible in part by the efforts of Representative

Charles Schumer (D.-NY), Rep. Rodino, Rep. Howard Berman (D.-CA), Rep. Leon Panetta (D.-CA), and Rep. Dan Lundgren (D.-CA). "Rep. Schumer's negotiated compromise on the temporary farm workers provision also split the opposition to the bill among growers," leaving a one time cohesive opposing force to IRCA badly splintered (LeMay 1994, 52).

A second significant compromise came when the House members agreed to the Senate version of the bill without an automatic end to employer sanctions, one provision House members fervently opposed. "In exchange for the compromise, the Senate agreed to a three year annual review of the employer sanctions program by the General Accounting Office, at which time the program could be terminated by a joint resolution if the Comptroller General determined that the employer sanctions program had resulted in widespread discrimination" (LeMay 1994, 54).

IRCA was unable to secure passage in 1982 and 1983 because of the continued opposition in the House. Representatives were being pressured by special interest, religious, and economic groups who were fearful of the employer sanctions provision and who also feared that Representative Frank's (D.-MA.) anti-discrimination provisions were not enough. IRCA was doomed to failure until pressure from these groups subsided. The late hour

compromises were significant enough to satisfy five of the eleven Hispanic Caucus members who felt extreme pressure to oppose the bill from various organizations, such as MALDEF, the Roman Catholic Church, and the ACLU.

The turning point in IRCA's long battle came with the split of the Hispanic Caucus members. Recognizing the time and effort invested in an immigration bill, Rep. Bill Richardson commented, "I think this bill is better than nothing. It was the last gasp for legalization to take place in a humane way" (Cohodas 1986, 2595). The members of the Hispanic Caucus who had previously opposed IRCA, but cast a vote in favor of the final version of the bill did so reluctantly. Feeling this bill was the best compromise attainable, Rep. Albert Bustamante stated, "I will support this imperfect bill because I am committed to doing something about immigration policy" (Cited in LeMay 1994, 58).

The split in the Hispanic Caucus was made possible by last minute efforts by key congressmen to save the bill. The five members of the Hispanic Caucus that voted for IRCA, Albert Bustamante (D.-TX), Tony Coelho (D.-CA), Solomon Ortiz (D.-TX), Bill Richardson (D.-NM), and Esteban Torres (D.-CA), felt that the continued influx of illegal immigrants into the country "fueled the growing anti-

Hispanic sentiment and that IRCA was the best bill attainable to respond to that sentiment" (Ibid, 58). The six remaining members of the Hispanic Caucus maintained their original position voting against IRCA in the final vote: E. Kika de la Garza (D.-TX), Don Edwards (D.-CA), Robert Garcia (D.-NY), Henry Gonzales (D.-TX), Matthew Martinez (D.-CA), and Edward Roybal (D.-CA). They argued that the central tenet of the bill, employer sanctions, was a failed concept proven ineffective both domestically and abroad, and they opposed the Seasonal Agricultural Workers (SAW) program as economic exploitation (Ibid, 58).

VII. Analysis of the Enactment of IRCA- The House

This study relies on a traditional roll call analysis of HR469 to measure the association of four explanatory variables (tenure, ideological liberalism of the member, the percent minority population of the member's district, and the 1984 presidential vote in the member's district). Roll call analysis is useful to demonstrate the voting patterns of House members belonging to specific coalitions or voting blocs. The value of a roll call analysis is evident when linked to voting patterns demonstrating members as belonging to specified coalitions. It allows an analysis of how a coalition, especially its cue setters or opinion leaders,

perceive policy issues differently (Schneider 1979, 100; Jackson 1974).

The traditional view of congressional behavior focuses upon group behavior as a primary influence. It also focuses on the premise that how congressional members assess a vote's impact on their re-election as a concern affecting the capacity of Congress to make public policy (Mayhew 1974; Fiorina 1989; Arnold 1990). In considering the leadership role of the Hispanic Caucus on the IRCA vote, I examined whether the indicators associated with the Hispanic Caucus members' vote can be extrapolated to the Black Caucus and liberal Democrats to account for their vote on IRCA. A roll call vote "properly interpreted in the terms in which the different members, especially cue setters, perceived the purpose of their vote, allows for a systematic test of the cohesiveness of the opposing political forces with respect to many different issues and of the consistency of the cleavages from one issue or set of issues to another" (Schneider 1979, 101). That is to say that the cohesiveness of opposing groups can be systematically tested across a number of 'cross-cutting' or 'cleavage' issues. "The determination of cohesiveness or consistency of opposing forces, such as ideological constraints, exists in Congressional policymaking, from which can be extrapolated

explanations of past or possible legislative outcomes" (Schneider 1979, 101-02).

Consideration of characteristics of the member's district has long been involved in the research of legislative behavior. Many studies have shown that representatives who come from districts that are most typical of the parties tend to show the highest degree of party loyalty on roll calls (Jewell and Patterson 1973, 465).

A review of the literature on constituency influence indicates that much of the variation in the individual representative's pattern of voting and party loyalty "cannot be explained by any socioeconomic or electoral data in the district since not all roll call votes directly affect a representative's district" (Jewell and Patterson 1973, 469-70). In this case, the representative is free to turn to others for advice, accepting the view of a trusted friend or political ally on an issue less important to his/her district. Research shows "that the sources of voting cues within the legislative body are often more important than sources from the legislator's district even on some bills that affect the interests of important groups in a district" (Jewell and Patterson 1973, 473).

Roll call analyses on the influence of cue sources suggest association with the four variables. Two are associated with the individual representative--tenure and the degree of the legislator's liberalism. First, tenure in office is often an important factor in a representative's vote. With the IRCA vote coming late in 1986, the year 1978 was selected as a reasonable point of divergence. Those representatives elected prior to and including the 1978 election were considered to have a "safe seat" and thus were projected to vote their "conscience" against IRCA, while those elected after 1978 were more likely to vote for IRCA.

The second variable examined for association with the IRCA vote was the individual representative's degree of ideological liberalism. A liberalism index was comprised of scores on three indicators: his/her Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) score, American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) score, and Committee on Political Education of the AFL-CIO (COPE) score. The general rating of these three groups provide a measure of the legislator's political ideology and the degree to which the legislator represents the different group's interests. The scores range across issues concerning both the individual and the group; it is not simply a record of liberal/conservative voting behavior (Barone and Ujifusa 1985, 1987, xvi). A legislator's degree

of liberalism was measured by having a combined score of 80 or greater on the ADA, ACLU, and COPE scores. Democrats having a combined score of 50 or greater were included as "liberal." Those scoring 80 or above were "very liberal." Those who averaged 50 to 80 were "moderately liberal." It was postulated that a member who scored an average of 80 or higher on the index (very liberal) was more likely to oppose IRCA, while those representatives scoring above 50 but below 80 (moderately liberal) were more likely to vote for IRCA.

Two variables associated with the representative's district were examined--how the district voted in the 1984 presidential election and the total minority population as a percentage of its total population. It was postulated that representatives who came from a district that voted for Mondale were expected to more likely vote against IRCA, while those representatives whose districts voted for Reagan were more likely to vote for IRCA, and representatives whose district had 60 percent or more racial and Latino minorities were projected to oppose IRCA, while those whose district had less than 60 percent racial and Latino minorities were more likely to vote for IRCA.

Association between the votes on IRCA and the explanatory variables was measured using Lambda (L) and Yule's Q. The statistic Lambda is a coefficient used to

measure the association between nominal variables. Lambda allows us to determine the influence of a second variable and the extent to which it reduces the number of errors made without knowing that variable (Nachmias 1992; Andrews et al., 1981). The Lambda score represents the advantage gained in correctly predicting the dependent variable. A Lambda score of $L = .60$ indicates that knowing the independent variable improve ones chances of correctly guessing the dependent variable by 60 percent.

A second nominal measure, Yule's Q, is used to measure the association of the variable for liberal Democrats and all of Congress. Because Lambda cannot account for the large differences in the cells, Yule's Q is used to accommodate the variance. A Yule's Q measure is similar to that of Lambda in that the resulting score is the percentage gained in accurately predicting the dependent variable.

Chi-square is a common measure of statistical significance that indicates whether a measure of the strength of a relationship is statistically significant. The chi square value and the degrees of freedom are compared on a table to determine the level of probability that the relationship found in the sample exists in the universal population being tested. The probability tells us the extent to which the relationship is significant. A

probability of .05 tells us that we can be sure a relationship exists between the variables 95% of the time.

VIII. Results of This Study

The results of this study do show association between the four variables and the IRCA vote. As expected, as one moves farther away from the original split of the Hispanic Caucus, the pattern holds but to a lesser degree. Properly understood, IRCA is the result of significant compromises by both liberals and conservatives on immigration reform. Key compromises on several contentious provisions split the votes of blocs in Congress. The nature of immigration reform naturally tends to be divisive, and true to its nature, the immigration vote cut across party lines and voting blocs. Although IRCA's provisions applied to illegal immigrants of all nationalities, not surprisingly it focused on the problem of illegal Hispanic immigration. For reasons previously mentioned, the crisis at the U.S./Mexican border brought immigration law reform to the table. As a result, the Hispanic Caucus assumed a leadership role in the debate in Congress.

The Hispanic Caucus provided arguments and leadership that were a model for members of the Black Caucus and liberal Democrats. The split in the Hispanic Caucus was

significant because both the Black Caucus and liberal Democrats took their cue from the Hispanic Caucus. The split in the Hispanic caucus signaled those members who looked to the Hispanic Caucus for leadership that it was acceptable to vote for IRCA. The split was significant in that it divided enough of the liberal bloc of votes on IRCA to secure its passage. The split within the Hispanic Caucus developed as key compromises, particularly the explicit anti-discrimination provisions and the guest worker program, proved to be acceptable to five of the eleven caucus members.

Table 1

**Congressional Hispanic Caucus Vote on IRCA
Tenure, Liberalism, Percent Minority & Presidential Vote**

Tenure	+1978	-1978	Total	Liberalism	+80	+80	Total
Against	1	5	6	Against	5	1	6
For	4	1	5	For	0	5	5
Total	5	6	11	Total	5	6	11

Lambda= .60
Chi Square= 4.27; df= 1
.05 Level of Probability

Lambda= .80
Chi Square= 4.27; df= 1
.05 Level of Probability

%Minority	+60%	-60%	Total	Pres. Vote	Mondale	Reagan	Total
Against	4	2	6	Against	3	3	6
For	0	5	5	For	0	5	5
Total	4	7	11	Total	3	8	11

Lambda= .60
Chi Square= 5.25; df= 1
.05 Level of Probability

Lambda= .40
Chi Square= 5.25; df= 1
.05 Level of Probability

Table 1 shows the association of the four variables and the IRCA vote. Each of the four variables associate with the IRCA vote to a statistically significant degree--that is, at a .05 level of probability.

Taking their cue from the Hispanic Caucus, the Congressional Black Caucus split evenly on the IRCA vote, nine each way. The members who voted against IRCA are George W. Crockett (D.-MI), Ronald V. Dellums (D.-CA), Mervyn Dymally (D.-CA), Augustus Hawkins (D.-CA), Charles Hayes (D.-IL), Mickey D. Leland (D.-TX), Charles Rangel (D.-NY), Gus Savage (D.-IL), and Edolphus Towns (D.-NY). The Black Caucus supported the position of the Hispanic Caucus throughout the four years of debate on IRCA (LeMay 1994, 52). It was not until the split within the Hispanic Caucus that members of the Black Caucus also split their vote. The members who voted for IRCA are William Clay (D.-MO), Cardiss Collins (D.-IL), Julian C. Dixon (D.-CA), Harold Ford (D.-TN), William Gray (D.-PA), Parren J. Mitchell (D.-MD), Major Owens (D.-NY), Louis Stokes (D.-OH), and Alan Wheat (D.-MO).

Table 2 shows the Lambda scores of the Black Caucus votes on the four variables. The results of the Black Caucus scores are interesting because, as predicted, the pattern held but to a lesser degree for the Black Caucus than for the Hispanic Caucus. Two variables, tenure and

percent minority, did not show statistically significant scores. However, liberalism and presidential vote showed an absolute advantage in knowing the independent variable.

Table 2

Congressional Black Caucus Vote on IRCA							
Tenure, Liberalism, Percent Minority & Presidential Vote							
Tenure	+1978	-1978	Total	Liberalism	+80	-80	Total
Against	5	4	9	Against	9	0	9
For	2	7	9	For	9	0	9
Total	7	11	18	Total	18	0	18
Lambda= .33 Chi Square= 2.11; df= 1 .20 Level of Probability				Lambda= 0 Absolute Advantage Chi Square= 0.0; df= 1			
% Minority	+60%	-60%	Total	Pres. Vote	Mondale	Reagan	Total
Against	8	1	9	Against	9	0	9
For	6	3	9	For	9	0	9
Total	14	8	18	Total	18	0	18
Lambda= .22 Chi Square= 1.30; df= 1 .30 Level of Probability				Lambda= 0 Absolute Advantage Chi Square= 0.0; df= 1			

A third voting bloc examined was the liberal Democrats. As a voting bloc, liberal Democrats possess a significant influence on policy outcomes based on their large number. A legislator's degree of liberalism, as previously mentioned, was measured by having a combined score of 80 or greater on the ADA, ACLU, and COPE scores. There were 72 very liberal and 101 moderately liberal Democrats (this excludes members

of the Black and Hispanic Caucuses to avoid double counting).

Table 3 shows the split of the liberal Democrats on IRCA as 133 in favor, 40 opposed. (See Appendix H and I for voting information).

Table 3

Congressional Liberal Democrats Vote on IRCA
Tenure, Liberalism, Percent Minority & Presidential Vote

Tenure	+1978	-1978	Total	Liberalism	+80	+80	Total
Against	17	23	40	Against	11	29	40
For	53	80	133	For	61	72	133
Total	70	103	173	Total	72	101	173

Yule's Q= .06
Chi Square= .09; df= 1
.80 Level of Probability

Yule's Q= .39
Chi Square= 4.28; df= 1
.05 Level of Probability

%Minority	+60%	-60%	Total	Pres. Vote	Mondale	Reagan	Total
Against	2	38	40	Against	15	25	40
For	3	130	133	For	25	108	133
Total	5	168	173	Total	40	133	173

Yule's Q= .39
Chi Square= .85; df= 1
.50 Level of Probability

Yule's Q= .44
Chi Square= 6.05; df= 1
.02 Level of Probability

As predicted, the patterns hold in the relationships but to a weaker degree than for the Hispanic Caucus. Liberalism and the presidential vote variables were associated at a statistically significant level of probability, whereas tenure and percent minority were not.

Table 4 shows the scores of the roll call vote on IRCA for the entire House. (See Appendix J and K for voting information). Once again, liberalism and the presidential vote variables yield a statistically significant association, whereas tenure and percent minority do not. In each of the three groups analyzed after the Hispanic Caucus, liberalism and presidential vote associate with the IRCA vote to a statistically significant level of probability. As predicted, the pattern held as one moved away from the original split of the Hispanic Caucus.

Table 4

**Congressional Roll Call Vote on IRCA
Tenure, Liberalism, Percent Minority & Presidential Vote**

Tenure	+1978	-1978	Total	Liberalism	+80	-80	Total
Against	91	80	171	Against	27	144	171
For	135	98	233	For	72	161	233
Total	226	178	404	Total	99	305	404

Yule's Q= .22
Chi Square= 3.73; df= 1
.10 Level of Probability

Yule's Q= .32
Chi Square= 12.20; df= 1
.001 Level of Probability

% Minority	+60%	-60%	Total	Pres. Vote	Mondale	Reagan	Total
Against	14	157	171	Against	30	141	171
For	9	224	233	For	35	198	233
Total	23	381	404	Total	65	339	404

Yule's Q= .38
Chi Square= .85; df= 1
.50 Level of Probability

Yule's Q= .09
Chi Square= 6.05; df= 1
.02 Level of Probability

As a variable, tenure did not prove to associate with the IRCA vote as expected. It is argued that the representatives chose their vote on IRCA for other reasons rather than being concerned for re-election. For those representatives elected after 1978, a vote in favor of IRCA did not threaten their constituency enough for the representative to worry about electoral outcomes in the next election. The percent minority population as a percentage of the whole also did not associate with the IRCA vote. I examined whether or not the percentage of the district population that was Hispanic alone predicted the member's vote on IRCA.

Table 5 presents the data on the forty liberal Democrats who opposed IRCA, comparing their respective district's percent population Hispanic with its total minority population. Of the 40 liberal Democrats who voted against IRCA, seven had ten percent or greater Hispanic population in their district, whereas in 13 districts minorities comprised at least a quarter of the population. In fact, only one Congressman--Coleman (D.-TX) had a district over 50% Hispanic. The total percent minority in the district seems more important factor in influencing a member's vote.

Table 5

Liberal Democrats Voting Against IRCA
Percent Hispanic and Percent Total Minority

Member Name	District	% Hispanic	% Total Minority
Akaka, (D) HI	2nd Dist.	7%	64%
Andrews, (D) TX	25th Dist.	12%	35%
Applegate, (D) OH	18th Dist.	0%	2%
Biaggi, (D) NY	19th Dist.	13%	25%
Boggs, (D) LA	2nd Dist.	3%	56%
Boner, (D) TN	5th Dist.	1%	21%
Boxer, (D) CA	6th Dist.	5%	23%
Burton, (D) CA	5th Dist.	9%	41%
Burton, (D) CA	6th Dist.	1%	4%
Carr, (D) MI	6th Dist.	2%	9%
Coleman, (D) TX	16th Dist.	55%	60%
Erdreich, (D) AL	6th Dist.	1%	32%
Evans, (D) IL	17th Dist.	2%	4%
Frost, (D) TX	24th Dist.	11%	41%
Gaydos, (D) PA	20th Dist.	0%	5%
Gordon, (D) TN	6th Dist.	1%	8%
Guarini, (D) NJ	14th Dist.	24%	38%
Hall, (D) OH	3rd Dist.	1%	17%
Hertel, (D) MI	14th Dist.	1%	6%
Horton, (D) NY	29th Dist.	1%	5%
Hughes, (D) NJ	2nd Dist.	3%	15%
Jacobs, (D) IN	10th Dist.	1%	26%
Jones, (D) NC	1st Dist.	1%	33%
Jones, (D) TN	8th Dist.	1%	19%
Kaptur, (D) OH	9th Dist.	2%	13%
Kleczka, (D) WI	4th Dist.	3%	3%
Kolter, (D) PA	4th Dist.	0%	2%
Mineta, (D) CA	13th Dist.	10%	19%
Murphy, (D) PA	22nd Dist.	0%	3%
Neal, (D) NC	5th Dist.	1%	1%
Oakar, (D) OH	20th Dist.	2%	5%
Olin, (D) VA	6th Dist.	1%	11%
Rinaldo, (D) NJ	7th Dist.	7%	18%
Russo, (D) NJ	3rd Dist.	3%	9%
Schroeder, (D) CO	1st Dist.	15%	28%
Staggers, (D) WV	2nd Dist.	1%	4%
Stratton, (D) NY	23rd Dist.	1%	6%

Traficant, (D) OH	17th	Dist.	1%	11%
Visclosky, (D) IN	1st	Dist.	7%	29%
Yatron, (D) PA	6th	Dist.	1%	2%

A similar comparison of the entire House was done. (See Table 6) I examined whether or not the percentage of the district population that was Hispanic alone predicted the member's vote against IRCA. Of the 171 members who voted against IRCA, 29 had districts where Hispanics comprised at least ten percent of the total population. Of the 29, only eleven districts had fifty percent or greater total minority as a district. However, of the 171 members who voted against IRCA, seventeen had districts with more than fifty percent total minority, and 46 districts minorities comprised at least twenty-five percent of the total population. The members who voted against IRCA did so because of large minority populations within their districts, although the minority population was a relatively low percentage of the total population in most cases.

Table 6

Congressional Votes Against IRCA
Percent Hispanic and Percent Total Minority

Member Name	District	% Hispanic	% Total Minority
Akaka, (D) HI	2nd Dist.	7%	64%

Andrews, (D) TX	25th	Dist.	12%	35%
Applegate, (D) OH	18th	Dist.	0%	0%
Archer, (D) TX	7th	Dist.	6%	11%
Armey, (R) TX	26th	Dist.	4%	8%
Barnard, (R) IN	1st	Dist.	1%	5%
Bartlett, (R) TX	3rd	Dist.	3%	7%
Barton, (R) TX	6th	Dist.	5%	15%
Bateman, (R) VA	1st	Dist.	1%	31%
Bentley, (R) MD	2nd	Dist.	1%	7%
Bevill, (R) AL	4th	Dist.	1%	7%
Biaggi, (D) NY	19th	Dist.	13%	25%
Bilirakis, (R) FL	9th	Dist.	2%	5%
Bliley, (R) VA	3rd	Dist.	1%	28%
Boggs, (D) LA	2nd	Dist.	3%	56%
Boner, (D) TN	5th	Dist.	1%	21%
Boulter, (R) TX	13th	Dist.	7%	13%
Boxer, (D) CA	6th	Dist.	5%	23%
Broomfield, (R) MI	17th	Dist.	1%	3%
Brown, (R) CO	4th	Dist.	11%	12%
Burton, (D) CA	5th	Dist.	9%	41%
Burton, (R) IN	6th	Dist.	3%	4%
Callahan, (R) AL	1st	Dist.	1%	30%
Carney, (R) NY	1st	Dist.	8%	8%
Carr, (D) MI	6th	Dist.	2%	9%
Chapman, (D) TX	1st	Dist.	1%	18%
Chappell, (D) FL	4th	Dist.	2%	11%
Chappie, (D) CA	2nd	Dist.	5%	8%
Coats, (R) IN	4th	Dist.	1%	5%
Cobey, (R) NC	4th	Dist.	1%	20%
Coble, (R) NC	6th	Dist.	1%	20%
Coleman, (D) TX	16th	Dist.	55%	60%
Combest, (R) TX	19th	Dist.	20%	25%
Courter, (R) NJ	12th	Dist.	2%	9%
Craig, (R) ID	1st	Dist.	3%	5%
Crane, (R) IL	12th	Dist.	3%	5%
Crockett, (D) MI	13th	Dist.	3%	71%
Daniel, (D) VA	6th	Dist.	1%	23%
Daub, (R) NE	2nd	Dist.	2%	10%
de la Garza, (D) TX	15th	Dist.	66%	67%
DeLay, (R) TX	22nd	Dist.	12%	24%
Dellums, (D) CA	8th	Dist.	6%	38%
Dickinson, (R) AL	2nd	Dist.	1%	28%
Dreier, (R) CA	33rd	Dist.	16%	26%
Duncan, (R) TN	2nd	Dist.	1%	7%
Dymally, (D) CA	31st	Dist.	21%	61%
Dyson, (D) MD	1st	Dist.	1%	19%

Edwards, (D) CA	24th	Dist.	24%	40%
Edwards, (D) OK	5th	Dist.	2%	11%
Emerson, (R) MO	8th	Dist.	0%	3%
English, (D) OK	6th	Dist.	2%	14%
Erdreich, (D) AL	6th	Dist.	1%	32%
Evans, (D) IL	17th	Dist.	2%	4%
Fawell, (R) IL	13th	Dist.	2%	5%
Fielder, (R) CA	9th	Dist.	9%	15%
Fields, (R) TX	8th	Dist.	11%	27%
Flippo, (D) AL	5th	Dist.	1%	14%
Franklin, (R) MS	2nd	Dist.	1%	54%
Frost, (D) TX	24th	Dist.	11%	41%
Gallo, (R) NJ	11th	Dist.	2%	6%
Garcia, (D) NY	18th	Dist.	49%	84%
Gaydos, (D) PA	20th	Dist.	0%	5%
Gekas, (R) PA	17th	Dist.	1%	7%
Gonzales, (D) TX	20th	Dist.	56%	66%
Gordon, (D) TN	6th	Dist.	1%	8%
Gradison, (R) OH	2nd	Dist.	1%	18%
Gregg, (R) NH	1st	Dist.	1%	1%
Guarini, (D) NJ	14th	Dist.	24%	38%
Hall, (D) OH	3rd	Dist.	1%	17%
Hall, (D) TX	4th	Dist.	2%	15%
Hammerschmidt, (R) AR	1st	Dist.	1%	4%
Hawkins, (D) CA	29th	Dist.	32%	84%
Hayes, (D) IL	1st	Dist.	1%	92%
Hendon, (R) NC	11th	Dist.	1%	7%
Hertel, (D) MI	14th	Dist.	1%	6%
Hiler, (R) IN	3rd	Dist.	1%	5%
Holt, (R) MD	4th	Dist.	1%	21%
Hopkins, (R) KY	6th	Dist.	1%	10%
Horton, (D) NY	29th	Dist.	1%	5%
Hubbard, (D) KY	1st	Dist.	1%	9%
Hughes, (D) NJ	2nd	Dist.	3%	15%
Hunter, (R) CA	45th	Dist.	14%	19%
Hyde, (R) IL	6th	Dist.	3%	6%
Jacobs, (D) IN	10th	Dist.	1%	26%
Jenkins, (D) GA	9th	Dist.	1%	6%
Jones, (D) NC	1st	Dist.	1%	33%
Jones, (D) YN	8th	Dist.	1%	19%
Kaptur, (D) OH	9th	Dist.	2%	13%
Kemp, (R) NY	31st	Dist.	1%	3%
Klecza, (D) WI	4th	Dist.	3%	3%
Kolbe, (R) AZ	5th	Dist.	14%	18%
Kolter, (D) PA	4th	Dist.	0%	2%
Kramer, (R) CO	5th	Dist.	6%	11%

Leath, (D) TX	11th	Dist.	8%	21%
Leland, (D) TX	18th	Dist.	27%	67%
Lent, (R) NY	4th	Dist.	3%	7%
Lloyd, (D) TN	3rd	Dist.	1%	12%
Loefler, (R) TX	21st	Dist.	16%	20%
Lujan, (R) NM	1st	Dist.	33%	38%
Lewis, (R) FL	12th	Dist.	4%	20%
Mack, (R) FL	13th	Dist.	2%	6%
Madigan, (R) IL	15th	Dist.	1%	6%
Marlenee, (R) MT	2nd	Dist.	1%	6%
Martin, (R) NY	26th	Dist.	1%	3%
Martinez, (D) CA	30th	Dist.	48%	59%
McCain, (R) AZ	1st	Dist.	9%	14%
McGrath, (R) NY	5th	Dist.	3%	14%
Meyers, (R) KS	3rd	Dist.	2%	11%
Miller, (D) CA	7th	Dist.	8%	23%
Mineta, (D) CA	13th	Dist.	10%	19%
Molinari, (R) NY	14th	Dist.	6%	12%
Murphy, (D) PA	22nd	Dist.	0%	3%
Myers, (R) IN	7th	Dist.	1%	4%
Neal (D) NC	5th	Dist.	1%	16%
Oakar, (D) OD	5th	Dist.	2%	5%
Olin, (D) VA	6th	Dist.	1%	11%
Parris, (R) VA	8th	Dist.	3%	16%
Petri, (R) WI	6th	Dist.	1%	1%
Porter, (R) IL	10th	Dist.	4%	11%
Pursell, (R) MI	2nd	Dist.	1%	7%
Rangel, (D) NY	16th	Dist.	35%	85%
Ray, (D) GA	3rd	Dist.	2%	34%
Regula, (R) OH	16th	Dist.	1%	5%
Reid, (D) NY	1st	Dist.	7%	18%
Rinaldo, (D) NJ	7th	Dist.	7%	18%
Ritter, (R) PA	15th	Dist.	2%	3%
Roberts, (R) KS	1st	Dist.	2%	3%
Robinson, (D) AR	2nd	Dist.	1%	16%
Roemer, (D) LA	4th	Dist.	2%	31%
Roukema, (R) NJ	5th	Dist.	2%	4%
Rowland, (R) CT	5th	Dist.	3%	7%
Roybal, (D) CA	25th	Dist.	57%	76%
Russo, (D) IL	3rd	Dist.	3%	9%
Savage, (D) IL	2nd	Dist.	7%	73%
Saxton, (R) NJ	13th	Dist.	2%	10%
Schroeder, (D) CO	1st	Dist.	15%	28%
Schuetz, (R) MI	10th	Dist.	1%	2%
Sensenbrenner, (R) WI	9th	Dist.	1%	1%
Shelby, (D) AL	7th	Dist.	1%	31%

Shuster, (R) PA	9th	Dist.	0%	1%
Sijander, (R) MI	4th	Dist.	1%	7%
Skeen, (R) NM	2nd	Dist.	29%	34%
Skelton, (D) MO	4th	Dist.	1%	4%
Slaughter, (R) NY	7th	Dist.	1%	12%
Smith, (R) NH	1st	Dist.	1%	1%
Smith, (D) OR	5th	Dist.	2%	4%
Smith, (R) OR	2nd	Dist.	3%	5%
Snyder, (R) KY	4th	Dist.	0%	2%
Soloman, (R) NY	24th	Dist.	1%	2%
Spence, (R) SC	2nd	Dist.	1%	34%
Staggers, (D) WV	2nd	Dist.	1%	4%
Stenholm, (D) TX	17th	Dist.	9%	12%
Stratton, (D) NY	23rd	Dist.	1%	6%
Stump, (R) AZ	3rd	Dist.	9%	15%
Sundquist, (R) TN	7th	Dist.	1%	13%
Sweeney, (R) TX	14th	Dist.	17%	28%
Swindall, (R) GA	4th	Dist.	2%	14%
Tallon, (D) SC	6th	Dist.	1%	38%
Tauzin, (D) LA	3rd	Dist.	3%	23%
Taylor, (R) MO	7th	Dist.	1%	3%
Towns, (D) NY	11th	Dist.	34%	82%
Traficant, (D) OH	17th	Dist.	1%	11%
Valentine, (D) NC	2nd	Dist.	1%	37%
VanderJagt, (R) MI	9th	Dist.	1%	5%
Visclosky, (D) IN	1st	Dist.	7%	29%
Watkins, (D) OK	3rd	Dist.	1%	11%
Whitley, (D) NC	3rd	Dist.	2%	28%
Whittaker, (R) KS	5th	Dist.	1%	4%
Whitten, (D) MI	1st	Dist.	1%	22%
Wirth, (D) CO	1st	Dist.	7%	9%
Yatron, (D) PA	6th	Dist.	1%	2%
Young, (R) FL	8th	Dist.	1%	8%
Young, (R) AK	1st	Dist.	2%	21%

Again, the total minority population as opposed to percent Hispanic, appears to be an important factor. The remaining members, who "voted their conscience," did not find the late hour compromises acceptable enough to vote for IRCA. This seems to be a plausible explanation for the non-

association of the variable percent minority with the IRCA vote.

IX. The Senate: Analysis of Enactment and Study Results

The road to enactment in the Senate was not as long and embattled as it had been in the House. The Senate did pass similar versions of the IRCA bill in 1982 and in 1983, awaiting similar approval from the House. Due to the controversial provisions, the House did not pass its version of the IRCA bill, and the Senate was left waiting another year.

Sen. Edward M. Kennedy, who opposed the economic sanctions for fear of greater discrimination against Hispanic peoples, led much of the opposition in the Senate. Kennedy, however, was outdone by one of the bills hard-working sponsors, Sen. Alan Simpson. Sen. Simpson worked tirelessly with many of the Senators on amendments and revisions, hoping to garner their vote. Although the Senate was under the same pressures as the House members, Senate members were better able to deal with the special interest groups because of their statewide constituency. A Representative, coming from a single district, was more likely to be responsive to special interests or large minority populations because their votes would have a

significant impact in future elections, whereas senators enjoy a little more freedom because of his/her statewide constituencies. He/she is less likely to have to be responsive to a small group within the larger state because his/her electoral success is not likely to depend on it.

A roll call analysis on the Senate votes on IRCA show no association between the IRCA vote and the four variables. The scores of the IRCA vote and the four variables can be seen on Table 7.

Table 7

Senate Vote on IRCA							
<u>Tenure, Liberalism, Percent Minority & Presidential Vote</u>							
Tenure	+1978	-1978	Total	Liberalism	+80	+80	Total
Against	7	17	24	Against	4	20	24
For	21	41	62	For	15	47	62
Total	28	58	86	Total	19	67	86
Yule's Q= .11 Chi Square= .172; df= 1 .70 Level of Probability				Yule's' Q= .23 Chi Square= .567; df= 1 .50 Level of Probability			
%Minority	+60%	-60%	Total	Pres. Vote	Mondale	Reagan	Total
Against	1	23	24	Against	1	23	24
For	1	61	62	For	3	59	62
Total	2	84	86	Total	4	82	86
Yule's Q= .45 Chi Square= .576; df= 1 .50 Level of Probability				Yule's Q= .08 Chi Square= .018; df= 1 .90 Level of Probability			

It was postulated that a senator's tenure was less important in the IRCA vote because of the six year term served by

senators. Only in those cases where a senator was up for re-election, as one third of the senators were, would they vote against IRCA. The remaining two-thirds of the Senate were free to vote their conscience, because the chance of being held accountable two or four years down the road are slim. With respect to a senator's degree of liberalism, the same expectations given to House members are given here. A senator with an average score of 80 or greater on the index is considered very liberal and therefore would vote against IRCA. Senators who scored below 80, would be more likely to vote for IRCA.

It was postulated that senators who had more than 60 percent total minority population in their state would be less likely to vote for IRCA, while senators who had less than 60 percent total minority population would be more likely to vote for IRCA. The variable percent minority population received the highest Yule's Q score of .45. Again, it was postulated that senators whose state voted for Mondale in the 1984 presidential race would be less likely to vote for IRCA, while states that voted for Reagan were more likely to vote for IRCA.

Again, I examined whether or not the percentage of the district population that was Hispanic alone predicted the senator's vote against IRCA. Of the twenty-four senators

who voted against IRCA, three states had ten percent or greater Hispanic populations and in only four states did minorities comprise more than a quarter of the total population. Only one senator, Inouye (D.-HI.), had more than 60 percent total minority population (Asian).

Table 8

Senate Votes Against IRCA
Percent Hispanic and Percent Total Minority

Member Name	State	% Hispanic	% Total Minority
Abdnor, (R)	S. Dakota	0%	5%
Armstrong, (R)	Colorado	10%	15%
Bumpers, (D)	Arkansas	1%	15%
Cochran, (R)	Mississippi	1%	32%
Cohen, (R)	Maryland	0%	0%
Denton, (R)	Alabama	1%	24%
Domenici, (R)	New Mexico	33%	43%
Ford, (D)	Kentucky	8%	8%
Garn, (R)	Utah	4%	7%
Gramm, (R)	Texas	18%	30%
Hatch, (R)	Utah	4%	8%
Hecht, (R)	Nevada	6%	14%
Heflin, (D)	Alabama	1%	24%
Helms, (R)	N. Carolina	1%	22%
Humphery, (R)	New Hampshire	1%	1%
Inouye, (D)	Hawaii	6%	68%
Kennedy, (D)	Massachusetts	2%	6%
McClure, (R)	Iowa	3%	5%
Mitchell, (D)	Maine	0%	0%
Nickles, (R)	Oklahoma	2%	14%
Pressler, (R)	S. Dakota	0%	5%
Riegle, (D)	Michigan	1%	14%
Rudman, (R)	New Hampshire	1%	1%
Zorinsky, (D)	Nebraska	1%	4%

Like conditions in the House, it appears that the Hispanic population did not play a significant role in a senator's decision to vote against IRCA. However, unlike the House findings, total percent minority does not appear to influence the vote. This is revealing because it reaffirms the earlier postulate that a senator would be more likely to ignore special interest groups because of a statewide constituency. Because states are geographically larger and their minority populations more disperse, senators may experience less pressure from minority interests to vote with them.

It is also interesting to note that of the twenty four senators voting against IRCA, exactly half of the states had total minority populations of at least fourteen percent. Although not a particularly large number, spread across an entire state one particular interest groups pressure can be effectively neutralized. Unlike the House study, where total minority population was important, it appears that total minority population in the Senate was not an influential consideration in the IRCA vote.

X. Evaluation of IRCA's Provisions

Of all of the significant provisions included in IRCA, none has received more study and attention than employer

sanctions. The intent of IRCA's employer sanctions provision was to increase the costs of hiring undocumented workers, thereby reducing the demand for illegal labor. Employers were then faced with a numbers of options. One, they could cut off all hiring of undocumented aliens and raise their prices accordingly, or they "could continue to hire illegals and lower their wages to cover the increased costs and risks associated with IRCA" (Donato and Massey 1993, 525). Therefore, one area in which to evaluate IRCA is its effect on migrant wages.

Donato and Massey (1993) find that "the continued high probability of undocumented out-migration reported in Mexican field studies suggests that IRCA did not lower the demand for unauthorized workers and that employers mainly chose the second option: continuing to hire undocumented migrants and lowered their wages" (Donato and Massey 1993, 525-26). As a result, IRCA has the potential to draw fewer undocumented migrants should the wage rate become severely depressed to where it no longer serves as a pull factor. However, the continued flow of illegal immigrants suggests that "this movement has not yet been restricted and that the labor market has adjusted to IRCA via lower wages" (Donato and Massey 1993, 526).

Data also suggest that IRCA "sharply increased the penalties for illegal status among Mexican workers in the United States, suggesting a qualitative shift in the way that employers treat and evaluate their undocumented employees after IRCA" (Donato and Massey 1993, 539). Given these trends, IRCA appears to have created a double jeopardy for illegal immigrants. "Undocumented migration continues to persist despite the new law, while wage exploitation and illegal employment practices proliferate" (Ibid, 539).

Research on IRCA's effects on hiring practices supports the assumption that the distribution of demand for undocumented workers remained fairly constant.⁸ Employers of undocumented aliens were likely to change their behavior if they believed that the risk of sanctions is relatively great. In this case, employers had little to fear, because "the INS investigates less than one quarter of one percent of U.S. establishments in any one year" (Lowell and Jing 1994, 440).

Two reasons exist as to why demand is thought to have remained constant. First, undocumented migration to the U.S. did not change dramatically despite the depression of wages. Second, many employers reported no difficulty in finding documented workers. Many U.S. employers did not perceive changes in the supply or availability of authorized

workers, which may be explained by the early failure of a central part of the IRCA mechanism: "fraudulent documents have long been acknowledged as the greatest hurdle to the success of IRCA" (Lowell and Jing 1994, 444).

However, research suggests that post-IRCA hiring patterns imply high levels of fraudulent document use; "as many as half of the unauthorized hires since IRCA may have taken jobs with employers who were fully compliant with the Act, by completing the I-9 paperwork for each new hire" (Lowell and Jing 1994, 444). Despite IRCA's good intentions, the role of illegal documents plays a larger role in hiring processes than previously thought. That fake identification documents are so readily available has generated discussion as to the use of "tamper-proof" identification documents such as Social Security cards and driver's licenses. However, many experts doubt that such a complex and costly step in maintaining the security of identification will remain tamper-proof for long.

A study by the Rand Corporation and the Urban Institute looks at employer sanctions from yet another perspective, enforcing employer sanctions under IRCA and employer perspectives on implementation. In looking at the INS' ability to enforce employer sanctions, the Rand study found that:

- In the communities they visited, "the number of investigations conducted are low relative to the number of employers".
- The INS had been "circumspect in dealing with most employers and has avoided generating broad public opposition to sanctions enforcement".
- "The enforcement effort--and the burden of coping with inspections and fines--falls heavily on small firms owned by ethnics".
- Rand observed "significant variation in implementation from site to site. Local INS offices differed with respect to the priority attached to sanctions enforcement, procedures followed, characteristics of firms targeted for enforcement, and the numbers and types of fines imposed".
- Evidence of "poor coordination between INS investigations and Border Patrol offices has led to different treatment of similar firms within the same geographic area"

(Adapted from Fix and Hill 1990, 84-86).

The Rand study found that discrimination exists in the resources and selection of firms to be investigated.⁹ The INS prescribed the use of a General Administrative Plan (GAP) which calls for random, neutral targeting of firms for

investigation. Evidence suggests most agencies were meeting their GAP quotas, however, "many reported that the share of the staff time devoted to GAP cases was closer to 25 percent than to the 40 percent anticipated by INS central planners" (Fix and Hill 1990, 97). Some survey respondents supported "random targeting as a means of avoiding charges of selective enforcement, identifying trends in non-compliance, and alerting employers in all industries they must comply with IRCA" (Ibid, 98).

The Rand study also found significant patterns in the distribution of IRCA penalties, suggesting that there are two regional models of enforcement. "The Eastern and Northern regions emphasize small numbers of large fines based on substantive violations, whereas the Southern and Western regions emphasize larger numbers of fines, based on technical violations rather than knowing hires of undocumented aliens" (Ibid, 118).

The study also surveyed employer perspectives on implementation. Evidence suggests that:

- Of those firms "that have been the target of INS educational or investigative activities report that these activities are not disruptive or punitive in character";

- "Most firms know about IRCA's ban on the hiring of undocumented workers but many are not in full compliance with the record keeping requirements";
- Employer "knowledge of the law and completeness of efforts to comply vary by industry and are generally best in firms that have formal personnel systems or are required to document their hiring practices";
- A small number of the firms report "major changes in their labor costs, production methods, or other business practices";
- "Though few respondents reported openly discriminating against foreign looking or foreign sounding applicants, many do not accept the full range of work eligibility documents permitted by the law. The exclusion of some legitimate documents could work to the disadvantage of foreign-born applicants" (Adapted from Fix and Hill 1990, 126-27).

A final survey of employer attitudes asked how IRCA has affected their business practices. The respondents were asked whether they "had more paperwork, more difficulty in recruiting or retaining workers, were forced to pay higher wages or benefits, or had changed locations or production methods" (Fix and Hill 1990, 132). Respondents believed

that IRCA had imposed additional costs on their business, in time used for handling paperwork and higher wages. Additional costs were "claimed by the largest firms (where compliance is likely to be complete) even though institutional structures should keep the marginal costs low" (Fix and Hill 1990, 133). These firms claimed that IRCA's provision placed additional costs on their firm for the time in doing additional paperwork as well as keeping track of expiration dates of their workers' provisional work authorization. One-in-eight firms reported having to pay higher wages as a result of IRCA due to the amnesty program rather than to employer sanctions.

Subsequent research on the impact of IRCA in reducing the flow of illegal immigrants has shown that IRCA failed to reduce the flow of illegal immigrants by any substantial number (Finch 1990, 244-58; Donato et al. 1992, 139-56). While the numbers of illegals apprehended at the border in 1987 was reduced by 30 percent, figures show that the number rose again in 1988 and have since risen to their pre-IRCA levels (Donato and Massey 1993, 525; Kossoudji 1992, 159-76; LeMay 1994, 112-30).

A study done by Crane et al. (1990), shows that "no data set provide conclusive evidence that employer sanctions have or have not reduced undocumented immigration" (Crane et

al. 1990, viii). The majority of their evidence, however, "points to some decline in the flow in the year 1987, but a comparison of past trends suggests the flow returned to normal or expected levels in 1988" (Ibid, viii; LeMay 1994, 113-115). Moreover, Crane's work also suggests a decline in the number of apprehensions in 1989, however the decline was most likely a result of the legalization program rather than from any deterrent effect IRCA might have intended.

Additional studies on the deterrent effects of employer sanctions in reducing the flow of illegal immigrants into the U.S. share similar findings. "The studies are generally consistent in suggesting a decrease in the flow of illegal immigrants across the U.S./Mexican border" in the immediate period after IRCA's enactment, "notwithstanding the difficulties of detecting such an effect" (Bean 1990, 262). The reduction in the flow of illegal immigrants was largely attributed to legalization, the amnesty and SAW programs. The SAW legalization and the general legalization program "removed individuals from the illegal flow in two ways: first, by making them a part of the legal flow of labor and other migrants across the border and, second, by allowing them to settle permanently in the United States" (Bean 1990, 262). Bean concludes that IRCA was successful in reducing the proportion of the undocumented population and

undocumented flow from Mexico (Bean 1990, 262-263). In conclusion, IRCA was moderately successful in reducing the flow of illegal immigration but for only a limited period of time after enactment.

As many who opposed IRCA feared, the antidiscrimination provision did not protect Hispanic-American or other ethnic American citizens from discriminatory employers. As a safeguard, IRCA included procedures for review by the General Accounting Office (GAO) to determine whether job discrimination had resulted in significant hardships for peoples of Hispanic origin or descent. The 1990 GAO report indicated "a pattern of discrimination was found as a result of IRCA" (See GAO Report, also Perotti 1990, 733). The GAO investigation found that employers "checked only those individuals suspected of being unauthorized aliens or had adopted exclusionary hiring practices since the enactment of IRCA by rejecting persons on the basis of foreign appearance, accent, name or birth" (GAO Report , and Perotti 1990, 733).

Similar discrimination resulted in California, where over 60 percent of the amnesty applications were filed. In January, 1990, a seven member state commission issued a report on the impact and effectiveness of employer sanctions and anti-discrimination provisions (America, February, 1990,

163-64). The panel concluded that "inefficient efforts of the INS to educate the public about the details of IRCA's provisions and misguided or intentional discrimination resulted in personal and human costs to applicants who are or appear to be foreign-born, regardless of their actual immigration status" (Ibid, 164). Other studies have found similar results. Arizona, and New York, for example, found "widespread discrimination" and concluded that, "for the purposes of Congressional review of the impact of employer sanctions as currently implemented, a 'widespread' pattern of discrimination had been documented" (Cited in LeMay 1994, 98; see also 111-135).

IRCA outlaws discrimination on the basis of national origin in any work place with four or more employees. "Discrimination based on citizenship is prohibited regardless of the size of the workplace" (Finch 1990, 253). Members of the Hispanic Caucus and Hispanic communities in general opposed the use of employer sanctions because of the fear that they would provide an excuse for employers to discriminate against Hispanic-looking peoples. The expansion of the antidiscrimination provisions, a result of late hour compromises, was "an attempt to address these concerns by prohibiting employers from discriminating against workers

on the basis of national origin or citizenship status" (Ibid, 253).

A study done by Vernon M. Briggs (1990), reveals that 19 percent of the employers surveyed had introduced some type of discriminatory hiring practices as a result of the new law. Of the 19 percent of employers who admitted to engaging in discriminatory hiring practices, "10 percent of the employers adopted employment practices that discriminated on the basis of a person's 'foreign appearance or accent' (i.e., national origin discrimination) and 9 percent initiated employment practices that discriminated on the basis of alien status (i.e., citizenship discrimination)" (Briggs 1990, 808). According to the General Accounting Office, a number of reasons existed for the apparent "widespread pattern of discrimination" found to have been caused by employer sanctions (Briggs 1990, 810). First, "employers lacked an adequate understanding of the major provisions of IRCA," (2) "they were uncertain about the proper means to determine worker eligibility," and (3) "they were confused about what to do if they suspected the documents they were presented with were counterfeit or fraudulent" (Ibid, 810).

The GAO report supported the findings of several other reports on employer discrimination as a result of IRCA. The

California Fair Employment and Housing Commission, the New York Interagency Task Force on Immigration Affairs, and the Arizona Civil Rights Advisory Board all came to similar conclusions regarding employer discrimination: that "IRCA had caused employers to refuse to accept or to be uncertain about the validity of certain work eligibility documents which they were presented" (Briggs 1990, 812). In an effort to eliminate discriminatory practices by employers, the GAO report recommended the continuation of educational efforts by the INS and the Department of Labor (Briggs 1990, 812). Since Congress chose not to rescind the employer sanctions when presented with it, the GAO report opted to promote and strengthen educational programs for employers.

XI. Conclusion: Some Lessons From IRCA

Despite IRCA's intentions, it neither successfully reduced the flow of illegal immigration to the United States nor prevented employer discrimination. It resulted precisely in what those who opposed its passage had most feared, discriminatory hiring practices by U.S. employers. Certainly, then, a lesson that can be drawn from this analysis of the IRCA vote is that those members of the Hispanic and Black Caucuses who decided to vote for IRCA's passage adopted a failed strategy. In the future, if they

indeed want to prevent increased discrimination, and if they favor less restrictive immigration policy, they need to continue to vote against enactment of such legislation as a cohesive bloc. The number of liberal members in Congress is declining. A split in the minority caucuses (Hispanic and Black) that signals a split in the declining liberal Democratic voting bloc will result in even more restrictive legislation.

As expected by many, the apparent failure of IRCA to reduce the influx of illegal immigration has resulted in continued efforts to reform immigration law. Thus, as cited in the introduction to this paper, renewed efforts to reform immigration were introduced into Congress in 1994, 1995, and 1996. Each continues the restrictive policy approach underlying IRCA. The new state and national efforts, such as Proposition 187 and the 1995 Simpson proposal, continue to pursue policies intended to "reduce the pull" by removing incentives of jobs or benefits (Mehlman 1994, 25-26). To the extent that the immigration flow, whether legal or illegal, is largely the result of "push" factors, such policy reforms are likely to be as ineffective as was IRCA. Certainly the voting blocs discussed herein, although reduced in size and influence in the new Congress, can take a lesson from the effects of their split on the IRCA vote.

Enactment of more restrictive immigration policy is not likely to reduce the flow, or prevent rising discriminatory behavior.

Recent concern over illegal immigration has renewed discussion of a tamper-proof national identification card, which has been proposed to replace the Social Security card as proof of the right to work in the United States. While some see such a national ID card as helping to curb the hiring of illegal aliens (Kuttner 1991), others doubt the ability of the government to make a tamper proof card. Any ID card that could be reproduced on the streets would eliminate the gain of having such a card. Moreover, many doubt the willingness of Americans to carry national identity cards (Commonweal, January, 1995 3-4). The Clinton Administration has proposed a computer verification plan now being tested in several states.

Though no one can predict the future of United States policy to reform immigration with any great accuracy, one can surely expect it to include more immigration reform measures. For now, immigration policy remains one of the most important policy considerations on the American agenda. The unknown fate of California's and Florida's federal lawsuits will certainly create legal precedents in immigration policy. The ability of forces advocating a more

restrictive immigration policy to split the voting blocs within Congress, coupled with the declining strength of the numbers of Hispanic, Black, and liberal Democratic members, should suggest a revised strategy among those minority populations--mostly Black and Hispanic--who oppose more restrictive immigration policy or fear the increased discrimination likely to result from its enactment. Perhaps reliance on the courts to seek redress is their best, and maybe only, viable strategy for the foreseeable future (LeMay 1985, 273-308). Even the slightest of splits is likely to result in the enactment of more restrictive immigration reform law. The courts have shown a propensity to overturn clearly discriminatory laws. Since Congress has failed to react to the GAO report indicating that IRCA did, indeed, result in increased discrimination, "the courts rather than Congress may be the only arena in which minority groups will successfully find redress" (Dale, LeMay and Miriam 1994, 741-45).

California's Proposition 187 will continue to be a salient political issue as the courts decide its fate over the next several years and as Congress reacts to the political pressures in manifests. In many places throughout our nation, immigration policy impacts our everyday lives and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future.

However, it is important to remember that the immigration issue is not debated equally among the fifty states. While immigration is an important issue in California, New Mexico, Texas, Florida, and New York, it is a relatively insignificant issue in remaining states. Competing interests of policymakers in Washington will no doubt shape the substance of immigration policy. Understanding the origins of past immigration policies, the issues and individuals involved, offers us a chance to speculate on the future changes in immigration law.

Examination of the IRCA case offers lessons to future legislators on both sides of the issue, should they be inclined to learn from past failures. The study of immigration policy reform provides us with useful insight into the nature of the policy process as a "flow." The policy process is a dynamic, ongoing, flowing search for an appropriate course of action to cope with problems. As the immigration reform case illustrates so well, when the nature of the problem being dealt with is very complex, the policy process itself becomes complicated. Just as the immigration process is complex and difficult to fully understand, so too is any policy process designed by legislators to cope with the complexities of the immigration flow. Complexity results not only in difficulty, but also in a rich view of

human political behavior that is all the more interesting because of its very complexity. Efforts to analyze such a process are all the more rewarding.

Appendix A

Congressional Roll Call Vote Against IRCA House Roll Call Vote Number 469:(173)

Akaka, (D)	DeLay, (R)	Hughes, (D)
Andrews, (D)	Dellums, (D)	Hunter, (R)
Applegate, (D)	Dickinson, (R)	Hyde, (R)
Archer, (R)	Dreier, (R)	Jacobs, (D)
Armey, (R)	Duncan, (R)	Jenkins, (D)
Barnard, (R)	Dymally, (D)	Jones, (D) (NC)
Bartlett, (R)	Dyson, (D)	Jones, (D) (TN)
Barton, (R)	Edwards, (D) (CA)	Kaptur, (D)
Bateman, (R)	Edwards, (R) (OK)	Kemp, (R)
Bentley, (R)	Emerson, (R)	Kleczka, (D)
Bevill, (D)	English, (D)	Kolbe, (R)
Biaggi, (D)	Erdreich, (D)	Kolter, (D)
Bilirakis, (R)	Evans, (D)	Kramer, (R)
Bliley, (R)	Fawell, (R)	Leath, (D)
Boggs, (D)	Fielder, (R)	Leland, (D)
Boner, (D)	Fields, (R)	Lent, (R)
Boulter, (R)	Flippo, (D)	Lloyd, (D)
Boxer, (D)	Franklin, (R)	Loefler, (R)
Broomfield, (D)	Frost, (D)	Lujan, (R)
Brown, (R)	Gallo, (R)	Mack, (R)
Burton, (D) (CA)	Garcia, (D)	Madigan, (R)
Burton, (R) (IN)	Gaydos, (D)	Marlenee, (R)
Callahan, (R)	Gekas, (R)	Martin, (R)
Carney, (R)	Gonzales, (D)	Martinez, (D)
Carr, (D)	Gordon, (D)	McCain, (R)
Chapman, (R)	Gradison, (R)	McGrath, (R)
Chappell, (D)	Gregg, (R)	Meyers, (R)
Chappie, (R)	Guarini, (D)	Miller, (R)
Coats, (R)	Hall, (D) (OH)	Mineta, (D)
Cobey, (R)	Hall, (D) (TX)	Molinari, (R)
Coble, (R)	Hammerschmidt, (R)	Murphy, (D)
Coleman, (D)	Hawkins, (D)	Myers, (R)
Combest, (R)	Hayes, (D)	Neal, (D)
Courter, (R)	Hendon, (R)	Oakar, (D)
Craig, (R)	Hertel, (D)	Olin, (D)
Crane, (R)	Hiler, (R)	Parris, (R)
Crockett, (D)	Holt, (R)	Petri, (R)
Daniel, (D)	Hopkins, (R)	Porter, (R)
Daub, (R)	Horton, (R)	Pursell, (R)
de la Garza, (D)	Hubbard, (D)	Rangel, (D)
Ray, (D)	Sensenbrenner, (R)	Swindall, (R)

Regula, (R)	Sijander, (R)	Tallon, (D)
Reid, (D)	Skeen, (R)	Tauzin, (D)
Rinaldo, (R)	Skelton, (D)	Taylor, (R)
Ritter, (R)	Slaughter, (R)	Towns, (D)
Roberts, (D)	Smith, (R) (OK)	Traficant, (D)
Robinson, (D)	Smith, (R) (NH)	Valentine, (D)
Roemer, (D)	Snyder, (R)	VanderJagt, (R)
Roukema, (R)	Soloman, (R)	Visclosky, (D)
Rowland, (D)	Spence, (R)	Watkins, (D)
Roybal, (D)	Staggers, (D)	Whitley, (D)
Russo, (D)	Stenholm, (D)	Whittaker, (R)
Savage, (D)	Stratton, (D)	Wirth, (R)
Saxton, (R)	Stump, (R)	Yatron, (D)
Schroeder, (D)	Sundquist, (R)	Young, (R) (KS)
Schuetz, (R)	Sweeney, (R)	Young, (R) (FL)

Source: Congressional Record-House, 15 October 1986,
H10598-10599.

Appendix B

Congressional Roll Call Vote For IRCA The House Roll Call Vote Number 469:(238)

Abercrombie, (D)	Darden, (D)	Gray, (D) (PA)
Ackerman, (D)	Dashle, (D)	Green, (R)
Alexander, (D)	Davis, (R)	Gunderson, (R)
Annunzio, (D)	Derrick, (D)	Hamilton, (D)
Anthony, (D)	DeWine, (R)	Hatcher, (D)
Aspin, (D)	Dicks, (D)	Hefner, (D)
Atkins, (D)	Dingell, (D)	Henry, (R)
AuCoin, (D)	DioGuardi, (R)	Hillis, (R)
Barnes, (D)	Dixon, (D)	Howard, (D)
Bates, (D)	Donnelly, (D)	Hoyer, (D)
Bedell, (D)	Dorgan, (D)	Huckaby, (D)
Beilenson, (D)	Dornan, (R)	Hutto, (D)
Bennett, (D)	Dowdy, (D)	Ireland, (R)
Bereuter, (R)	Downey, (D)	Jeffords, (R)
Berman, (D)	Durbin, (D)	Johnson, (R)
Boehlert, (D)	Dwyer, (D)	Kanjorski, (D)
Boland, (D)	Early, (D)	Kasich, (R)
Bonoir, (D)	Eckart, (R)	Kastenmeier, (D)
Bonker, (D)	Edgar, (D)	Kennelly, (D)
Borski, (D)	Evans, (R)	Kildee, (D)
Bosco, (D)	Fascell, (D)	Kostmayer, (D)
Boucher, (D)	Fazio, (D)	LaFalce, (D)
Brown, (D)	Feighan, (D)	Lagomarsino, (R)
Bruce, (D)	Fish, (R)	Lantos, (D)
Bryant, (D)	Florio, (D)	Leach, (R)
Bustamante, (D)	Foglietta, (D)	Lehman, (D) (CA)
Byron, (D)	Foley, (D)	Lehman, (D) (FL)
Carper, (D)	Ford, (D) (MI)	Levin, (D)
Chandler, (R)	Ford, (D) (TN)	Levine, (D)
Chaney, (R)	Frank, (D)	Lewis, (R)
Clay, (D)	Franzel, (R)	Lightfoot, (D)
Clinger, (R)	Fugua, (D)	Lipinski, (D)
Coelho, (D)	Gejdenson, (D)	Livingston, (R)
Coleman, (R)	Gephardt, (D)	Lott, (R)
Collins, (D)	Gibbons, (D)	Lowery, (R)
Conte, (R)	Gilman, (R)	Lowry, (D)
Cooper, (D)	Gingrich, (R)	Luken, (D)
Coughlin, (R)	Glickman, (D)	Lungren, (R)
Coyne, (D)	Goodling, (R)	MacKay, (D)
Dannemeyer, (D)	Gray, (D) (IL)	Manton, (D)
Markey, (D)	Packard, (R)	Stallings, (D)

Martin, (R)	Panetta, (D)	Strangeland, (R)
Matsui, (D)	Pashayan, (R)	Stark, (D)
Mavroules, (D)	Pease, (D)	Stokes, (D)
Mazolli, (D)	Penny, (D)	Strang, (R)
McCandless, (R)	Pepper, (D)	Studds, (D)
McCloskey, (D)	Perkins, (D)	Swift, (D)
McCollum, (R)	Pickle, (D)	Synar, (D)
McCurdey, (D)	Price, (D)	Tauke, (D)
McDade, (R)	Quillen, (R)	Thomas, (R) (CA)
McHugh, (D)	Rahall, (D)	Thomas, (D) (GA)
McKernan, (R)	Richardson, (D)	Torres, (D)
McKinney, (R)	Ridge, (R)	Torricelli, (D)
McMillan, (R)	Rodino, (D)	Traxler, (D)
Mica, (D)	Roe, (D)	Udall, (D)
Michel, (R)	Rogers, (R)	Vento, (D)
Mikulski, (D)	Rose, (D)	Volkmer, (D)
Miller, (R) (WA)	Rostenkowski, (D)	Vucanovich, (R)
Miller, (D) (CA)	Roth, (R)	Waldon, (D)
Mitchell, (D)	Rowland, (R)	Walgren, (D)
Moakley, (D)	Sabo, (D)	Walker, (R)
Mollohan, (D)	Schaefer, (R)	Waxman, (D)
Monson, (R)	Scheuer, (D)	Weber, (R)
Montgomery, (D)	Schneider, (R)	Wheat, (D)
Moody, (D)	Schulze, (R)	Whitehurst, (R)
Moorhead, (R)	Schumer, (D)	Williams, (D)
Morrison, (D) (CT)	Seiberling, (D)	Wilson, (D)
Morrison, (R) (WA)	Sharp, (D)	Wise, (D)
Mrazek, (D)	Shaw, (R)	Wolf, (R)
Murtha, (D)	Shumway, (R)	Wolpe, (D)
Natcher, (D)	Sikorski, (D)	Wortley, (R)
Nelson, (D)	Sisisky, (D)	Wright, (D)
Neilson, (R)	Slattey, (D)	Wyden, (D)
Nowak, (D)	Smith, (D) (FL)	Wylie, (R)
Oberstar, (D)	Smith, (R) (NE)	Yates, (D)
Obey, (D)	Smith, (R) (NJ)	Young, (D)
Ortiz, (D)	Snowe, (R)	Zschau, (R)
Owens, (D)	Solarz, (D)	
Oxley, (R)	Spratt, (D)	

Source: Congressional Record-House, 15 October 1986,
H10598-10599.

Appendix C

Congressional Roll Call Vote, Non-Voters on IRCA House Roll Call Vote Number 469:(21)

Badham, (R)	Hansen, (R)	McEwen, (R)
Breaux, (D)	Hartnett, (R)	Moore, (R)
Brooks, (D)	Jones, (D)	Nichols, (D)
Campbell, (R)	Kindness, (R)	Rudd, (R)
Conyers, (D)	Latta, (R)	St. Germain, (D)
Fowler, (D)	Long, (D)	Weaver, (D)
Grotberg, (R)	Lundine, (D)	Weiss, (D)

Source: Congressional Record-House, 15 October 1986,
H10598-10599.

Appendix D

Analysis of Hispanic Caucus Votes on IRCA Members Who Voted Against IRCA, 1986

Member/Dist.	Year Elected	Minority Population	Pres. Vote	Liberalism Index
de la Garza, (D) TX, 15th Dist.	1964	66% Spanish 1% Black 67% Total	Mondale 46% Reagan 54%	ADA- 40 ACLU- 58 COPE- 57 AV= 51.6
Edwards, (D) CA, 10th Dist.	1962	24% Spanish 19% Asian 5% Black 1% Am Ind 49% Total	Mondale 48% Reagan 51%	ADA- 100 ACLU-100 COPE- 93 AV= 97.6
Garcia, (D) NY, 18th Dist.	1978	49% Spanish 44% Black 1% Asian 94% Total	Mondale 81% Reagan 19%	ADA- 90 ACLU- 85 COPE- 95 AV= 90
Gonzales, (D) TX, 20th Dist.	1961	56% Spanish 9% Black 1% Asian 66% Total	Mondale 59% Reagan 41%	ADA- 95 ACLU-100 COPE- 90 AV= 95
Martinez, (D) CA, 30th Dist.	1982	48% Spanish 9% Asian 1% Black 1% Am Ind 59% Total	Mondale 44% Reagan 55%	ADA- 95 ACLU- 80 COPE- 98 AV= 91
Roybal, (D) CA, 25th Dist.	1962	57% Spanish 10% Black 8% Asian 1% Am Ind 76% Total	Mondale 60% Reagan 39%	ADA- 100 ACLU- 93 COPE- 94 AV= 95.6

Source: Barone, Michael, and Grant Ujifusa. 1987. The
Almanac of American Politics, 1988.
Washington, D.C.: National Journal Inc.

Appendix E

Analysis of Hispanic Caucus Vote on IRCA Members Who Voted For IRCA, 1986

Member/Dist.	Year Elected	Minority Population	Pres. Vote	Liberalism Index
Bustamante, (D) TX, 23rd Dist.	1984	51% Spanish 4% Black 1% Asian 56% Total	Mondale 41% Reagan 59%	ADA- 70 ACLU- 81 COPE- 95 AV= 82
Coelho, (D) CA, 15th Dist	1978	20% Spanish 2% Black 1% Asian 23% Total	Mondale 40% Reagan 59%	ADA- 80 ACLU- 85 COPE- 82 AV= 82.3
Ortiz, (D) TX, 27th Dist.	1982	55% Spanish 3% Black 58% Total	Mondale 47% Reagan 53%	ADA- 60 ACLU- 60 COPE- 87 AV= 69
Richardson, (D) MN, 3rd Dist.	1982	37% Spanish 17% Am Ind 1% Black 55% Total	Mondale 46% Reagan 53%	ADA- 85 ACLU- 80 COPE- 83 AV= 82.6
Torres, (D) CA, 34th Dist.	1982	42% Spanish 4% Asian 2% Black 1% Am Ind 49% Total	Mondale 40% Reagan 59%	ADA- 95 ACLU- 90 COPE- 100 AV= 95

Source: Barone, Michael, and Grant Ujifusa. 1987. The Almanac of American Politics, 1988.
Washington, D.C.: National Journal Inc.

Appendix F

Analysis of Black Caucus Vote on IRCA Members Who Voted Against IRCA, 1986

Member/Dist.	Year Elected	Minority Population	Pres. Vote	Liberalism Index
Crockett, (D) MI, 13th Dist.	1980	67% Black 3% Spanish 1% Asian 71% Total	Mondale 85% Reagan 15%	ADA- 95 ACLU- 100 COPE- 93 AV= 96
Dellums, (D) CA, 8th Dist.	1970	24% Black 8% Asian 6% Spanish 38% Total	Mondale 65% Reagan 34%	ADA- 100 ACLU- 89 COPE- 93 AV= 94
Dymally, (D) CA, 1st Dist.	1980	31% Black 21% Spanish 8% Asian 60% Total	Mondale 58% Reagan 41%	ADA- 100 ACLU- 95 COPE- 93 AV= 96
Hawkins, (D) CA, 29th Dist.	1962	51% Black 32% Spanish 1% Asian 84% Total	Mondale 77% Reagan 22%	ADA- 85 ACLU- 94 COPE- 96 AV= 91.6
Hayes, (D) IL, 1st Dist.	1983	90% Black 1% Spanish 1% Asian 92% Total	Mondale 95% Reagan 5%	ADA- 95 ACLU- 94 COPE- 100 AV= 96.3
Leland, (D) TX, 18th Dist.	1978	39% Black 27% Spanish 1% Asian 67% Total	Mondale 72% Reagan 28%	ADA- 100 ACLU- 95 COPE- 94 AV= 96.3
Rangel, (D) NY, 16th Dist.	1970	49% Black 35% Spanish 1% Asian 85% Total	Mondale 84% Reagan 16%	ADA- 100 ACLU- 94 COPE- 91 AV= 95

Savage, (D)	1980	66% Black	Mondale 84%	ADA- 95
IL, 2nd Dist.		7% Spanish	Reagan 16%	ACLU-100
		73% Total		COPE- 98
				AV= 97.6
Towns, (D)	1982	47% Black	Mondale 78%	ADA- 95
NY, 11th Dist.		34% Spanish	Reagan 21%	ACLU- 94
		1% Asian		COPE- 98
		82% Total		AV= 95.6

Source: Barone, Michael, and Grant Ujifusa. 1987. The Almanac of American Politics, 1988. Washington, D.C.: National Journal.

Appendix G

Analysis of Black Caucus Votes on IRCA Members Who Voted For IRCA, 1986

Member/Dist.	Year Elected	Minority Population	Pres. Vote	Liberalism Index
Clay, (D) MO, 1st Dist.	1968	46% Black 1% Asian 1% Spanish 48% Total	Mondale 63% Reagan 37%	ADA- 75 ACLU- 100 COPE- 95 AV= 90
Collins, (D) IL, 7th Dist.	1973	60% Black 4% Spanish 2% Asian 66% Total	Mondale 75% Reagan 25%	ADA- 95 ACLU- 94 COPE- 95 AV= 94.6
Dixon, (D) CA, 28th Dist.	1978	37% Black 24% Spanish 8% Asian 69% Total	Mondale 67% Reagan 32%	ADA- 85 ACLU- 94 COPE- 96 AV= 91.6
Ford, (D) TN, 9th Dist.	1974	51% Black 1% Spanish 52% Total	Mondale 64% Reagan 36%	ADA- 100 ACLU- 94 COPE- 91 AV= 95
Gray, (D) PA, 2nd Dist.	1978	76% Black 1% Spanish 1% Asian 78% Total	Mondale 90% Reagan 10%	ADA- 80 ACLU- 90 COPE- 96 AV= 88.6
Mitchell, (D) MD, 7th Dist.	1970	70% Black 1% Spanish 1% Asian 72% Total	Mondale 82% Reagan 18%	ADA- 90 ACLU- 98 COPE- 94 AV= 94
Owens, (D) NY, 12th Dist.	1982	78% Black 9% Spanish 2% Asian 89% Total	Mondale 85% Reagan 14%	ADA- 95 ACLU- 88 COPE- 98 AV= 93.6

Stokes, (D)	1968	58% Black	Mondale 78%	ADA- 100
OH, 21st Dist.		1% Spanish	Reagan 21%	ACLU- 100
		1% Asian		COPE- 94
		60% Total		AV= 98
Wheat, (D)	1982	20% Black	Mondale 54%	ADA- 95
MO, 5th Dist.		2% Spanish	Reagan 46%	ACLU- 100
		1% Asian		COPE- 95
		23% Total		AV= 96.6

Source: Barone, Michael, and Grant Ujifusa. 1985. The Almanac of American Politics, 1986.
Washington, D.C.: National Journal Inc.

Source: Barone, Michael, and Grant Ujifusa. 1987. The Almanac of American Politics, 1988.
Washington, D.C.: National Journal Inc.

Appendix H

Analysis of Liberal Democrats Votes on IRCA Members Who Voted Against IRCA, 1986

Member/Dist.	Year Elected	Minority Population	Pres. Vote	Liberalism Index
Akaka, (D) HI, 2nd Dist.	1976	55% Asian 7% Spanish 2% Black 64% Total	Mondale 43% Reagan 56%	ADA- 65 ACLU- 89 COPE- 50 AV= 68
Andrews, (D) TX, 25th Dist.	1982	23% Black 12% Spanish 35% Total	Mondale 47% Reagan 53%	ADA- 50 ACLU- 55 COPE- 60 AV= 55
Applegate, (D) OH, 18th Dist.	1976	2% Black 2% Total	Mondale 46% Reagan 53%	ADA- 65 ACLU- 40 COPE- 73 AV= 59.3
Archer, (R) TX, 7th Dist.	1970	6% Spanish 3% Black 2% Asian 11% Total	Mondale 17% Reagan 83%	ADA- 0 ACLU- 5 COPE- 5 AV= 3.3
Armey, (R) TX, 26th Dist.	1984	4% Spanish 3% Black 1% Asian 8% Total	Mondale 23% Reagan 76%	ADA- 0 ACLU- 5 COPE- 3 AV= 2.6
Barnard, (R) IN, 4th Dist.	1980	4% Black 1% Spanish 5% Total	Mondale 33% Reagan 67%	ADA- 0 ACLU- 0 COPE- 5 AV= 1.6
Bartlett, (R) TX, 3rd Dist.	1982	3% Black 3% Spanish 1% Asian 7% Total	Mondale 18% Reagan 82%	ADA- 5 ACLU- 10 COPE- 5 AV= 6.6

Barton, (R) TX, 6th Dist.	1984	10% Black 5% Spanish 15% Total	Mondale 30% Reagan 70%	ADA- 0 ACLU- 0 COPE- 3 AV= 1
Bateman, (R) VA, 1st Dist.	1980	29% Black 1% Spanish 1% Asian 31% Total	Mondale 37% Reagan 62%	ADA-0 ACLU- 10 COPE- 3 AV= 4.3
Bentley, (R) MD, 2nd Dist.	1984	5% Black 1% Asian 1% Spanish 7% Total	Mondale 34% Reagan 66%	ADA- 20 ACLU- 10 COPE- 41 AV= 23.6
Bevill, (R) AL, 4th Dist.	1966	6% Black 1% Spanish 7% Total	Mondale 40% Reagan 59%	ADA- 40 ACLU- 25 COPE- 57 AV= 40.6
Biaggi, (D) NY, 19th Dist.	1968	13% Spanish 11% Black 1% Asian 25% Total	Mondale 48% Reagan 52%	ADA- 65 ACLU- 52 COPE- 88 AV= 68.3
Bilirakis, (R) FL, 9th Dist.	1982	3% Black 2% Spanish 5% Total	Mondale 33% Reagan 67%	ADA- 15 ACLU- 15 COPE- 26 AV= 18.6
Bliley, (R) VA, 3rd Dist.	1980	26% Black 1% Spanish 1% Asian 28% Total	Mondale 35% Reagan 65%	ADA- 5 ACLU- 5 COPE- 11 AV= 7
Boggs, (D) LA, 2nd Dist.	1973	52% Black 3% Spanish 1% Asian 56% Total	Mondale 62% Reagan 37%	ADA- 80 ACLU- 64 COPE- 74 AV= 72.6
Boner, (D) TN, 5th Dist.	1978	20% Black 1% Spanish 21% Total	Mondale 48% Reagan 52%	ADA- 50 ACLU- 42 COPE- 84 AV= 58.6

Boulter, (R) TX, 13th Dist.	1984	7% Spanish 5% Black 1% Asian 13% Total	Mondale 28% Reagan 72%	ADA- 5 ACLU- 5 COPE- 7 AV= 5.6
Boxer, (D) CA, 6th Dist.	1982	9% Black 9% Asian 5% Spanish 23% Total	Mondale 56% Reagan 42%	ADA- 90 ACLU- 89 COPE- 98 AV= 92.3
Broomfield, (R) MI, 17th Dist.	1956	1% Asian 1% Black 1% Spanish 3% Total	Mondale 25% Reagan 75%	ADA- 5 ACLU- 0 COPE- 19 AV= 8
Brown, (R) CO, 4th Dist.	1980	11% Spanish 1% Asian 12% Total	Mondale 32% Reagan 68%	ADA- 10 ACLU- 15 COPE- 7 AV= 10.6
Burton, (D) CA, 5th Dist.	1983	20% Asian 9% Spanish 9% Black 41% Total	Mondale 65% Reagan 33%	ADA- 90 ACLU- N/A COPE- 100 AV= 95
Burton, (R) IN, 6th Dist.	1982	3% Black 1% Spanish 4% Total	Mondale 28% Reagan 72%	ADA- 5 ACLU- 5 COPE- 14 AV= 8
Callahan, (R) AL, 1st Dist.	1984	28% Black 1% Spanish 1% Am Ind 30% Total	Mondale 34% Reagan 64%	ADA- 0 ACLU- 5 COPE- 19 AV= 8
Carney, (R) NY, 1st Dist.	1978	4% Black 3% Spanish 1% Asian 8% Total	Mondale 34% Reagan 66%	ADA- 5 ACLU- 15 COPE- 19 AV= 13
Carr, (D) MD, 6th Dist.	1982	6% Black 2% Spanish 1% Asian 9% Total	Mondale 63% Reagan 36%	ADA- 70 ACLU- 60 COPE- 83 AV= 71

Chapman, (D) TX, 1st Dist.	1985	17% Black 1% Spanish 18% Total	Mondale 38% Reagan 61%	ADA- 40 ACLU- 16 COPE- 48 AV= 34.6
Chappell, (D) FL, 4th Dist.	1968	9% Black 2% Spanish 11% Total	Mondale 33% Reagan 67%	ADA- 30 ACLU- 23 COPE- 35 AV= 29.3
Chappie, (R) CA, 2nd Dist.	1980	5% Spanish 2% Am Ind 1% Asian 8% Total	Mondale 35% Reagan 63%	ADA- 10 ACLU- 33 COPE- 8 AV= 17
Coats, (R) IN, 4th Dist.	1980	4% Black 1% Spanish 5% Total	Mondale 33% Reagan 67%	ADA- 10 ACLU- 5 COPE- 13 AV= 9.3
Cobey, (R) NC, 4th Dist.	1984	18% Black 1% Asian 1% Spanish 20% Total	Mondale 40% Reagan 60%	ADA- ACLU- COPE- AV=
Coble, (R) NC, 6th Dist.	1984	19% Black 1% Spanish 20% Total	Mondale 35% Reagan 65%	ADA- 10 ACLU- 5 COPE- 23 AV= 12.6
Coleman, (D) TX, 16th Dist.	1982	55% Spanish 4% Black 1% Asian 60% Total	Mondale 57% Reagan 43%	ADA- 70 ACLU- 65 COPE- 83 AV= 72.6
Combest, (R) TX, 19th Dist.	1984	20% Spanish 5% Black 25% Total	Mondale 25% Reagan 75%	ADA- 5 ACLU- 5 COPE- 10 AV= 6.6
Courter, (R) NJ, 12th Dist.	1978	5% Black 2% Asian 2% Spanish 9% Total	Mondale 35% Reagan 65%	ADA- 25 ACLU- 15 COPE- 26 AV= 22

Craig, (R) IN, 1st Dist.	1980	3% Spanish 1% Am Ind 1% Asian 5% Total	Mondale 30% Reagan 68%	ADA- 5 ACLU- 5 COPE- 8 AV= 6
Crane, (R) IL, 12th Dist.	1969	3% Spanish 1% Asian 1% Black 5% Total	Mondale 23% Reagan 77%	ADA- 0 ACLU- 5 COPE- 7 AV= 4
Crockett, (D) MI, 13th Dist.	1980	67% Black 3% Spanish 1% Asian 71% Total	Mondale 85% Reagan 15%	ADA- 95 ACLU- 100 COPE- 93 AV= 96
Daniel, (D) VA, 6th Dist.	1968	22% Black 1% Spanish 23% Total	Mondale 33% Reagan 65%	ADA- 5 ACLU- 7 COPE- 12 AV= 8
Daub, (R) NE, 2nd Dist.	1980	7% Black 2% Spanish 1% Asian 10% Total	Mondale 32% Reagan 32%	ADA- 50 ACLU- 10 COPE- 14 AV= 9.6
dela Garza, (D) CA, 15th Dist.	1964	66% Spanish 1% Black 67% Total	Mondale 54% Reagan 46%	ADA- 55 ACLU- 50 COPE- 60 AV= 55
DeLay, (R) TX, 22nd Dist.	1984	12% Spanish 9% Black 3% Asian 24% Total	Mondale 30% Reagan 70%	ADA- 0 ACLU- 5 COPE- 3 AV= 2.6
Dellums, (D) CA, 8th Dist.	1970	24% Black 8% Asian 6% Spanish 38% Total	Mondale 65% Reagan 34%	ADA- 100 ACLU- 89 COPE- 91 AV= 93.3
Dickinson, (R) AL, 2nd Dist.	1964	27% Black 1% Spanish 28% Total	Mondale 36% Reagan 63%	ADA- 15 ACLU- 26 COPE- 12 AV= 17.6

Dreier, (R) CA, 33rd Dist.	1980	16% Spanish 5% Black 4% Asian 1% Am Ind 26% Total	Mondale 29% Reagan 70%	ADA- 0 ACLU- 5 COPE- 1 AV= 2
Duncan, (R) TN, 2nd Dist.	1964	6% Black 1% Spanish 7% Total	Mondale 35% Reagan 64%	ADA- 10 ACLU- 0 COPE- 19 AV= 9.6
Dymally, (D) CA, 31st Dist.	1980	31% Black 21% Spanish 8% Asian 1% Am Ind 61% Total	Mondale 58% Reagan 41%	ADA- 100 ACLU- 95 COPE- 93 AV= 96
Dyson, (D) MD, 1st Dist.	1980	17% Black 1% Asian 1% Spanish 19% Total	Mondale 35% Reagan 65%	ADA- 30 ACLU- 10 COPE- 72 AV= 37.3
Edwards, (D) CA, 10th Dist.	1962	24% Spanish 10% Asian 5% Black 1% Am Ind 40% Total	Mondale 48% Reagan 51%	ADA- 100 ACLU- 100 COPE- 93 AV= 97.6
Edwards, (D) OK, 5th Dist.	1976	5% Black 3% Am Ind 2% Spanish 1% Asian 11% Total	Mondale 23% Reagan 76%	ADA- 10 ACLU- 18 COPE- 8 AV= 12
Emerson, (R) MO, 8th Dist.	1980	3% Black 3% Total	Mondale 31% Reagan 69%	ADA- 50 ACLU- 5 COPE- 12 AV= 7.3
English, (D) OK, 6th Dist.	1974	9% Black 3% Am Ind 2% Spanish 14% Total	Mondale 30% Reagan 69%	ADA- 35 ACLU- 20 COPE- 29 AV= 28

Erdreich, (D) AL, 6th Dist.	1982	31% Black 1% Spanish 32% Total	Mondale 41% Reagan 59%	ADA- 55 ACLU- 25 COPE- 73 AV= 51
Evans, (D) IL, 17th Dist.	1982	2% Black 2% Spanish 4% Total	Mondale 46% Reagan 54%	ADA- 100 ACLU- 95 COPE- 93 AV= 96
Fawell, (R) IL, 13th Dist.	1984	2% Asian 2% Spanish 1% Black 5% Total	Mondale 46% Reagan 54%	ADA- 20 ACLU- 20 COPE- 10 AV= 16.6
Fielder, (R) CA, 21st Dist.	1980	9% Spanish 3% Asian 2% Black 1% Am Ind 15% Total	Mondale 27% Reagan 72%	ADA- 20 ACLU- 50 COPE- 18 AV= 29.3
Fields, (R) TX, 8th Dist.	1980	15% Black 11% Spanish 1% Asian 27% Total	Mondale 40% Reagan 60%	ADA- 5 ACLU- 5 COPE- 6 AV= 5.3
Flipppo, (D) AL AL, 5th Dist.	1976	13% Black 1% Spanish 14% Total	Mondale 40% Reagan 59%	ADA- 40 ACLU- 29 COPE- 42 AV= 37
Franklin, (R) MS, 2nd Dist.	1982	53% Black 1% Spanish 54% Total	Mondale 50% Reagan 50%	ADA- 10 ACLU- 15 COPE- 3 AV= 9.3
Frost, (D) TX, 24th Dist.	1978	29% Black 11% Spanish 1% Asian 41% Total	Mondale 47% Reagan 53%	ADA- 45 ACLU- 55 COPE- 76 AV= 58.6
Gallo, (R) NJ, 11th Dist.	1984	2% Asian 2% Black 2% Spanish 6% Total	Mondale 31% Reagan 69%	ADA- 35 ACLU- 25 COPE- 42 AV= 34

Garcia, (D) NY, 18th Dist.	1978	49% Spanish 44% Black 1% Asian 84% Total	Mondale 81% Reagan 19%	ADA- 95 ACLU- 94 COPE- 96 AV= 95
Gaydos, (D) PA, 20th Dist.	1968	5% Black 5% Total	Mondale 61% Reagan 37%	ADA- 55 ACLU- 47 COPE- 90 AV= 64
Gekas, (R) PA, 17th Dist.	1982	6% Black 1% Spanish 7% Total	Mondale 33% Reagan 66%	ADA- 10 ACLU- 15 COPE- 21
Gonzales, (D) TX, 20th Dist.	1961	56% Spanish 9% Black 1% Asian 66% Total	Mondale 59% Reagan 41%	ADA- 95 ACLU- 100 COPE- 90 AV= 95
Gordon, (D) TN, 6th Dist.	1984	7% Black 1% Spanish 8% Total	Mondale 41% Reagan 59%	ADA- 75 ACLU- 68 COPE- 73 AV= 72
Gradison, (R) OH, 2nd Dist.	1974	16% Black 1% Asian 1% Spanish 18% Total	Mondale 35% Reagan 64%	ADA- 15 ACLU- 10 COPE- 14 AV= 13
Gregg, (R) NH, 1st Dist.	1980	1% Spanish 1% Total	Mondale 32% Reagan 68%	ADA- 20 ACLU- 20 COPE- 15 AV= 18.3
Guarini, (D) NJ, 14th Dist.	1978	24% Spanish 11% Black 3% Asian 38% Total	Mondale 53% Reagan 47%	ADA- 80 ACLU- 65 COPE- 91 AV= 78.6
Hall, (D) OH, 3rd Dist.	1978	16% Black 1% Spanish 17% Total	Mondale 43% Reagan 56%	ADA- 65 ACLU- 50 COPE- 79 AV= 64.6

Hall, (D) TX, 4th Dist.	1980	13% Black 2% Spanish 15% Total	Mondale 31% Reagan 69%	ADA- 10 ACLU- 11 COPE- 37 AV= 19.3
Hammerschmidt, AR, 3rd Dist.	1966	2% Black 1% Am Ind 1% Spanish 4% Total	Mondale 30% Reagan 70%	ADA- 5 ACLU- 5 COPE- 15 AV= 8.3
Hawkins, (D) CA, 29th Dist.	1962	51% Black 32% Spanish 1% Asian 84% Total	Mondale 77% Reagan 22%	ADA- 85 ACLU- 94 COPE- 96 AV= 91.6
Hayes, (D) IL, 1st Dist.	1983	90% Black 1% Asian 1% Spanish 92% Total	Mondale 95% Reagan 5%	ADA- 95 ACLU- 94 COPE- 100 AV= 96.3
Hendon, (R) NC, 11th Dist.	1984	5% Black 1% Am Ind 1% Spanish 7% Total	Mondale 37% Reagan 63%	ADA-N/A ACLU-N/A COPE-N/A AV= N/A
Hertel, (D) MI, 14th Dist.	1980	4% Black 1% Asian 1% Spanish 6% Total	Mondale 37% Reagan 63%	ADA- 85 ACLU- 83 COPE 92 AV= 86.6
Hiler, (R) IN, 3rd Dist.	1980	4% Black 1% Spanish 5% Total	Mondale 38% Reagan 62%	ADA- 0 ACLU- 0 COPE- 5 AV= 1.6
Holt, (R) MD, 4th Dist.	1972	19% Black 1% Asian 1% Spanish 21% Total	Mondale 40% Reagan 59%	ADA- 10 ACLU- 15 COPE- 17 AV= 14
Hopkins, (R) KY, 6th Dist.	1978	9% Black 1% Spanish 10% Total	Mondale 37% Reagan 62%	ADA- 10 ACLU- 15 COPE- 27 AV= 17.3

Horton, (D) NY, 29th Dist.	1976	4% Black 1% Spanish 5% Total	Mondale 39% Reagan 61%	ADA- 75 ACLU- 73 COPE- 67 AV= 71.6
Hubbard, (D) KY, 1st Dist.	1974	8% Black 1% Spanish 9% Total	Mondale 45% Reagan 54%	ADA- 35 ACLU- 20 COPE- 63% AV= 39.3
Hughes, (D) NJ, 2nd Dist.	1974	12% Black 3% Spanish 15% Total	Mondale 38% Reagan 62%	ADA- 75 ACLU- 75 COPE- 73 AV= 74.3
Hunter, (R) CA, 45th Dist.	1980	14% Spanish 2% Asian 2% Black 1% Am Ind 19% Total	Mondale 28% Reagan 71%	ADA- 0 ACLU- 0 COPE- 24 AV= 8
Hyde, (R) IL, 6th Dist.	1974	3% Spanish 2% Asian 1% Black 6% Total	Mondale 44% Reagan 56%	ADA- 5 ACLU- 5 COPE- 16 AV= 8.6
Jacobs, (D) IN, 10th Dist.	1974	25% Black 1% Spanish 26% Total	Mondale 51% Reagan 48%	ADA- 85 ACLU- 80 COPE- 71 AV= 78.6
Jenkins, (D) GA, 9th Dist.	1976	5% Black 1% Spanish 6% Total	Mondale 31% Reagan 69%	ADA- 35 ACLU- 15 COPE- 37 AV= 16.6
Jones, (D) NC, 1st Dist.	1966	32% Black 1% Spanish 33% Total	Mondale 43% Reagan 57%	ADA- 55 ACLU- 61 COPE- 47 AV= 54.3
Jones, (D) TN, 8th Dist.	1969	18% Black 1% Spanish 19% Total	Mondale 43% Reagan 57%	ADA- 45 ACLU- 65 COPE- 62 AV= 57.3

Kaptur, (D) OH, 9th Dist.	1982	11% Black 2% Spanish 13% Total	Mondale 48% Reagan 51%	ADA- 75 ACLU- 68 COPE- 90 AV= 77.6
Kemp, (R) NY, 31st Dist.	1970	1% Asian 1% Black 1% Spanish 3% Total	Mondale 38% Reagan 62%	ADA- 15 ACLU- 21 COPE- 18 AV= 18
Kleczka, (D) WI, 4th Dist.	1984	3% Spanish 3% Total	Mondale 52% Reagan 48%	ADA- 75 ACLU- 88 COPE- 79 AV= 80.6
Kolbe, (R) AZ, 5th Dist.	1984	14% Spanish 2% Black 1% Am Ind 1% Asian 18% Total	Mondale 37% Reagan 62%	ADA- 20 ACLU- 25 COPE- 6 AV= 17
Kolter, (D) PA, 4th Dist.	1982	2% Black 2% Total	Mondale 52% Reagan 48%	ADA- 70 ACLU- 45 COPE- 90 AV= 68.3
Kramer, (R) CO, 5th Dist.	1978	6% Spanish 4% Black 1% Asian 11% Total	Mondale 25% Reagan 75%	ADA- 10 ACLU- 20 COPE- 15 AV= 15
Leath, (D) TX, 11th Dist.	1978	13% Black 8% Spanish 21% Total	Mondale 34% Reagan 66%	ADA- 40 ACLU- 26 COPE- 26 AV= 30.6
Leland, (D) TX, 18th Dist.	1978	39% Black 27% Spanish 1% Asian 67% Total	Mondale 72% Reagan 28%	ADA- 100 ACLU- 95 COPE- 94 AV= 96.3
Lent, (R) NY, 4th Dist.	1970	3% Black 3% Spanish 1% Asian 7% Total	Mondale 36% Reagan 64%	ADA- 20 ACLU- 5 COPE- 30 AV= 18.3

Lloyd, (D) TN, 3rd Dist.	1974	11% Black 1% Spanish 12% Total	Mondale 37% Reagan 63%	ADA- 20 ACLU- 30 COPE- 56 AV= 35.3
Loefler, (R) TX, 21st Dist.	1978	16% Spanish 3% Black 1% Asian 20% Total	Mondale 22% Reagan 78%	ADA- 5 ACLU- 10 COPE- 9 AV= 8
Lujan, (R) NM, 1st Dist.	1968	33% Spanish 2% Am Ind 2% Black 1% Asian 38% Total	Mondale 39% Reagan 60%	ADA- 5 ACLU- 10 COPE- 22 AV= 12.3
Mack, (R) FL, 13th Dist.	1982	4% Black 2% Spanish 6% Total	Mondale 26% Reagan 74%	ADA- 5 ACLU- 20 COPE- 10 AV= 11.6
Madigan, (R) IL, 15th Dist.	1972	5% Black 1% Spanish 6% Total	Mondale 32% Reagan 68%	ADA- 0 ACLU- 16 COPE- 29 AV= 15
Marlenee, (R) MT, 2nd Dist.	1976	5% Am Ind 1% Spanish 6% Total	Mondale 36% Reagan 63%	ADA- 0 ACLU- 10 COPE- 20 AV= 10
Martin, (R) NY, 26th Dist.	1980	1% Am Ind 1% Black 1% Spanish 3% Total	Mondale 34% Reagan 65%	ADA- 15 ACLU- 0 COPE- 27 AV= 14
Martinez, (D) CA, 30th Dist.	1982	48% Spanish 9% Asian 1% Am Ind 1% Black 59% Total	Mondale 44% Reagan 55%	ADA- 85 ACLU- 83 COPE- 99 AV= 89
Mc Cain, (R) AZ, 1st Dist.	1982	9% Spanish 3% Black 1% Am Ind 13% Total	Mondale 27% Reagan 72%	ADA- 10 ACLU- 20 COPE- 17 AV= 15.6

McGrath, (R) NY, 5th Dist.	1980	10% Black 3% Spanish 1% Asian 14% Total	Mondale 39% Reagan 60%	ADA- 20 ACLU- 30 COPE- 27 AV= 25.6
Meyers, (R) KS, 3rd Dist.	1984	8% Black 2% Spanisih 1% Asian 11% Total	Mondale 36% Reagan 63%	ADA- 25 ACLU- 20 COPE- 17 AV= 20.6
Miller, (D) CA, 7th Dist.	1974	10% Black 8% Spanish 4% Asian 1% Am Ind 23% Total	Mondale 47% Reagan 52%	ADA- 90 ACLU- 94 COPE- 89 AV= 91
Mineta, (D) CA, 13th Dist.	1974	10% Spanish 6% Asian 2% Black 1% Am Ind 19% Total	Mondale 41% Reagan 58%	ADA- 95 ACLU- 93 COPE- 88 AV= 92.6
Molinari, (R) NY, 14th Dist.	1980	6% Spanish 4% Black 2% Asian 12% Total	Mondale 34% Reagan 66%	ADA- 15 ACLU- 5 COPE- 24 AV= 14.6
Murphy, (D) PA, 22nd Dist.	1976	3% Black 3% Total	Mondale 57% Reagan 43%	ADA- 70 ACLU- 50 COPE- 80 AV= 66.6
Myers, (R) IN, 7th Dist.	1966	2% Black 1% Asian 1% Spanish 4% Total	Mondale 33% Reagan 66%	ADA- 5 ACVU- 5 COPE- 14 AV= 9.3
Neal, (D) NC, 5th Dist.	1974	15% Black 1% Spanish 16% Total	Mondale 36% Reagan 64%	ADA- 65 ACLU- 78 COPE- 51 AV= 64.6
Oakar, (D) OH, 20th Dist.	1976	2% Spanish 2% Black 1% Asian 5% Total	Mondale 51% Reagan 48%	ADA- 95 ACLU- 80 COPE- 93 AV= 89.3

Olin, (D) VA, 6th Dist.	1982	10% Black 1% Spanish 11% Total	Mondale 33% Reagan 66%	ADA- 55 ACLU- 63 COPE- 52 AV= 56.6
Parris, (R) VA, 8th Dist.	1980	10% Black 3% Asian 3% Spanish 16% Total	Mondale 38% Reagan 61%	ADA- 5 ACLU- 0 COPE- 25 AV= 10
Petri, (R) WI, 6th Dist.	1979	1% Spanish 1% Total	Mondale 38% Reagan 62%	ADA- 5 ACLU- 5 COPE- 25 AV= 11.6
Porter, (R) IL, 10th Dist.	1980	5% Black 4% Spanish 2% Asian 11% Total	Mondale 31% Reagan 68%	ADA- 15 ACLU- 5 COPE- 14 AV= 11.3
Pursell, (R) MI, 2nd Dist.	1976	5% Black 1% Asian 1% Spanish 7% Total	Mondale 35% Reagan 64%	ADA- 45 ACLU- 30 COPE- 45 AV= 40
Rangel, (D) NY, 16th Dist.	1970	49% Black 35% Spanish 1% Asian 85% Total	Mondale 84% Reagan 16%	ADA- 100 ACLU- 94 COPE- 91 AV= 95
Ray, (D) GA, 3rd Dist.	1982	31% Black 2% Spanish 1% Asian 34% Total	Mondale 45% Reagan 55%	ADA- 10 ACLU- 25 COPE- 25 AV= 20
Regula, (R) OH, 16th Dist.	1972	4% Black 1% Spanish 5% Total	Mondale 38% Reagan 62%	ADA- 15 COPE- 20 COPE- 34 AV= 23
Reid, (D) NV, 1st Dist.	1982	8% Black 7% Spanish 2% Asian 1% Am Ind 18% Total	Mondale 36% Reagan 62%	ADA- 75 ACLU- 60 COPE- 90 AV= 71.6

Rinaldo, (D) NJ, 7th Dist.	1972	10% Black 7% Spanish 1% Asian 18% Total	Mondale 37% Reagan 63%	ADA- 45 ACLU- 30 COPE- 82 AV= 52.3
Ritter, (R) PA, 15th Dist.	1978	2% Spanish 1% Black 3% Total	Mondale 42% Reagan 57%	ADA- 15% ACLU- 10 COPE- 34 AV= 19.6
Roberts, (R) KS, 1st Dist.	1980	2% Spanish 1% Black 3% Total	Mondale 25% Reagan 74%	ADA- 0 ACLU- 5 COPE- 5 AV= 3.3
Robinson, (D) AR, 2nd Dist.	1984	15% Black 1% Spanish 16% Total	Mondale 40% Reagan 60%	ADA- 25 ACLU- 25 COPE- 73 AV= 41
Roemer, (D) LA, 4th Dist.	1980	29% Black 2% Spanish 31% Total	Mondale 34% Reagan 65%	ADA- 35 ACLU- 21 COPE- 25 AV= 27
Roukema, (R) NJ, 5th Dist.	1980	2% Spanish 1% Asian 1% Black 4% Total	Mondale 29% Reagan 71%	ADA- 30 ACLU- 40 COPE- 27 AV= 32.3
Rowland, (R) CT, 5th Dist.	1984	4% Black 3% Spanish 7% Total	Mondale 33% Reagan 67%	ADA- 50 ACLU- 25 COPE- 48 AV= 41
Roybal, (D) CA, 25th Dist.	1962	57% Spanish 10% Black 8% Asian 1% Am Ind 76% Total	Mondale 60% Reagan 39%	ADA- 95 ACLU- 100 COPE- 93 AV= 96
Russo, (D) IL, 3rd Dist.	1974	5% Black 3% Spanish 1% Asian 9% Total	Mondale 35% Reagan 65%	ADA- 65 ACLU- 43 COPE- 78 AV= 62

Savage, (D) IL, 2nd Dist.	1980	66% Black 7% Spanish 73% Total	Mondale 84% Reagan 16%	ADA- 95 ACLU- 100 COPE- 98 AV= 97.6
Saxton, (R) NJ, 13th Dist.	1984	7% Black 2% Spanish 1% Asian 10% Total	Mondale 35% Reagan 65%	ADA- 30 ACLU- 15 COPE- 32 AV= 25.6
Schroeder, (D) CO, 1st Dist.	1972	15% Spanish 11% Black 1% Asian 27% Total	Mondale 53% Reagan 47%	ADA- 95 ACLU- 85 COPE- 74 AV= 84.6
Schuetz, (R) MI, 10th Dist.	1984	1% Black 1% Spanish 2% Total	Mondale 32% Reagan 67%	ADA- 10 ACLU- 5 COPE- 13 AV= 9.3
Sensenbrenner, WI, 9th Dist.	1978	1% Spanish 1% Total	Mondale 35% Reagan 65%	ADA- 0 ACLU- 20 COPE- 10 AV= 10
Sijander, (R) MI, 4th Dist.	1981	6% Black 1% Spanish 7% Total	Mondale 30% Reagan 69%	ADA- 0 ACLU- 10 COPE- 8 AV= 6
Skeen, (R) NM, 2nd Dist.	1980	29% Spanish 3% Black 1% Am Ind 1% Asian 34% Total	Mondale 33% Reagan 66%	ADA- 10 ACLU- 10 COPE- 8 AV= 9.3
Skelton, (D) MO, 4th Dist.	1976	3% Black 1% Spanish 4% Total	Mondale 33% Reagan 67%	ADA- 35 ACLU- 20 COPE- 66 AV= 40.3
Slaughter, (D) Ny, 30th Dist.	1986	4% Black 1% Asian 1% Spanish 6% Total	Mondale 37% Reagan 63%	ADA-N/A ACLU-N/A COPE-N/A AV= N/A

Smith, (R) NH, 1st Dist.	1984	1% Spanish 1% Total	Mondale 29% Reagan 70%	ADA- 5 ACLU- 0 COPE- 16 AV= 7
Snyder, (R) KY, 4th Dist.	1966	2% Black 2% Total	Mondale 30% Reagan 70%	ADA- 15 ACLU- 20 COPE- 21 AV= 18.6
Soloman, (R) NY, 24th Dist.	1978	1% Black 1% Spanish 2% Total	Mondale 31% Reagan 69%	ADA- 0 ACLU- 0 COPE- 20 AV= 6.6
Spence, (R) SC, 2nd Dist.	1970	32% Black 1% Asian 1% Spanish 34% Total	Mondale 36% Reagan 62%	ADA- 0 ACLU- 0 COPE- 14 AV= 4.6
Staggers, (D) WV, 2nd Dist.	1982	3% Black 1% Spanish 4% Total	Mondale 42% Reagan 58%	ADA- 80 ACLU- 65 COPE- 90 AV= 78.3
Stenholm, (D) TX, 17th Dist.	1978	9% Spanish 3% Black 12% Total	Mondale 32% Reagan 68%	ADA- 5 ACLU- 5 COPE- 16 AV= 8.6
Stratton, (D) NY, 23rd Dist.	1958	4% Black 1% Spanish 1% Asian 6% Total	Mondale 47% Reagan 53%	ADA- 45 ACLU- 31 COPE- 78 AV= 58
Stump, (R) AZ, 3rd Dist.	1976	9% Spanish 4% Am Ind 1% Asian 1% Black 15% Total	Mondale 28% Reagan 71%	ADA- 0 ACLU- 5 COPE- 10 AV= 5
Sundquist, (R) TN, 7th Dist.	1982	11% Black 1% Asian 1% Spanish 13% Total	Mondale 34% Reagan 66%	ADA- 5 ACLU- 0 COPE- 17 AV= 7.3

Sweeney, (R) TX, 14th Dist.	1984	17% Spanish 11% Black 28% Total	Mondale 32% Reagan 67%	ADA- 5 ACLU- 5 COPE- 10 AV= 6.6
Swindall (R) GA, 4th Dist.	1984	11% Black 2% Spanish 1% Asian 14% Total	Mondale 34% Reagan 66%	ADA- 0 ACLU- 0 COPE- 10 AV= 3.3
Tallon, (D) SC, 6th Dist.	1982	37% Black 1% Spanish 38% Total	Mondale 42% Reagan 57%	ADA- 40 ACLU- 0 COPE- 63 AV= 34.3
Tauzin, (D) LA, 3rd Dist.	1980	18% Black 3% Spanish 1% Am Ind 1% Asian 23% Total	Mondale 33% Reagan 65%	ADA- 20 ACLU- 10 COPE- 35 AV= 21.6
Taylor, (R) MO, 7th Dist.	1972	1% Am Ind 1% Black 1% Spanish 3% Total	Mondale 31% Reagan 69%	ADA- 5 ACLU- 5 COPE- 12 AV= 7.3
Towns, (D) NY, 11th Dist.	1982	47% Black 34% Spanish 1% Asian 82% Total	Mondale 78% Reagan 21%	ADA- 95 ACLU- 94 COPE- 98 AV= 95.6
Trafficant, (D) OH, 17th Dist.	1984	10% Black 1% Spanish 11% Total	Mondale 57% Reagan 42%	ADA- 95A ACLU- 65 COPE- 100 AV= 86.6
Valentine, (D) NC, 2nd Dist.	1982	36% Black 1% Spanish 37% Total	Mondale 47% Reagan 53%	ADA- 30 ACLU- 25 COPE- 39 AV= 31.3
VanderJagt, MI, 9th Dist.	1966	4% Black 1% Spanish 5% Total	Mondale 31% Reagan 69%	ADA- 0 ACLU- 5 COPE- 16 AV= 7

Visclosky, (D) IN, 1st Dist.	1984	22% Black 7% Spanish 29% Total	Mondale 57% Reagan 43%	ADA- 90 ACLU-90 COPE- 81 AV= 87
Watkins, (D) OK, 3rd Dist.	1976	6% Am Ind 4% Black 1% Spanish 11% Total	Mondale 38% Reagan 62%	ADA- 40 ACLU- 40 COPE- 41 AV= 40.3
Whitley, (D) NC, 3rd Dist.	1976	25% Black 2% Spanish 1% Am Ind 28% Total	Mondale 39% Reagan 61%	ADA- 25 ACLU- 55 COPE- 49 AV= 43
Whittaker, (R) KS, 5th Dist.	1978	2% Black 1% Am Ind 1% Spanish 4% Total	Mondale 32% Reagan 67%	ADA- 10 ACLU- 10 COPE- 8 AV- 9.3
Wirth, (D) CO, 1st Dist.	1974	7% Spanish 1% Asian 1% Black 9% Total	Mondale 39% Reagan 61%	ADA- 85 ACLU- 90 COPE- 76 AV= 83.6
Yatron, (D) PA, 6th Dist.	1968	1% Black 1% Spanish 2% Total	Mondale 36% Reagan 64%	ADA- 65 ACLU- 36 COPE- 82 AV= 61
Young, (R) FL, 8th Dist.	1970	7% Black 1% Spanish 8% Total	Mondale 37% Reagan 63%	ADA- 25 ACLU- 13 COPE- 15 AV= 17.6

Source: Barone, Michael, and Grant Ujifusa. 1985. The Almanac of American Politics, 1986.
Washington, D.C.: National Journal Inc.

Source: Barone, Michael, and Grant Ujifusa. 1987. The Almanac of American Politics, 1988.
Washington, D.C.: National Journal, Inc.

Appendix I

Analysis of Liberal Democrats Votes on IRCA Members Who Voted For IRCA, 1986

Member/Dist.	Year Elected	% Minority Population	Pres. Vote	Liberalism Index
Ackerman, (D) NY, 7th Dist.	1983	17% Spanish 11% Black 6% Asian 34% Total	Mondale 53% Reagan 46%	ADA- 85 ACLU- 94 COPE- 98 AV= 92.3
Alexander, (D) AR, 1st Dist.	1968	16% Black 1% Spanish 17% Total	Mondale 46% Reagan 57%	ADA- 75 ACLU- 70 COPE- 67 AV= 70.6
Annunzio, (D) IL, 11th Dist.	1964	5% Spanish 4% Asian 9% Total	Mondale 41% Reagan 59%	ADA- 70 ACLU- 60 COPE- 92 AV= 74
Anthony, (D) AR, 4th Dist.	1978	25% Black 1% Spanish 26% Total	Mondale 44% Reagan 56%	ADA- 50 ACLU- 60 COPE- 52 AV= 54
Aspin, (D) WI, 1st Dist.	1970	3% Black 2% Spanish 5% Total	Mondale 45% Reagan 55%	ADA- 50 ACLU- 77 COPE- 84 AV= 70.3
Atkins, (D) MA, 5th Dist.	1984	3% Spanish 1% Asian 1% Black 5% Total	Mondale 43% Reagan 57%	ADA- 90 ACLU- 89 COPE- 86 AV= 88.3
AuCoin, (D) OR, 1st Dist.	1974	2% Spanish 2% Asian 1% Am Ind 1% Black 6% Total	Mondale 43% Reagan 57%	ADA- 89 ACLU- 71 COPE- 75 AV= 78.3

Barnes, (D) MD, 8th Dist.	1978	8% Black 4% Asian 4% Spanish 16% Total	Mondale 51% Reagan 48%	ADA- 85 ACLU- 90 COPE- 90 AV= 88.3
Bates, (D) CA, 44th Dist.	1982	22% Spanish 13% Black 7% Asian 1% Amer Ind 43% Total	Mondale 47% Reagan 52%	ADA- 90 ACLU- 80 COPE- 82 AV= 84
Bedell, (D) IA, 6th Dist.	1974	1% Spanish 1% Total	Mondale 42% Reagan 57%	ADA- 70 ACLU- 45 COPE- 60 AV= 58.3
Beilenson, (D) CA, 23rd Dist.	1976	8% Spanish 3% Asian 3% Black 14% Total	Mondale 46% Reagan 53%	ADA- 80 ACLU- 83 COPE- 76 AV= 79.6
Berman, (D) CA, 26th Dist.	1982	20% Spanish 4% Black 3% Asian 1% Am Ind 28% Total	Mondale 45% Reagan 54%	ADA- 95 ACLU- 94 COPE- 88 AV= 92.3
Boehlert, (R) NY, 25th Dist.	1982	2% Black 1% Spanish 3% Total	Mondale 37% Reagan 63%	ADA- 50 ACLU- 50 COPE- 66 AV= 55.3
Boland, (D) MA, 2nd Dist.	1952	4% Black 3% Spanish 7% Total	Mondale 46% Reagan 53%	ADA- 70 ACLU- 57 COPE- 90 AV= 72.3
Bonoir, (D) MI, 12th Dist.	1976	2% Black 1% Spanish 3% Total	Mondale 33% Reagan 66%	ADA- 95 ACLU- 84 COPE- 92 AV= 90.3
Bonker, (D) WA, 3rd Dist.	1974	1% Spanish 1% Asian 1% Am Ind 1% Black 4% Total	Mondale 45% Reagan 53%	ADA- 70 ACLU- 89 COPE- 82 AV= 80.3

Borski, (D) PA, 3rd Dist.	1982	7% Black 1% Spanish 1% Asian 9% Total	Mondale 46% Reagan 54%	ADA- 75 ACLU- 60 COPE- 97 AV= 77.3
Bosco, (D) CA, 1st Dist.	1982	5% Spanish 2% Am Ind 1% Asian 1% Black 9% Total	Mondale 46% Reagan 52%	ADA- 70 ACLU- 76 COPE- 78 AV= 74.6
Boucher, (D) VA, 9th Dist.	1982	2% Black 1% Spanish 3% Total	Mondale 41% Reagan 58%	ADA- 70 ACLU- 87 COPE- 75 AV= 77.3
Brown, (D) CA, 36th Dist.	1972	20% Spanish 7% Black 1% Asian 1% Am Ind 29% Total	Mondale 43% Reagan 56%	ADA- 95 ACLU- 94 COPE- 90 AV= 93
Bruce, (D) IL, 19th Dist.	1984	3% Black 1% Asian 1% Spanish 5% Total	Mondale 38% Reagan 62%	ADA- 80 ACLU- 70 COPE- 87 AV= 79
Bryant, (D) TX, 5th Dist.	1982	18% Black 10% Spanish 1% Asian 29% Total	Mondale 41% Reagan 59%	ADA- 65 ACLU- 55 COPE- 92 AV= 70.6
Carper, (D) DE, 1st Dist.	1982	14% Black 1% Spanish 1% Asian 16% Total	Mondale 40% Reagan 60%	ADA- 55 ACLU- 50 COPE- 69 AV= 58
Coleman, (D) TX, 16th Dist.	1982	55% Spanish 4% Black 1% Asian 60% Total	Mondale 43% Reagan 57%	ADA- 70 ACLU- 65 COPE- 83 AV= 72.6
Conte, (D) MA, 1st Dist.	1958	1% Black 1% Spanish 2% Total	Mondale 49% Reagan 51%	ADA- 75 ACLU- 65 COPE- 64 AV= 68

Cooper, (D) TN, 4th Dist.	1982	4% Black 1% Spanish 5% Total	Mondale 42% Reagan 57%	ADA-70 ACLU- 75 COPE- 65 AV= 70
Coyne, (D) PA, 14th Dist.	1980	19% Black 1% Spanish 1% Asian 21% Total	Mondale 68% Reagan 30%	ADA- 100 ACLU- 90 COPE- 95 AV= 95
Daschle, (D) SD, 1st Dist.	1978	5% Am Ind 5% Total	Mondale 37% Reagan 63%	ADA- 70 ACLU- 65 COPE- 75 AV= 70
Derrick, (D) SC, 3rd Dist.	1974	20% Black 1% Spanish 21% Total	Mondale 32% Reagan 67%	ADA- 55 ACLU- 70 COPE- 54 AV= 59.6
Dicks, (D) WA, 6th Dist.	1976	6% Black 3% Asian 2% Spanish 1% Am Ind 18% Total	Mondale 42% Reagan 57%	ADA- 70 ACLU- 80 COPE- 83 AV= 77.6
Dingell, (D) Mi, 16th Dist.	1955	3% Black 2% Spanish 5% Total	Mondale 40% Reagan 60%	ADA- 75 ACLU- 75 COPE- 92 AV= 80.6
Donnelly, (D) MA, 11th Dist.	1978	7% Black 1% Asian 1% Spanish 9% Total	Mondale 48% Reagan 52%	ADA- 75 ACLU- 60 COPE- 88 AV= 74.3
Dorgan, (D) ND, 1st Dist.	1980	0% Total	Mondale 34% Reagan 65%	ADA- 70 ACLU- 70 COPE- 72 AV= 70.6
Downey, (D) NY, 2nd Dist.	1974	8% Black 6% Spanish 1% Asian 15% Total	Mondale 33% Reagan 66%	ADA- 95 ACLU- 94 COPE- 87 AV= 92

Durbin, (D) IL, 20th Dist.	1982	4% Black 4% Total	Mondale 42% Reagan 58%	ADA- 85 ACLU- 65 COPE- 84 AV= 78
Dwyer, (D) NJ, 6th Dist.	1980	8% Black 5% Spanish 1% Asian 14% Total	Mondale 41% Reagan 59%	ADA- 80 ACLU- 66 COPE- 96 AV= 80.6
Early, (D) MA, 3rd Dist.	1974	2% Spanish 1% Black 3% Total	Mondale 43% Reagan 57%	ADA- 85 ACLU- 68 COPE- 85 AV= 79.1
Eckart, (D) OH, 11th Dist.	1980	2% Black 2% Total	Mondale 40% Reagan 59%	ADA- 65 ACLU- 75 COPE- 86 AV= 75.3
Evans, (D) IL, 17th Dist.	1982	2% Black 2% Spanish 4% Total	Mondale 46% Reagan 54%	ADA-90 ACLU- 85 COPE- 90 AV= 88.3
Fascell, (D) FL, 19th Dist.	1954	21% Spanish 10% Black 1% Asian 32% Total	Mondale 35% Reagan 65%	ADA- 70 ACLU- 55 COPE- 83 AV= 69.3
Fazio, (D) CA, 4th Dist.	1978	10% Spanish 5% Black 4% Asian 1% Am Ind 20% Total	Mondale 43% Reagan 56%	ADA- 80 ACLU- 95 COPE- 87 AV= 87.3
Feighan, (D) OH, 19th Dist.	1982	1% Black 1% Asian 2% Total	Mondale 40% Reagan 59%	ADA- 95 ACLU- 90 COPE- 89 AV= 91.3
Florio, (D) NJ, 1st Dist.	1974	13% Black 3% Spanish 1% Asian 17% Total	Mondale 45% Reagan 55%	ADA- 70 ACLU- 68 COPE- 92 AV= 76.6

Foglietta, (D) PA, 1st Dist.	1980	29% Black 7% Spanish 2% Asian 38% Total	Mondale 65% Reagan 35%	ADA- 90 ACLU- 84 COPE- 97 AV= 90.3
Foley, (D) WA, 5th Dist.	1964	2% Spanish 1% Am Ind 1% Asian 1% Black 5% Total	Mondale 39% Reagan 60%	ADA- 75 ACLU- 85 COPE- 80 AV= 80
Ford, (D) MI, 15th Dist.	1964	5% Black 1% Spanish 1% Asian 7% Total	Mondale 39% Reagan 61%	ADA- 80 ACLU- 88 COPE- 97 AV= 88.3
Frank, (D) MA, 4th Dist.	1980	1% Asian 1% Black 1% Spanish 3% Total	Mondale 51% Reagan 48%	ADA- 100 ACLU- 95 COPE- 91 AV= 95.3
Gejdenson, (D) CT, 2nd Dist.	1980	3% Black 1% Spanish 1% Asian 5% Total	Mondale 39% Reagan 61%	ADA- 95 ACLU- 90 COPE- 89 AV= 91.3
Gephardt, (D) MO, 3rd Dist.	1976	1% Black 1% Spanish 2% Total	Mondale 35% Reagan 65%	ADA- 70 ACLU- 64 COPE- 80 AV= 71.3
Gilman, (R) NY, 22nd Dist.	1972	6% Black 4% Spanish 1% Asian 11% Total	Mondale 38% Reagan 61%	ADA- 40 ACLU- 45 COPE- 72 AV= 52.3
Glickman, (D) KS, 4th Dist.	1976	6% Black 2% Spanish 1% Asian 1% Amer Ind 10% Total	Mondale 35% Reagan 63%	ADA- 55 ACLU- 70 COPE- 61 AV= 62
Gray, (D) IL, 22nd Dist.	1984	6% Black 1% Spanish 7% Total	Mondale 42% Reagan 56%	ADA- 5 ACLU- 66 COPE- 91 AV= 54

Hamilton, (D) IN, 9th Dist.	1964	2% Black 1% Spanish 3% Total	Mondale 39% Reagan 60%	ADA- 55 ACLU- 75 COPE- 67 AV= 65.6
Hefner, (D) NC, 8th Dist.	1974	18% Black 1% Am Ind 1% Spanish 20% Total	Mondale 34% Reagan 66%	ADA- 50 ACLU- 58 COPE- 51 AV= 53
Howard, (D) NJ, 3rd Dist.	1964	7% Black 2% Spanish 1% Asian 10% Total	Mondale 33% Reagan 77%	ADA- 85 ACLU- 75 COPE- 94 AV= 84.6
Hoyer, (D) MD, 5th Dist.	1981	31% Black 2% Asian 2% Spanish 35% Total	Mondale 57% Reagan 42%	ADA-75 ACLU- 95 COPE- 92 AV= 87.3
Jeffords, (R) VT, 1st Dist.	1974	1% Spanish 1% Total	Mondale 41% Reagan 58%	ADA- 60 ACLU- 68 COPE- 48 AV= 58.6
Johnson, (D) CT, 6th Dist.	1982	2% Black 2% Spanish 4% Total	Mondale 37% Reagan 63%	ADA- 67 ACLU- 42 COPE- 52 AV= 53.6
Kanjorski, (D) PA, 11th Dist.	1984	1% Black 1% Total	Mondale 44% Reagan 55%	ADA- 65 ACLU- 40 COPE- 84 AV= 63
Kastenmeier, (D) WI, 2nd Dist.	1958	1% Black 1% Asian 1% Spanish 3% Total	Mondale 51% Reagan 49%	ADA- 100 ACLU- 95 COPE- 89 AV= 94.6
Kennelly, (D) CT, 1st Dist	1982	10% Black 5% Spanish 1% Asian 16% Total	Mondale 47% Reagan 53%	ADA- 85 ACLU- 84 COPE- 89 AV= 86

Kildee, (D) MI, 7th Dist.	1976	14% Black 1% Spanish 15% Total	Mondale 45% Reagan 54%	ADA- 95 ACLU- 89 COPE- 94 AV= 92.6
Kostmayer, (D) PA, 8th Dist.	1982	2% Black 1% Spanish 1% Asian 4% Total	Mondale 36% Reagan 64%	ADA- 90 ACLU- 95 COPE- 87 AV= 90.6
LaFalce, (D) NY, 32nd Dist.	1974	7% Black 1% Am Ind 1% Spanish 9% Total	Mondale 45% Reagan 55%	ADA- 85 ACLU- 63 COPE- 83 AV= 77
Lantos, (D) CA, 11th Dist.	1980	12% Spanish 9% Asian 6% Black 27% Total	Mondale 49% Reagan 50%	ADA- 70 ACLU- 65 COPE- 93 AV= 76
Lehman, (D) CA, 18th Dist.	1982	21% Spanish 6% Black 4% Asian 1% Am Ind 32% Total	Mondale 48% Reagan 51%	ADA- 75 ACLU- 73 COPE- 91 AV= 79.6
Lehman, (D) FL, 17th Dist.	1972	24% Spanish 22% Black 1% Asian 47% Total	Mondale 54% Reagan 46%	ADA- 100 ACLU- 95 COPE- 87 AV= 94
Levin, (D) MI, 17th Dist.	1982	10% Black 1% Asian 1% Spanish 12% Total	Mondale 46% Reagan 54%	ADA- 85 ACLU- 85 COPE- 92 AV= 87.3
Levine, (D) CA CA, 27th Dist.	1982	12% Spanish 9% Black 5% Asian 1% Am Ind 27% Total	Mondale 46% Reagan 52%	ADA- 85 ACLU- 94 COPE- 94 AV= 91
Lipinski, (D) IL, 5th Dist.	1982	21% Spanish 3% Black 2% Asian 26% Total	Mondale 42% Reagan 58%	ADA- 45 ACLU- 26 COPE- 90 AV= 53.6

Lowry, (D) WA, 7th Dist.	1978	8% Black 7% Asian 2% Spanish 1% Am Ind 18% Total	Mondale 58% Reagan 41%	ADA- 95 ACLU- 100 COPE- 81 AV= 92
Luken, (D) OH, 1st Dist.	1976	14% Black 1% Spanish 15% Total	Mondale 35% Reagan 65%	ADA- 80 ACLU- 68 COPE- 77 AV= 75
Manton, (D) NY, 9th Dist.	1984	15% Spanish 5% Asian 3% Black 23% Total	Mondale 43% Reagan 57%	ADA- 75 ACLU- 65 COPE- 90 AV= 76.6
Markey, (D) MA, 9th Dist.	1976	1% Asian 1% Black 1% Spanish 3% Total	Mondale 49% Reagan 50%	ADA- 95 ACLU- 93 COPE- 89 AV= 92.3
Matsui, (D) CA, 3rd Dist.	1978	8% Spanish 7% Black 6% Asian 1% Am Ind 22% Total	Mondale 44% Reagan 55%	ADA- 95 ACLU- 90 COPE- 90 AV= 91.6
Mavroules, (D) MA, 6th Dist.	1978	1% Black 1% Spanish 2% Total	Mondale 44% Reagan 55%	ADA- 85 ACLU- 55 COPE- 92 AV= 77.3
Mazzoli, (D) KY, 3rd Dist.	1970	18% Black 1% Spanish 19% Total	Mondale 48% Reagan 52%	ADA- 50 ACLU- 50 COPE- 66 AV= 55.3
Mc Closkey, (D) IN, 8th Dist.	1982	2% Black 2% Total	Mondale 39% Reagan 60%	ADA- 55 ACLU- 57 COPE- 85 AV= 65.6
McHugh, (D) NY, 28th Dist.	1974	3% Black 2% Spanish 1% Asian 6% Total	Mondale 39% Reagan 61%	ADA- 80 ACLU- 75 COPE- 81 AV= 78.6

McKinney, (D) CT, 4th Dist.	1970	9% Black 6% Spanish 1% Asian 16% Total	Mondale 36% Reagan 63%	ADA- 50 ACLU- 73 COPE- 60 AV= 61
Milkulski, (D) MD, 3rd Dist.	1976	14% Black 1% Spanish 1% Asian 16% Total	Mondale 49% Reagan 50%	ADA-85 ACLU- 88 COPE- 90 AV= 87.6
Miller, (D) CA, 7th Dist.	1974	10% Black 8% Spanish 4% Asian 1% Am Ind 23% Total	Mondale 47% Reagan 52%	ADA- 90 ACLU- 94 COPE- 89 AV= 91
Moakley, (D) MA, 9th Dist.	1972	14% Black 4% Spanish 1% Asian 19% Total	Mondale 51% Reagan 48%	ADA- 95 ACLU- 65 COPE- 92 AV= 84
Mollohan, (D) WV, 1st Dist.	1982	2% Black 1% Spanish 3% Total	Mondale 43% Reagan 57%	ADA- 50 ACLU- 40 COPE- 90 AV= 60
Moody, (D) WI, 5th Dist.	1982	22% Black 2% Spanish 1% Asian 25% Total	Mondale 60% Reagan 40%	ADA- 90 ACLU- 94 COPE- 90 AV= 91.3
Morrison, (D) CT, 3rd Dist.	1982	9% Black 2% Spanish 1% Asian 12% Total	Mondale 41% Reagan 59%	ADA- 80 ACLU- 95 COPE- 86 AV= 87
Mrazek, (D) NY, 3rd Dist.	1982	3% Black 2% Spanish 1% Asian 6% Total	Mondale 35% Reagan 64%	ADA- 80 ACLU- 95 COPE- 86 AV= 87
Murtha, (D) PA, 12th Dist.	1974	1% Black 1% Total	Mondale 50% Reagan 50%	ADA- 40 ACLU- 42 COPE- 84 AV= 55.3

Natcher, (D) KY, 2nd Dist.	1953	6% Black 1% Spanish 7% Total	Mondale 36% Reagan 63%	ADA- 65 ACLU- 50 COPE- 72 AV= 62.3
Nowak, (D) NY, 33rd Dist.	1974	17% Black 2% Spanish 19% Total	Mondale 63% Reagan 37%	ADA- 95 ACLU- 75 COPE- 91 AV= 87
Oberstar, (DFL) MN, 8th Dist.	1974	1% Am Ind 1% Total	Mondale 59% Reagan 40%	ADA- 85 ACLU- 75 COPE- 93 AV= 84.3
Obey, (D) WI, 7th Dist.	1982	1% Amer Ind 1% Total	Mondale 47% Reagan 53%	ADA- 85 ACLU- 94 COPE- 86 AV= 88.3
Panetta, (D) CA, 16th Dist.	1976	18% Spanish 5% Asian 4% Black 1% Am Ind 28% Total	Mondale 46% Reagan 53	ADA- 85 ACLU- 84 COPE- 72 AV= 80.3
Pease, (D) OH, 13th Dist.	1976	5% Black 2% Spanish 7% Total	Mondale 40% Reagan 58%	ADA- 75 ACLU- 80 COPE- 82 AV= 79
Penny, (DFL) MN, 1st Dist.	1982	1% Spanish 1% Total	Mondale 44% Reagan 55%	ADA- 75 ACLU- 65 COPE- 55 AV= 65
Pepper, (D) FL, 18th Dist.	1962	50% Spanish 13% Black 1% Asian 64% Total	Mondale 40% Reagan 60%	ADA- 70 ACLU- 68 COPE- 94 AV= 77.3
Perkins, (D) KY, 7th Dist.	1984	1% Black 1% Spanish 2% Total	Mondale 51% Reagan 49%	ADA- 80 ACLU- 75 COPE- 90 AV= 81.6

Pickle, (D) TX, 10th Dist.	1963	15% Spanish 9% Black 1% Asian 25% Total	Mondale 42% Reagan 58%	ADA- 40 ACLU- 65 COPE- 52 AV= 52.3
Price, (D) IL, 21st Dist.	1944	12% Black 1% Spanish 13% Total	Mondale 47% Reagan 53%	ADA- 65 ACLU- 65 COPE- 96 AV= 75.3
Rahall, (D) WV, 4th Dist.	1976	6% Black 1% Spanish 7% Total	Mondale 50% Reagan 49%	ADA- 90 ACLU- 65 COPE- 86 AV= 80.3
Roe, (D) NJ, 8th Dist.	1969	12% Black 10% Spanish 1% Asian 23% Total	Mondale 42% Reagan 58%	ADA- 75 ACLU- 50 COPE- 91 AV= 72
Rodino, (D) NJ, 10th Dist.	1948	54% Black 12% Spanish 1% Asian 67% Total	Mondale 75% Reagan 25%	ADA- 100 ACLU- 100 COPE- 95 AV= 98.3
Rose, (D) NC, 7th Dist.	1972	25% Black 7% Am Ind 2% Spanish 1% Asian 35% Total	Mondale 43% Reagan 57%	ADA- 55 ACLU- 66 COPE- 62 AV= 61
Rostenkowski, (D) IL, 8th Dist.	1958	25% Spanish 3% Black 2% Asian 30% Total	Mondale 49% Reagan 51%	ADA- 65 ACLU- 63 COPE- 87 AV= 71.6
Sabo, (DFL) MN, 5th Dist.	1978	5% Black 1% Am Ind 1% Asian 7% Total	Mondale 62% Reagan 38%	ADA- 95 ACLU- 95 COPE- 90 AV= 93.3
Scheuer, (D) NY, 8th Dist.	1974	12% Spanish 9% Black 4% Asian 25% Total	Mondale 53% Reagan 47%	ADA- 95 ACLU- 85 COPE- 92 AV= 90.6

Schumer, (D) NY, 10th Dist.	1980	7% Spanish 4% Black 2% Asian 13% Total	Mondale 51% Reagan 49%	ADA- 85 ACLU- 90 COPE- 93 AV= 89.3
Sharp, (D) IN, 2nd Dist.	1974	2% Black 1% Spanish 3% Total	Mondale 32% Reagan 68%	ADA- 65 ACLU- 80 COPE- 72 AV= 72.3
Sikorski, (DFL) MN, 6th Dist.	1982	1% Asian 1% Spanish 2% Total	Mondale 47% Reagan 52%	ADA- 85 ACLU- 73 COPE- 94 AV= 84
Sisisky, (D) VA, 4th Dist.	1982	37% Black 1% Spanish 1% Asian 39% Total	Mondale 43% Reagan 56%	ADA- 45 ACLU- 55 COPE- 61 AV= 53.6
Slattery, (D) KS, 2nd Dist.	1982	7% Black 3% Spanish 1% Asian 1% Am Ind 12% Total	Mondale 35% Reagan 64%	ADA- 45 ACLU- 60 COPE- 56 AV= 53.6
Smith, (D) FL, 16th Dist.	1982	20% Spanish 4% Black 1% Asian 25% Total	Mondale 39% Reagan 61%	ADA- 65 ACLU- 50 COPE- 93 AV= 69.3
Solarz, (D) NY, 13th Dist.	1974	13% Spanish 6% Black 2% Asian 21% Total	Mondale 53% Reagan 47%	ADA- 90 ACLU- 87 COPE- 89 AV= 88.6
Spratt, (D) SC, 5th Dist.	1982	29% Black 1% Spanish 30% Total	Mondale 38% Reagan 62%	ADA- 60 ACLU- 70 COPE- 54 AV= 61.3
Stark, (D) CA, 9th Dist.	1972	12% Spanish 10% Black 6% Asian 1% Am Ind 29% Total	Mondale 49% Reagan 50%	ADA- 95 ACLU- 85 COPE- 93 AV= 91

Studds, (D) MA, 10th Dist.	1972	1% Black 1% Spanish 2% Total	Mondale 45% Reagan 55%	ADA- 95 ACLU- 95 COPE- 89 AV= 93
Swift, (D) WA 2nd Dist.	1978	2% Am Ind 1% Asian 1% Spanish 4% Total	Mondale 44% Reagan 55%	ADA- 90 ACLU- 90 COPE- 82 AV= 87.3
Synar, (D) OK, 2nd Dist.	1978	10% Am Ind 4% Black 1% Spanish 15% Total	Mondale 35% Reagan 64%	ADA- 70 ACLU- 88 COPE- 58 AV= 72
Torricelli, (D) NJ, 9th Dist.	1982	5% Black 4% Spanish 2% Asian 11% Total	Mondale 41% Reagan 59%	ADA- 70 ACLU- 61 COPE- 93 AV= 74.6
Traxler, (D) MI, 8th Dist.	1974	6% Black 3% Spanish 9% Total	Mondale 39% Reagan 60%	ADA- 80 ACLU- 73 COPE- 86 AV= 79.6
Udall, (D) AZ, 2nd Dist.	1961	30% Spanish 5% Black 4% Am Ind 1% Asian 40% Total	Mondale 48% Reagan 51%	ADA- 85 ACLU- 95 COPE- 86 AV= 88.6
Vento, (DFL) MN, 4th Dist.	1976	2% Black 2% Spanish 1% Asian 5% Total	Mondale 59% Reagan 40%	ADA- 90 ACLU- 84 COPE- 92 AV= 88.6
Volkmer, (D) MO, 9th Dist.	1980	3% Black 3% Total	Mondale 36% Reagan 64%	ADA- 55 ACLU- 30 COPE- 68 AV= 51
Walgren, (D) PA, 18th Dist.	1976	2% Black 1% Asian 3% Total	Mondale 41% Reagan 58%	ADA- 85 ACLU- 73 COPE- 83 AV= 80.3

Waxman, (D) CA, 24th Dist.	1974	22% Spanish 11% Asian 6% Black 39% Total	Mondale 55% Reagan 44%	ADA- 95 ACLU- 88 COPE- 88 AV= 90.3
Williams, (D) MT, 1st Dist.	1978	3% Am Ind 1% Spanish 4% Total	Mondale 40% Reagan 58%	ADA- 85 ACLU- 95 COPE- 88 AV= 89.3
Wise, (D) WV, 3rd Dist.	1982	3% Black 1% Spanish 4% Total	Mondale 44% Reagan 56%	ADA- 75 ACLU- 70 COPE- 88 AV= 77.6
Wolpe, (D) MI, 3rd Dist.	1978	8% Black 2% Spanish 10% Total	Mondale 36% Reagan 63%	ADA- 90 ACLU- 95 COPE- 90 AV= 91.6
Wright, (D) TX, 12th Dist.	1954	15% Black 9% Spanish 24% Total	Mondale 41% Reagan 58%	ADA- 80 ACLU- 81 COPE- 76 AV= 79
Wyden, (D) OR, 3rd Dist.	1980	5% Black 2% Asian 2% Spanish 9% Total	Mondale 53% Reagan 47%	ADA- 80 ACLU- 75 COPE- 80 AV= 78.3
Yates, (D) IL, 9th Dist.	1964	9% Black 8% Spanish 5% Asian 22% Total	Mondale 55% Reagan 45%	ADA- 90 ACLU- 94 COPE- 92 AV= 92
Young, (D) MO, 2nd Dist.	1976	5% Black 1% Asian 1% Spanish 7% Total	Mondale 34% Reagan 66%	ADA- 55 ACLU- 55 COPE- 77 AV= 62.3

Source: Barone, Michael, and Grant Ujifusa. 1987. The Almanac of American Politics, 1986.
Washington, D.C.: National Journal Inc.

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Appendix J

Analysis of Congressional Roll Call Votes on IRCA Members Who Voted Against IRCA, 1986

Member/Dist	Year Elected	Minority Population	Pres. Vote	Liberalism Index
Akaka, (D) HI, 2nd Dist.	1976	55% Asian 7% Spanish 2% Black 64% Total	Mondale 43% Reagan 56%	ADA- 65 ACLU- 89 COPE- 50 AV= 68
Andrews, (D) TX, 25th Dist.	1982	23% Black 12% Spanish 35% Total	Mondale 47% Reagan 53%	ADA- 50 ACLU- 55 COPE- 60 AV= 55
Applegate, (D) OH, 18th Dist.	1976	2% Black 2% Total	Mondale 46% Reagan 53%	ADA- 65 ACLU- 40 COPE- 73 AV= 59.3
Archer, (R) TX, 7th Dist.	1970	6% Spanish 3% Black 2% Asian 11% Total	Mondale 17% Reagan 83%	ADA- 0 ACLU- 5 COPE- 5 AV= 3.3
Armey, (R) TX, 26th Dist.	1984	4% Spanish 3% Black 1% Asian 8% Total	Mondale 23% Reagan 76%	ADA- 0 ACLU- 5 COPE- 3 AV= 2.6
Barnard, (R) IN, 4th Dist.	1980	4% Black 1% Spanish 5% Total	Mondale 33% Reagan 67%	ADA- 0 ACLU- 0 COPE- 5 AV= 1.6
Bartlett, (R) TX, 3rd Dist.	1982	3% Black 3% Spanish 1% Asian 7% Total	Mondale 18% Reagan 82%	ADA- 5 ACLU- 10 COPE- 5 AV= 6.6

Barton, (R) TX, 6th Dist.	1984	10% Black 5% Spanish 15% Total	Mondale 30% Reagan 70%	ADA- 0 ACLU- 0 COPE- 3 AV= 1
Bateman, (R) VA, 1st Dist.	1980	29% Black 1% Spanish 1% Asian 31% Total	Mondale 37% Reagan 62%	ADA-0 ACLU- 10 COPE- 3 AV= 4.3
Bentley, (R) MD, 2nd Dist.	1984	5% Black 1% Asian 1% Spanish 7% Total	Mondale 34% Reagan 66%	ADA- 20 ACLU- 10 COPE- 41 AV= 23.6
Bevill, (R) AL, 4th Dist.	1966	6% Black 1% Spanish 7% Total	Mondale 40% Reagan 59%	ADA- 40 ACLU- 25 COPE- 57 AV= 40.6
Biaggi, (D) NY, 19th Dist.	1968	13% Spanish 11% Black 1% Asian 25% Total	Mondale 48% Reagan 52%	ADA- 65 ACLU- 52 COPE- 88 AV= 68.3
Bilirakis, (R) FL, 9th Dist.	1982	3% Black 2% Spanish 5% Total	Mondale 33% Reagan 67%	ADA- 15 ACLU- 15 COPE- 26 AV= 18.6
Bliley, (R) VA, 3rd Dist.	1980	26% Black 1% Spanish 1% Asian 28% Total	Mondale 35% Reagan 65%	ADA- 5 ACLU- 5 COPE- 11 AV= 7
Boggs, (D) LA, 2nd Dist.	1973	52% Black 3% Spanish 1% Asian 56% Total	Mondale 62% Reagan 37%	ADA- 80 ACLU- 64 COPE- 74 AV= 72.6
Boner, (D) TN, 5th Dist.	1978	20% Black 1% Spanish 21% Total	Mondale 48% Reagan 52%	ADA- 50 ACLU- 42 COPE- 84 AV= 58.6

Boulter, (R) TX, 13th Dist.	1984	7% Spanish 5% Black 1% Asian 13% Total	Mondale 28% Reagan 72%	ADA- 5 ACLU- 5 COPE- 7 AV= 5.6
Boxer, (D) CA, 6th Dist.	1982	9% Black 9% Asian 5% Spanish 23% Total	Mondale 56% Reagan 42%	ADA- 90 ACLU- 89 COPE- 98 AV= 92.3
Broomfield, (R) MI, 17th Dist.	1956	1% Asian 1% Black 1% Spanish 3% Total	Mondale 25% Reagan 75%	ADA- 5 ACLU- 0 COPE- 19 AV= 8
Brown, (R) CO, 4th Dist.	1980	11% Spanish 1% Asian 12% Total	Mondale 32% Reagan 68%	ADA- 10 ACLU- 15 COPE- 7 AV= 10.6
Burton, (D) CA, 5th Dist.	1983	20% Asian 9% Spanish 9% Black 41% Total	Mondale 65% Reagan 33%	ADA- 90 ACLU- N/A COPE- 100 AV= 95
Burton, (R) IN, 6th Dist.	1982	3% Black 1% Spanish 4% Total	Mondale 28% Reagan 72%	ADA- 5 ACLU- 5 COPE- 14 AV= 8
Callahan, (R) AL, 1st Dist.	1984	28% Black 1% Spanish 1% Am Ind 30% Total	Mondale 34% Reagan 64%	ADA- 0 ACLU- 5 COPE- 19 AV= 8
Carney, (R) NY, 1st Dist.	1978	4% Black 3% Spanish 1% Asian 8% Total	Mondale 34% Reagan 66%	ADA- 5 ACLU- 15 COPE- 19 AV= 13
Carr, (D) MI, 6th Dist.	1982	6% Black 2% Spanish 1% Asian 9% Total	Mondale 63% Reagan 36%	ADA- 70 ACLU- 60 COPE- 83 AV= 71

Chapman, (D) TX, 1st Dist.	1985	17% Black 1% Spanish 18% Total	Mondale 38% Reagan 61%	ADA- 40 ACLU- 16 COPE- 48 AV= 34.6
Chappell, (D) FL, 4th Dist.	1968	9% Black 2% Spanish 11% Total	Mondale 33% Reagan 67%	ADA- 30 ACLU- 23 COPE- 35 AV= 29.3
Chappie, (R) CA, 2nd Dist.	1980	5% Spanish 2% Am Ind 1% Asian 8% Total	Mondale 35% Reagan 63%	ADA- 10 ACLU- 33 COPE- 8 AV= 17
Coats, (R) IN, 4th Dist.	1980	4% Black 1% Spanish 5% Total	Mondale 33% Reagan 67%	ADA- 10 ACLU- 5 COPE- 13 AV= 9.3
Cobey, (R) NC, 4th Dist.	1984	18% Black 1% Asian 1% Spanish 20% Total	Mondale 40% Reagan 60%	ADA- N/A ACLU- N/A COPE- N/A AV= N/A
Coble, (R) NC, 6th Dist.	1984	19% Black 1% Spanish 20% Total	Mondale 35% Reagan 65%	ADA- 10 ACLU- 5 COPE- 23 AV= 12.6
Coleman, (D) TX, 16th Dist.	1982	55% Spanish 4% Black 1% Asian 60% Total	Mondale 57% Reagan 43%	ADA- 70 ACLU- 65 COPE- 83 AV= 72.6
Combest, (R) TX, 19th Dist.	1984	20% Spanish 5% Black 25% Total	Mondale 25% Reagan 75%	ADA- 5 ACLU- 5 COPE- 10 AV= 6.6
Courter, (R) NJ, 12th Dist.	1978	5% Black 2% Asian 2% Spanish 9% Total	Mondale 35% Reagan 65%	ADA- 25 ACLU- 15 COPE- 26 AV= 22

Craig, (R) ID, 1st Dist.	1980	3% Spanish 1% Am Ind 1% Asian 5% Total	Mondale 30% Reagan 68%	ADA- 5 ACLU- 5 COPE- 8 AV= 6
Crane, (R) IL, 12th Dist.	1969	3% Spanish 1% Asian 1% Black 5% Total	Mondale 23% Reagan 77%	ADA- 0 ACLU- 5 COPE- 7 AV= 4
Crockett, (D) MI, 13th Dist.	1980	67% Black 3% Spanish 1% Asian 71% Total	Mondale 85% Reagan 15%	ADA- 95 ACLU- 100 COPE- 93 AV= 96
Daniel, (D) VA, 6th Dist.	1968	22% Black 1% Spanish 23% Total	Mondale 33% Reagan 65%	ADA- 5 ACLU- 7 COPE- 12 AV= 8
Daub, (R) NE, 2nd Dist.	1980	7% Black 2% Spanish 1% Asian 10% Total	Mondale 32% Reagan 32%	ADA- 50 ACLU- 10 COPE- 14 AV= 9.6
dela Garza, (D) TX, 15th Dist.	1964	66% Spanish 1% Black 67% Total	Mondale 54% Reagan 46%	ADA- 55 ACLU- 50 COPE- 60 AV= 55
DeLay, (R) TX, 22nd Dist.	1984	12% Spanish 9% Black 3% Asian 24% Total	Mondale 30% Reagan 70%	ADA- 0 ACLU- 5 COPE- 3 AV= 2.6
Dellums, (D) CA, 8th Dist.	1970	24% Black 8% Asian 6% Spanish 38% Total	Mondale 65% Reagan 34%	ADA- 100 ACLU- 89 COPE- 91 AV= 93.3
Dickinson, (R) AL, 2nd Dist.	1964	27% Black 1% Spanish 28% Total	Mondale 36% Reagan 63%	ADA- 15 ACLU- 26 COPE- 12 AV= 17.6

Dreier, (R) CA, 33rd Dist.	1980	16% Spanish 5% Black 4% Asian 1% Am Ind 26% Total	Mondale 29% Reagan 70%	ADA- 0 ACLU- 5 COPE- 1 AV= 2
Duncan, (R) TN, 2nd Dist.	1964	6% Black 1% Spanish 7% Total	Mondale 35% Reagan 64%	ADA- 10 ACLU- 0 COPE- 19 AV= 9.6
Dymally, (D) CA, 31st Dist.	1980	31% Black 21% Spanish 8% Asian 1% Am Ind 61% Total	Mondale 58% Reagan 41%	ADA- 100 ACLU- 95 COPE- 93 AV= 96
Dyson, (D) MD, 1st Dist.	1980	17% Black 1% Asian 1% Spanish 19% Total	Mondale 35% Reagan 65%	ADA- 30 ACLU- 10 COPE- 72 AV= 37.3
Edwards, (D) CA, 10th Dist.	1962	24% Spanish 10% Asian 5% Black 1% Am Ind 40% Total	Mondale 48% Reagan 51%	ADA- 100 ACLU- 100 COPE- 93 AV= 97.6
Edwards, (D) OK, 5th Dist.	1976	5% Black 3% Am Ind 2% Spanish 1% Asian 11% Total	Mondale 23% Reagan 76%	ADA- 10 ACLU- 18 COPE- 8 AV= 12
Emerson, (R) MO, 8th Dist.	1980	3% Black 3% Total	Mondale 31% Reagan 69%	ADA- 50 ACLU- 5 COPE- 12 AV= 7.3
English, (D) OK, 6th Dist.	1974	9% Black 3% Am Ind 2% Spanish 14% Total	Mondale 30% Reagan 69%	ADA- 35 ACLU- 20 COPE- 29 AV= 28

Erdreich, (D) AL, 6th Dist.	1982	31% Black 1% Spanish 32% Total	Mondale 41% Reagan 59%	ADA- 55 ACLU- 25 COPE- 73 AV= 51
Evans, (D) IL, 17th Dist.	1982	2% Black 2% Spanish 4% Total	Mondale 46% Reagan 54%	ADA- 100 ACLU- 95 COPE- 93 AV= 96
Fawell, (R) IL, 13th Dist.	1984	2% Asian 2% Spanish 1% Black 5% Total	Mondale 46% Reagan 54%	ADA- 20 ACLU- 20 COPE- 10 AV= 16.6
Fielder, (R) CA, 21st Dist.	1980	9% Spanish 3% Asian 2% Black 1% Am Ind 15% Total	Mondale 27% Reagan 72%	ADA- 20 ACLU- 50 COPE- 18 AV= 29.3
Fields, (R) TX, 8th Dist.	1980	15% Black 11% Spanish 1% Asian 27% Total	Mondale 40% Reagan 60%	ADA- 5 ACLU- 5 COPE- 6 AV= 5.3
Flippo, (D) AL, 5th Dist.	1976	13% Black 1% Spanish 14% Total	Mondale 40% Reagan 59%	ADA- 40 ACLU- 29 COPE- 42 AV= 37
Franklin, (R) MS, 2nd Dist.	1982	53% Black 1% Spanish 54% Total	Mondale 50% Reagan 50%	ADA- 10 ACLU- 15 COPE- 3 AV= 9.3
Frost, (D) TX, 24th Dist.	1978	29% Black 11% Spanish 1% Asian 41% Total	Mondale 47% Reagan 53%	ADA- 45 ACLU- 55 COPE- 76 AV= 58.6
Gallo, (R) NJ, 11th Dist.	1984	2% Asian 2% Black 2% Spanish 6% Total	Mondale 31% Reagan 69%	ADA- 35 ACLU- 25 COPE- 42 AV= 34

Garcia, (D) NY, 18th Dist.	1978	49% Spanish 44% Black 1% Asian 84% Total	Mondale 81% Reagan 19%	ADA- 95 ACLU- 94 COPE- 96 AV= 95
Gaydos, (D) P PA, 20th Dist.	1968	5% Black 5% Total	Mondale 61% Reagan 37%	ADA- 55 ACLU- 47 COPE- 90 AV= 64
Gekas, (R) PA, 17th Dist.	1982	6% Black 1% Spanish 7% Total	Mondale 33% Reagan 66%	ADA- 10 ACLU- 15 COPE- 21
Gonzales, (D) TX, 20th Dist.	1961	56% Spanish 9% Black 1% Asian 66% Total	Mondale 59% Reagan 41%	ADA- 95 ACLU- 100 COPE- 90 AV= 95
Gordon, (D) TN, 6th Dist.	1984	7% Black 1% Spanish 8% Total	Mondale 41% Reagan 59%	ADA- 75 ACLU- 68 COPE- 73 AV= 72
Gradison, (R) OH, 2nd Dist.	1974	16% Black 1% Asian 1% Spanish 18% Total	Mondale 35% Reagan 64%	ADA- 15 ACLU- 10 COPE- 14 AV= 13
Gregg, (R) NH, 1st Dist.	1980	1% Spanish 1% Total	Mondale 32% Reagan 68%	ADA- 20 ACLU- 20 COPE- 15 AV= 18.3
Guarini, (D) NJ, 14th Dist.	1978	24% Spanish 11% Black 3% Asian 38% Total	Mondale 53% Reagan 47%	ADA- 80 ACLU- 65 COPE- 91 AV= 78.6
Hall, (D) OH, 3rd Dist.	1978	16% Black 1% Spanish 17% Total	Mondale 43% Reagan 56%	ADA- 65 ACLU- 50 COPE- 79 AV= 64.6

Hall, (D) TX, 4th Dist.	1980	13% Black 2% Spanish 15% Total	Mondale 31% Reagan 69%	ADA- 10 ACLU- 11 COPE- 37 AV= 19.3
Hammerschmidt, AR, 3rd Dist.	1966	2% Black 1% Am Ind 1% Spanish 4% Total	Mondale 30% Reagan 70%	ADA- 5 ACLU- 5 COPE- 15 AV= 8.3
Hawkins, (D) CA, 29th Dist.	1962	51% Black 32% Spanish 1% Asian 84% Total	Mondale 77% Reagan 22%	ADA- 85 ACLU- 94 COPE- 96 AV= 91.6
Hayes, (D) IL, 1st Dist.	1983	90% Black 1% Asian 1% Spanish 92% Total	Mondale 95% Reagan 5%	ADA- 95 ACLU- 94 COPE- 100 AV= 96.3
Hendon, (R) NC, 11th Dist.	1984	5% Black 1% Am Ind 1% Spanish 7% Total	Mondale 37% Reagan 63%	ADA- N/A ACLU- N/A COPE- N/A AV= N/A
Hertel, (D) MI, 14th Dist.	1980	4% Black 1% Asian 1% Spanish 6% Total	Mondale 37% Reagan 63%	ADA- 85 ACLU- 83 COPE 92 AV= 86.6
Hiler, (R) IN, 3rd Dist.	1980	4% Black 1% Spanish 5% Total	Mondale 38% Reagan 62%	ADA- 0 ACLU- 0 COPE- 5 AV= 1.6
Holt, (R) MD, 4th Dist.	1972	19% Black 1% Asian 1% Spanish 21% Total	Mondale 40% Reagan 59%	ADA- 10 ACLU- 15 COPE- 17 AV= 14
Hopkins, (R) KY, 6th Dist.	1978	9% Black 1% Spanish 10% Total	Mondale 37% Reagan 62%	ADA- 10 ACLU- 15 COPE- 27 AV= 17.3

Horton, (D) NY, 29th Dist.	1976	4% Black 1% Spanish 5% Total	Mondale 39% Reagan 61%	ADA- 75 ACLU- 73 COPE- 67 AV= 71.6
Hubbard, (D) KY, 1st Dist.	1974	8% Black 1% Spanish 9% Total	Mondale 45% Reagan 54%	ADA- 35 ACLU- 20 COPE- 63 AV= 39.3
Hughes, (D) NJ, 2nd Dist.	1974	12% Black 3% Spanish 15% Total	Mondale 38% Reagan 62%	ADA- 75 ACLU- 75 COPE- 73 AV= 74.3
Hunter, (R) CA, 45th Dist.	1980	14% Spanish 2% Asian 2% Black 1% Am Ind 19% Total	Mondale 28% Reagan 71%	ADA- 0 ACLU- 0 COPE- 24 AV= 8
Hyde, (R) IL, 6th Dist.	1974	3% Spanish 2% Asian 1% Black 6% Total	Mondale 44% Reagan 56%	ADA- 5 ACLU- 5 COPE- 16 AV= 8.6
Jacobs, (D) IN, 10th Dist.	1974	25% Black 1% Spanish 26% Total	Mondale 51% Reagan 48%	ADA- 85 ACLU- 80 COPE- 71 AV= 78.6
Jenkins, (D) GA, 9th Dist.	1976	5% Black 1% Spanish 6% Total	Mondale 31% Reagan 69%	ADA- 35 ACLU- 15 COPE- 37 AV= 16.6
Jones, (D) NC, 1st Dist.	1966	32% Black 1% Spanish 33% Total	Mondale 43% Reagan 57%	ADA- 55 ACLU- 61 COPE- 47 AV= 54.3
Jones, (D) TN, 8th Dist.	1969	18% Black 1% Spanish 19% Total	Mondale 43% Reagan 57%	ADA- 45 ACLU- 65 COPE- 62 AV= 57.3

Kaptur, (D) OH, 9th Dist.	1982	11% Black 2% Spanish 13% Total	Mondale 48% Reagan 51%	ADA- 75 ACLU- 68 COPE- 90 AV= 77.6
Kemp, (R) NY, 31st Dist.	1970	1% Asian 1% Black 1% Spanish 3% Total	Mondale 38% Reagan 62%	ADA- 15 ACLU- 21 COPE- 18 AV= 18
Kleczka, (D) WI, 4th Dist.	1984	3% Spanish 3% Total	Mondale 52% Reagan 48%	ADA- 75 ACLU- 88 COPE- 79 AV= 80.6
Kolbe, (R) AZ, 5th Dist.	1984	14% Spanish 2% Black 1% Am Ind 1% Asian 18% Total	Mondale 37% Reagan 62%	ADA- 20 ACLU- 25 COPE- 6 AV= 17
Kolter, (D) PA, 4th Dist.	1982	2% Black 2% Total	Mondale 52% Reagan 48%	ADA- 70 ACLU- 45 COPE- 90 AV= 68.3
Kramer, (R) CO, 5th Dist.	1978	6% Spanish 4% Black 1% Asian 11% Total	Mondale 25% Reagan 75%	ADA- 10 ACLU- 20 COPE- 15 AV= 15
Leath, (D) TX, 11th Dist.	1978	13% Black 8% Spanish 21% Total	Mondale 34% Reagan 66%	ADA- 40 ACLU- 26 COPE- 26 AV= 30.6
Leland, (D) TX, 18th Dist.	1978	39% Black 27% Spanish 1% Asian 67% Total	Mondale 72% Reagan 28%	ADA- 100 ACLU- 95 COPE- 94 AV= 96.3
Lent, (R) NY, 4th Dist.	1970	3% Black 3% Spanish 1% Asian 7% Total	Mondale 36% Reagan 64%	ADA- 20 ACLU- 5 COPE- 30 AV= 18.3

Lloyd, (D) TN, 3rd Dist.	1974	11% Black 1% Spanish 12% Total	Mondale 37% Reagan 63%	ADA- 20 ACLU- 30 COPE- 56 AV= 35.3
Loefler, (R) TX, 21st Dist.	1978	16% Spanish 3% Black 1% Asian 20% Total	Mondale 22% Reagan 78%	ADA- 5 ACLU- 10 COPE- 9 AV= 8
Lujan, (R) MN, 1st Dist.	1968	33% Spanish 2% Am Ind 2% Black 1% Asian 38% Total	Mondale 39% Reagan 60%	ADA- 5 ACLU- 10 COPE- 22 AV= 12.3
Lewis, (R) FL, 12th Dist.	1982	16% Black 4% Spanish 20% Total	Mondale 33% Reagan 67%	ADA- 10 ACLU- 20 COPE- 16 AV= 15.3
Mack, (R) FL, 13th Dist.	1982	4% Black 2% Spanish 6% Total	Mondale 26% Reagan 74%	ADA- 5 ACLU- 20 COPE- 10 AV= 11.6
Madigan, (R) IL, 15th Dist.	1972	5% Black 1% Spanish 6% Total	Mondale 32% Reagan 68%	ADA- 0 ACLU- 16 COPE- 29 AV= 15
Marlenee, (R) MT, 2nd Dist.	1976	5% Am Ind 1% Spanish 6% Total	Mondale 36% Reagan 63%	ADA- 0 ACLU- 10 COPE- 20 AV= 10
Martin, (R) NY, 26th Dist.	1980	1% Am Ind 1% Black 1% Spanish 3% Total	Mondale 34% Reagan 65%	ADA- 15 ACLU- 0 COPE- 27 AV= 14
Martinez, (D) CA, 30th Dist.	1982	48% Spanish 9% Asian 1% Am Ind 1% Black 59% Total	Mondale 44% Reagan 55%	ADA- 85 ACLU- 83 COPE- 99 AV= 89

Mc Cain, (R) AZ, 1st Dist.	1982	9% Spanish 3% Black 1% Am Ind 1% Asian 14% Total	Mondale 27% Reagan 72%	ADA- 10 ACLU- 20 COPE- 17 AV= 15.6
McGrath, (R) NY, 5th Dist.	1980	10% Black 3% Spanish 1% Asian 14% Total	Mondale 39% Reagan 60%	ADA- 20 ACLU- 30 COPE- 27 AV= 25.6
Meyers, (R) KS, 3rd Dist.	1984	8% Black 2% Spanish 1% Asian 11% Total	Mondale 36% Reagan 63%	ADA- 25 ACLU- 20 COPE- 17 AV= 20.6
Miller, (D) CA, 7th Dist.	1974	10% Black 8% Spanish 4% Asian 1% Am Ind 23% Total	Mondale 47% Reagan 52%	ADA- 90 ACLU- 94 COPE- 89 AV= 91
Mineta, (D) CA, 13th Dist.	1974	10% Spanish 6% Asian 2% Black 1% Am Ind 19% Total	Mondale 41% Reagan 58%	ADA- 95 ACLU- 93 COPE- 88 AV= 92.6
Molinari, (R) NY, 14th Dist.	1980	6% Spanish 4% Black 2% Asian 12% Total	Mondale 34% Reagan 66%	ADA- 15 ACLU- 5 COPE- 24 AV= 14.6
Murphy, (D) PA, 22nd Dist.	1976	3% Black 3% Total	Mondale 57% Reagan 43%	ADA- 70 ACLU- 50 COPE- 80 AV= 66.6
Myers, (R) IN, 7th Dist.	1966	2% Black 1% Asian 1% Spanish 4% Total	Mondale 33% Reagan 66%	ADA- 5 ACLU- 5 COPE- 14 AV= 9.3

Neal, (D) NC, 5th Dist.	1974	15% Black 1% Spanish 16% Total	Mondale 36% Reagan 64%	ADA- 65 ACLU- 78 COPE- 51 AV= 64.6
Oakar, (D) OH, 20th Dist.	1976	2% Spanish 2% Black 1% Asian 5% Total	Mondale 51% Reagan 48%	ADA- 95 ACLU- 80 COPE- 93 AV= 89.3
Olin, (D) VA, 6th Dist.	1982	10% Black 1% Spanish 11% Total	Mondale 33% Reagan 66%	ADA- 55 ACLU- 63 COPE- 52 AV= 56.6
Parris, (R) VA, 8th Dist.	1980	10% Black 3% Asian 3% Spanish 16% Total	Mondale 38% Reagan 61%	ADA- 5 ACLU- 0 COPE- 25 AV= 10
Petri, (R) WI, 6th Dist.	1979	1% Spanish 1% Total	Mondale 38% Reagan 62%	ADA- 5 ACLU- 5 COPE- 25 AV= 11.6
Porter, (R) IL, 10th Dist.	1980	5% Black 4% Spanish 2% Asian 11% Total	Mondale 31% Reagan 68%	ADA- 15 ACLU- 5 COPE- 14 AV= 11.3
Pursell, (R) MI, 2nd Dist.	1976	5% Black 1% Asian 1% Spanish 7% Total	Mondale 35% Reagan 64%	ADA- 45 ACLU- 30 COPE- 45 AV= 40
Rangel, (D) NY, 16th Dist.	1970	49% Black 35% Spanish 1% Asian 85% Total	Mondale 84% Reagan 16%	ADA- 100 ACLU- 94 COPE- 91 AV= 95
Ray, (D) GA, 3rd Dist.	1982	31% Black 2% Spanish 1% Asian 34% Total	Mondale 45% Reagan 55%	ADA- 10 ACLU- 25 COPE- 25 AV= 20

Regula, (R) OH, 16th Dist.	1972	4% Black 1% Spanish 5% Total	Mondale 38% Reagan 62%	ADA- 15 COPE- 20 COPE- 34 AV= 23
Reid, (D) NV, 1st Dist.	1982	8% Black 7% Spanish 2% Asian 1% Am Ind 18% Total	Mondale 36% Reagan 62%	ADA- 75 ACLU- 60 COPE- 90 AV= 71.6
Rinaldo, (D) NJ, 7th Dist.	1972	10% Black 7% Spanish 1% Asian 18% Total	Mondale 37% Reagan 63%	ADA- 45 ACLU- 30 COPE- 82 AV= 52.3
Ritter, (R) PA, 15th Dist.	1978	2% Spanish 1% Black 3% Total	Mondale 42% Reagan 57%	ADA- 15 ACLU- 10 COPE- 34 AV= 19.6
Roberts, (R) KS, 1st Dist.	1980	2% Spanish 1% Black 3% Total	Mondale 25% Reagan 74%	ADA- 0 ACLU- 5 COPE- 5 AV= 3.3
Robinson, (D) AR, 2nd Dist.	1984	15% Black 1% Spanish 16% Total	Mondale 40% Reagan 60%	ADA- 25 ACLU- 25 COPE- 73 AV= 41
Roemer, (D) LA, 4th Dist.	1980	29% Black 2% Spanish 31% Total	Mondale 34% Reagan 65%	ADA- 35 ACLU- 21 COPE- 25 AV= 27
Roukema, (R) NJ, 5th Dist.	1980	2% Spanish 1% Asian 1% Black 4% Total	Mondale 29% Reagan 71%	ADA- 30 ACLU- 40 COPE- 27 AV= 32.3
Rowland, (R) CT, 5th Dist.	1984	4% Black 3% Spanish 7% Total	Mondale 33% Reagan 67%	ADA- 50 ACLU- 25 COPE- 48 AV= 41

Roybal, (D) CA, 25th Dist.	1962	57% Spanish 10% Black 8% Asian 1% Am Ind 76% Total	Mondale 60% Reagan 39%	ADA- 95 ACLU- 100 COPE- 93 AV= 96
Russo, (D) IL, 3rd Dist.	1974	5% Black 3% Spanish 1% Asian 9% Total	Mondale 35% Reagan 65%	ADA- 65 ACLU- 43 COPE- 78 AV= 62
Savage, (D) IL, 2nd Dist.	1980	66% Black 7% Spanish 73% Total	Mondale 84% Reagan 16%	ADA- 95 ACLU- 100 COPE- 98 AV= 97.6
Saxton, (R) NJ, 13th Dist.	1984	7% Black 2% Spanish 1% Asian 10% Total	Mondale 35% Reagan 65%	ADA- 30 ACLU- 15 COPE- 32 AV= 25.6
Schroeder, (D) CO, 1st Dist.	1972	15% Spanish 11% Black 1% Asian 1% Am Ind 28% Total	Mondale 53% Reagan 47%	ADA- 95 ACLU- 85 COPE- 74 AV= 84.6
Schuetz, (R) MI, 10th Dist.	1984	1% Black 1% Spanish 2% Total	Mondale 32% Reagan 67%	ADA- 10 ACLU- 5 COPE- 13 AV= 9.3
Sensenbrenner, WI, 9th Dist.	1978	1% Spanish 1% Total	Mondale 35% Reagan 65%	ADA- 0 ACLU- 20 COPE- 10 AV= 10
Shelby, (D) AL, 7th Dist.	1978	30% Black 1% Spanish 31% Total	Mondale 40% Reagan 59%	ADA- 15 ACLU- 20 COPE- 37 AV= 24
Shuster, (R) PA, 9th Dist.	1972	1% Black 1% Total	Mondale 33% Reagan 66%	ADA- 5 ACLU- 0 COPE- 16 AV= 7

Sijander, (R) MI, 4th Dist.	1981	6% Black 1% Spanish 7% Total	Mondale 30% Reagan 69%	ADA- 0 ACLU- 10 COPE- 8 AV= 6
Skeen, (R) NM, 2nd Dist.	1980	29% Spanish 3% Black 1% Am Ind 1% Asian 34% Total	Mondale 33% Reagan 66%	ADA- 10 ACLU- 10 COPE- 8 AV- 9.3
Skelton, (D) MO, 4th Dist.	1976	3% Black 1% Spanish 4% Total	Mondale 33% Reagan 67%	ADA- 35 ACLU- 20 COPE- 66 AV= 40.3
Slaughter, (R) NY, 7th Dist.	1984	11% Black 1% Spanish 12% Total	Mondale 31% Reagan 68%	ADA- 0 ACLU- 5 COPE- 16 AV= 7
Smith, (R) NH, 1st Dist.	1984	1% Spanish 1% Total	Mondale 29% Reagan 70%	ADA- 5 ACLU- 0 COPE- 16 AV= 7
Smith, (D) OR, 5th Dist.	1980	2% Spanish 1% Am Ind 1% Asian 4% Total	Mondale 41% Reagan 59%	ADA- 0 ACLU- 5 COPE- 8 AV= 4.3
Smith, (R) OR, 2nd Dist.	1982	3% Spanish 1% Am Ind 1% Asian 5% Total	Mondale 36% Reagan 64%	ADA- 5 ACLU- 15 COPE- 11 AV= 10.3
Snyder, (R) KY, 4th Dist.	1966	2% Black 2% Total	Mondale 30% Reagan 70%	ADA- 15 ACLU- 20 COPE- 21 AV= 18.6
Soloman, (R) NY, 24th Dist.	1978	1% Black 1% Spanish 2% Total	Mondale 31% Reagan 69%	ADA- 0 ACLU- 0 COPE- 20 AV= 6.6

Spence, (R) SC, 2nd Dist.	1970	32% Black 1% Asian 1% Spanish 34% Total	Mondale 36% Reagan 62%	ADA- 0 ACLU- 0 COPE- 14 AV= 4.6
Staggers, (D) WV, 2nd Dist.	1982	3% Black 1% Spanish 4% Total	Mondale 42% Reagan 58%	ADA- 80 ACLU- 65 COPE- 90 AV= 78.3
Stenholm, (D) TX, 17th Dist.	1978	9% Spanish 3% Black 12% Total	Mondale 32% Reagan 68%	ADA- 5 ACLU- 5 COPE- 16 AV= 8.6
Stratton, (D) NY, 23rd Dist.	1958	4% Black 1% Spanish 1% Asian 6% Total	Mondale 47% Reagan 53%	ADA- 45 ACLU- 31 COPE- 78 AV= 58
Stump, (R) AZ, 3rd Dist.	1976	9% Spanish 4% Am Ind 1% Asian 1% Black 15% Total	Mondale 28% Reagan 71%	ADA- 0 ACLU- 5 COPE- 10 AV= 5
Sundquist, (R) TN, 7th Dist.	1982	11% Black 1% Asian 1% Spanish 13% Total	Mondale 34% Reagan 66%	ADA- 5 ACLU- 0 COPE- 17 AV= 7.3
Sweeney, (R) TX, 14th Dist.	1984	17% Spanish 11% Black 28% Total	Mondale 32% Reagan 67%	ADA- 5 ACLU- 5 COPE- 10 AV= 6.6
Swindall (R) GA, 4th Dist.	1984	11% Black 2% Spanish 1% Asian 14% Total	Mondale 34% Reagan 66%	ADA- 0 ACLU- 0 COPE- 10 AV= 3.3
Tallon, (D) SC, 6th Dist.	1982	37% Black 1% Spanish 38% Total	Mondale 42% Reagan 57%	ADA- 40 ACLU- 0 COPE- 63 AV= 34.3

Tauzin, (D) LA, 3rd Dist.	1980	18% Black 3% Spanish 1% Am Ind 1% Asian 23% Total	Mondale 33% Reagan 65%	ADA- 20 ACLU- 10 COPE- 35 AV= 21.6
Taylor, (R) MO, 7th Dist.	1972	1% Am Ind 1% Black 1% Spanish 3% Total	Mondale 31% Reagan 69%	ADA- 5 ACLU- 5 COPE- 12 AV= 7.3
Towns, (D) NY, 11th Dist.	1982	47% Black 34% Spanish 1% Asian 82% Total	Mondale 78% Reagan 21%	ADA- 95 ACLU- 94 COPE- 98 AV= 95.6
Trafficant, (D) OH, 17th Dist.	1984	10% Black 1% Spanish 11% Total	Mondale 57% Reagan 42%	ADA- 95A ACLU- 65 COPE- 100 AV= 86.6
Valentine, (D) NC, 2nd Dist.	1982	36% Black 1% Spanish 37% Total	Mondale 47% Reagan 53%	ADA- 30 ACLU- 25 COPE- 39 AV= 31.3
VanderJagt, (R) MI, 9th Dist.	1966	4% Black 1% Spanish 5% Total	Mondale 31% Reagan 69%	ADA- 0 ACLU- 5 COPE- 16 AV= 7
Visclosky, (D) IN, 1st Dist.	1984	22% Black 7% Spanish 29% Total	Mondale 57% Reagan 43%	ADA- 90 ACLU- 90 COPE- 81 AV= 87
Watkins, (D) OK, 3rd Dist.	1976	6% Am Ind 4% Black 1% Spanish 11% Total	Mondale 38% Reagan 62%	ADA- 40 ACLU- 40 COPE- 41 AV= 40.3
Whitley, (D) NC, 3rd Dist.	1976	25% Black 2% Spanish 1% Am Ind 28% Total	Mondale 39% Reagan 61%	ADA- 25 ACLU- 55 COPE- 49 AV= 43

Whittaker, (R) KS, 5th Dist.	1978	2% Black 1% Am Ind 1% Spanish 4% Total	Mondale 32% Reagan 67%	ADA- 10 ACLU- 10 COPE- 8 AV- 9.3
Whitten, (D) MI, 1st Dist.	1941	21% Black 1% Spanish 22% Total	Mondale 37% Reagan 63%	ADA- 55 ACLU- 62 COPE- 40 AV= 52.3
Wirth, (D) CO, 1st Dist.	1974	7% Spanish 1% Asian 1% Black 9% Total	Mondale 39% Reagan 61%	ADA- 85 ACLU- 90 COPE- 76 AV= 83.6
Yatron, (D) PA, 6th Dist.	1968	1% Black 1% Spanish 2% Total	Mondale 36% Reagan 64%	ADA- 65 ACLU- 36 COPE- 82 AV= 61
Young, (R) FL, 8th Dist.	1970	7% Black 1% Spanish 8% Total	Mondale 37% Reagan 63%	ADA- 25 ACLU- 13 COPE- 15 AV= 17.6
Young, (R) AK, 1st Dist.	1973	14% Am Ind 3% Black 2% Asian 2% Spanish 21% Total	Mondale 30% Reagan 67%	ADA- 20 ACLU- 23 COPE- 42 AV= 28.3

Source: Barone, Michael, and Grant Ujifusa. 1985 The Almanac of American Politics, 1986.
Washington, D.C.: National Journal Inc.

Source: Barone, Michael, and Grant Ujifusa. 1987. The Almanac of American Politics, 1988.
Washington, D.C.: National Journal, Inc.

Appendix K

Analysis of Congressional Roll Call Votes on IRCA Members Who Voted For IRCA, 1986

Member/Dist.	Year Elected	% Minority Population	Pres. Vote	Liberalism Index
Abercrombie, (D) HI, 1st Dist.	1986	64% Asian 5% Spanish 1% Black 70% Total	Mondale 44% Reagan 55%	ADA- N/A ACLU- N/A COPE- N/A AV= N/A
Ackerman, (D) NY, 7th Dist.	1983	17% Spanish 11% Black 6% Asian 34% Total	Mondale 53% Reagan 46%	ADA- 85 ACLU- 94 COPE- 98 AV= 92.3
Alexander, (D) AR, 1st Dist.	1968	16% Black 1% Spanish 17% Total	Mondale 46% Reagan 57%	ADA- 75 ACLU- 70 COPE- 67 AV= 70.6
Anderson, (D) CA, 22nd Dist.	1968	19% Spanish 7% Black 5% Asian 1% Am Ind 32% Total	Mondale 40% Reagan 58%	ADA- 75 ACLU- 65 COPE- 84 AV= 74.6
Annunzio, (D) IL, 11th Dist.	1964	5% Spanish 4% Asian 9% Total	Mondale 41% Reagan 59%	ADA- 70 ACLU- 60 COPE- 92 AV= 74
Anthony, (D) AR, 4th Dist.	1978	25% Black 1% Spanish 26% Total	Mondale 44% Reagan 56%	ADA- 50 ACLU- 60 COPE- 52 AV= 54
Aspin, (D) WI, 1st Dist.	1970	3% Black 2% Spanish 5% Total	Mondale 45% Reagan 55%	ADA- 50 ACLU- 77 COPE- 84 AV= 70.3

Atkins, (D) MA, 5th Dist.	1984	3% Spanish 1% Asian 1% Black 5% Total	Mondale 43% Reagan 57%	ADA- 90 ACLU- 89 COPE- 86 AV= 88.3
AuCoin, (D) OR, 1st Dist.	1974	2% Spanish 2% Asian 1% Am Ind 1% Black 6% Total	Mondale 43% Reagan 57%	ADA- 89 ACLU- 71 COPE- 75 AV= 78.3
Barnes, (D) MD, 8th Dist.	1978	8% Black 4% Asian 4% Spanish 16% Total	Mondale 51% Reagan 48%	ADA- 85 ACLU- 90 COPE- 90 AV= 88.3
Bates, (D) CA, 44th Dist.	1982	22% Spanish 13% Black 7% Asian 1% Am Ind 43% Total	Mondale 47% Reagan 52%	ADA- 90 ACLU- 80 COPE- 82 AV= 84
Bedell, (D) IA, 6th Dist.	1974	1% Spanish 1% Total	Mondale 42% Reagan 57%	ADA- 70 ACLU- 45 COPE- 60 AV= 58.3
Beilenson, (D) CA, 23rd Dist.	1976	8% Spanish 3% Asian 3% Black 14% Total	Mondale 46% Reagan 53%	ADA- 80 ACLU- 83 COPE- 76 AV= 79.6
Bennett, (D) FL, 3rd Dist.	1948	25% Black 2% Spanish 1% Asian 28% Total	Mondale 41% Reagan 59%	ADA- 55 ACLU- 40 COPE- 46 AV= 47
Bereuter, (R) NE, 1st Dist.	1978	1% Am Ind 1% Black 1% Spanish 3% Total	Mondale 32% Reagan 67%	ADA- 15 ACLU- 20 COPE- 18 AV= 17.6
Berman, (D) CA, 26th Dist.	1982	20% Spanish 4% Black 3% Asian 1% Am Ind 28% Total	Mondale 45% Reagan 54%	ADA- 95 ACLU- 94 COPE- 88 AV= 92.3

Boehlert, (R) NY, 25th Dist.	1982	2% Black 1% Spanish 3% Total	Mondale 37% Reagan 63%	ADA- 50 ACLU- 50 COPE- 66 AV= 55.3
Boland, (D) MA, 2nd Dist.	1952	4% Black 3% Spanish 7% Total	Mondale 46% Reagan 53%	ADA- 70 ACLU- 57 COPE- 90 AV= 72.3
Bonoir, (D) MI, 12th Dist.	1976	2% Black 1% Spanish 3% Total	Mondale 33% Reagan 66%	ADA- 95 ACLU- 84 COPE- 92 AV= 90.3
Bonker, (D) WA, 3rd Dist.	1974	1% Am Ind 1% Asian 1% Black 1% Spanish 4% Total	Mondale 45% Reagan 53%	ADA- 70 ACLU- 89 COPE- 82 AV= 80.3
Borski, (D) PA, 3rd Dist.	1982	7% Black 1% Spanish 1% Asian 9% Total	Mondale 46% Reagan 54%	ADA- 75 ACLU- 60 COPE- 97 AV= 77.3
Bosco, (D) CA, 1st Dist.	1982	5% Spanish 2% Am Ind 1% Asian 1% Black 9% Total	Mondale 46% Reagan 52%	ADA- 70 ACLU- 76 COPE- 78 AV= 74.6
Boucher, (D) VA, 9th Dist.	1982	2% Black 1% Spanish 3% Total	Mondale 41% Reagan 58%	ADA- 70 ACLU- 87 COPE- 75 AV= 77.3
Brown, (D) CA, 36th Dist.	1972	20% Spanish 7% Black 1% Asian 1% Am Ind 29% Total	Mondale 43% Reagan 56%	ADA- 95 ACLU- 94 COPE- 90 AV= 93
Bruce, (D) IL, 19th Dist.	1984	3% Black 1% Asian 1% Spanish 5% Total	Mondale 38% Reagan 62%	ADA- 80 ACLU- 70 COPE- 87 AV= 79

Bryant, (D) TX, 5th Dist.	1982	18% Black 10% Spanish 1% Asian 29% Total	Mondale 41% Reagan 59%	ADA- 65 ACLU- 55 COPE- 92 AV= 70.6
Bustamante, (D) TX, 23rd Dist.	1984	51% Spanish 4% Black 1% Asian 56% Total	Mondale 41% Reagan 59%	ADA- 50 ACLU- 72 COPE- 93 AV= 71.6
Byron, (D) MD, 6th Dist.	1978	4% Black 1% Asian 1% Black 6% Total	Mondale 31% Reagan 69%	ADA- 10 ACLU- 16 COPE- 46 AV= 24
Carper, (D) DE, 1st Dist.	1982	14% Black 1% Spanish 1% Asian 16% Total	Mondale 40% Reagan 60%	ADA- 55 ACLU- 50 COPE- 69 AV= 58
Chandler, (R) WA, 8th Dist.	1982	2% Asian 1% Am Ind 1% Black 1% Spanish 5% Total	Mondale 37% Reagan 62%	ADA- 20 ACLU- 40 COPE- 18 AV= 26
Cheney, (R) WY, 1st Dist.	1978	4% Spanish 1% Am Ind 1% Black 6% Total	Mondale 28% Reagan 71%	ADA- 0 ACLU- 10 COPE- 5 AV= 5
Clay, (D) MO, 1st Dist.	1968	46% Black 1% Asian 1% Spanish 48% Total	Mondale 63% Reagan 37%	ADA- 75 ACLU- 100 COPE- 95 AV= 90
Clinger, (R) PA, 23rd Dist.	1978	1% Black 1% Total	Mondale 37% Reagan 63%	ADA- 50 ACLU- 40 COPE- 40 AV= 43.3
Coelho, (D) CA, 15th Dist.	1978	20% Spanish 2% Asian 2% Black 24% Total	Mondale 40 Reagan 59%	ADA- 70 ACLU- 80 COPE- 85 AV= 78.3

Coleman, (D) TX, 16th Dist.	1982	55% Spanish 4% Black 1% Asian 60% Total	Mondale 43% Reagan 57%	ADA- 70 ACLU- 65 COPE- 83 AV= 72.6
Collins, (D) IL, 7th Dist.	1973	60% Black 4% Spanish 2% Asian 66% Total	Mondale 75% Reagan 25%	ADA- 95 ACLU- 94 COPE- 95 AV= 94.6
Conte, (D) MA, 1st Dist.	1958	1% Black 1% Spanish 2% Total	Mondale 49% Reagan 51%	ADA- 75 ACLU- 65 COPE- 64 AV= 68
Cooper, (D) TN, 4th Dist.	1982	4% Black 1% Spanish 5% Total	Mondale 42% Reagan 57%	ADA-70 ACLU- 75 COPE- 65 AV= 70
Coughlin, (R) PA, 13th Dist.	1968	6% Black 1% Asian 1% Spanish 8% Total	Mondale 40% Reagan 60%	ADA- 45 ACLU- 35 COPE- 36 AV= 38.6
Coyne, (D) PA, 14th Dist.	1980	19% Black 1% Spanish 1% Asian 21% Total	Mondale 68% Reagan 30%	ADA- 100 ACLU- 90 COPE- 95 AV= 95
Dannemeyer, (R) CA, 39th Dist.	1978	11% Spanish 3% Asian 1% Am Ind 1% Black 16% Total	Mondale 22% Reagan 77%	ADA- 5 ACLU- 10 COPE- 5 AV= 6.6
Darden, (D) GA, 7th Dist.	1983	5% Black 1% Spanish 6% Total	Mondale 27% Reagan 73%	ADA- 10 ACLU- 10 COPE- 39 AV= 19.6
Daschle, (D) SD, 1st Dist.	1978	5% Am Ind 5% Total	Mondale 37% Reagan 63%	ADA- 70 ACLU- 65 COPE- 75 AV= 70

Davis, (R) MI, 11th Dist.	1978	1% Am Ind 1% Black 2% Total	Mondale 41% Reagan 59%	ADA- 35 ACLU-30 COPE-58 AV= 41
Derrick, (D) SC, 3rd Dist.	1974	20% Black 1% Spanish 21% Total	Mondale 32% Reagan 67%	ADA- 55 ACLU- 70 COPE- 54 AV= 59.6
DeWine, (R) OH, 7th Dist.	1982	5% Black 1% Spanish 6% Total	Mondale 31% Reagan 68%	ADA- 0 ACLU- 5 COPE- 13 AV= 6
Dicks, (D) WA, 6th Dist.	1976	6% Black 3% Asian 2% Spanish 1% Am Ind 12% Total	Mondale 42% Reagan 57%	ADA- 70 ACLU- 80 COPE- 83 AV= 77.6
Dingell, (D) MI, 16th Dist.	1955	3% Black 2% Spanish 5% Total	Mondale 40% Reagan 60%	ADA- 75 ACLU- 75 COPE- 92 AV= 80.6
DioGuardi, (R) NY, 20th Dist.	1984	14% Black 5% Spanish 2% Asian 21% Total	Mondale 44% Reagan 56%	ADA- 35 ACLU- 10 COPE- 48 AV=31
Dixon, (D) CA, 28th Dist.	1978	37% Black 24% Spanish 8% Asian 69% Total	Mondale 67% Reagan 32%	ADA- 85 ACLU- 94 COPE- 96 AV= 91.6
Donnelly, (D) MA, 11th Dist.	1978	7% Black 1% Asian 1% Spanish 9% Total	Mondale 48% Reagan 52%	ADA- 75 ACLU- 60 COPE- 88 AV= 74.3
Dorgan, (D) ND, 1st Dist.	1980	0% Total	Mondale 34% Reagan 65%	ADA- 70 ACLU- 70 COPE- 72 AV= 70.6

Dornan, (R) CA, 38th Dist.	1984	25% Spanish 6% Asian 2% Black 1% Am Ind 34% Total	Mondale 30% Reagan 69%	ADA- 5 ACLU- 15 COPE- 8 AV= 9.3
Dowdy, (D) MI, 4th Dist.	1981	37% Black 1% Spanish 38% Total	Mondale 41% Reagan 59%	ADA- 45 ACLU- 16 COPE- 78 AV= 46.3
Downey, (D) NY, 2nd Dist.	1974	8% Black 6% Spanish 1% Asian 15% Total	Mondale 33% Reagan 66%	ADA- 95 ACLU- 94 COPE- 87 AV= 92
Durbin, (D) IL, 20th Dist.	1982	4% Black 4% Total	Mondale 42% Reagan 58%	ADA- 85 ACLU- 65 COPE- 84 AV= 78
Dwyer, (D) NJ, 6th Dist.	1980	8% Black 5% Spanish 1% Asian 14% Total	Mondale 41% Reagan 59%	ADA- 80 ACLU- 66 COPE- 96 AV= 80.6
Early, (D) MA, 3rd Dist.	1974	2% Spanish 1% Black 3% Total	Mondale 43% Reagan 57%	ADA- 85 ACLU- 68 COPE- 85 AV= 79.1
Eckart, (D) OH, 11th Dist.	1980	2% Black 2% Total	Mondale 40% Reagan 59%	ADA- 65 ACLU- 75 COPE- 86 AV= 75.3
Eckert, (R) NY, 20th Dist.	1984	4% Black 1% Asian 1% Spanish 6% Total	Mondale 37% Reagan 63%	ADA-N/A ACLU- N/A COPE- N/A AV= N/A
Edgar, (D) PA, 7th Dist.	1974	5% Black 1% Asian 1% Spanish 7% Total	Mondale 37% Reagan 62%	ADA- 95 ACLU- 90 COPE- 88 AV= 91

Evans, (D) IL, 17th Dist.	1982	2% Black 2% Spanish 4% Total	Mondale 46% Reagan 54%	ADA-90 ACLU- 85 COPE- 90 AV= 88.3
Fascell, (D) FL, 19th Dist.	1954	21% Spanish 10% Black 1% Asian 32% Total	Mondale 35% Reagan 65%	ADA- 70 ACLU- 55 COPE- 83 AV= 69.3
Fazio, (D) CA, 4th Dist.	1978	10% Spanish 5% Black 4% Asian 1% Am Ind 20% Total	Mondale 43% Reagan 56%	ADA- 80 ACLU- 95 COPE- 87 AV= 87.3
Feighan, (D) OH, 19th Dist.	1982	1% Black 1% Asian 2% Total	Mondale 40% Reagan 59%	ADA- 95 ACLU- 90 COPE- 89 AV= 91.3
Fish, (R) NY, 21st Dist.	1968	6% Black 3% Spanish 1% Asian 10% Total	Mondale 32% Reagan 68%	ADA- 45 ACLU- 42 COPE- 46 AV= 44.3
Florio, (D) NJ, 1st Dist.	1974	13% Black 3% Spanish 1% Asian 17% Total	Mondale 45% Reagan 55%	ADA- 70 ACLU- 68 COPE- 92 AV= 76.6
Foglietta, (D) PA, 1st Dist.	1980	29% Black 7% Spanish 2% Asian 38% Total	Mondale 65% Reagan 35%	ADA- 90 ACLU- 84 COPE- 97 AV= 90.3
Foley, (D) WA, 5th Dist.	1964	2% Spanish 1% Am Ind 1% Asian 1% Black 5% Total	Mondale 39% Reagan 60%	ADA- 75 ACLU- 85 COPE- 80 AV= 80
Ford, (D) MI, 15th Dist.	1964	5% Black 1% Spanish 1% Asian 7% Total	Mondale 39% Reagan 61%	ADA- 80 ACLU- 88 COPE- 97 AV= 88.3

Ford, (D) TN, 9th Dist.	1974	51% Black 1% Spanish 52% Total	Mondale 64% Reagan 36%	ADA- 100 ACLU- 94 COPE- 91 AV= 95
Frank, (D) MA, 4th Dist.	1980	1% Asian 1% Black 1% Spanish 3% Total	Mondale 51% Reagan 48%	ADA- 100 ACLU- 95 COPE- 91 AV= 95.3
Frenzel, (R) MN, 3rd Dist.	1970	1% Asian 1% Black 2% Total	Mondale 41% Reagan 59%	ADA- 30 ACLU- 50 COPE- 50 AV= 43.3
Fuqua, (D) FL, 2nd Dist.	1962	22% Black 1% Spanish 23% Total	Mondale 38% Reagan 62%	ADA- 25 ACLU- 18 COPE- 36 AV= 26.3
Gejdenson, (D) CT, 2nd Dist.	1980	3% Black 1% Spanish 1% Asian 5% Total	Mondale 39% Reagan 61%	ADA- 95 ACLU- 90 COPE- 89 AV= 91.3
Gephardt, (D) MO, 3rd Dist.	1976	1% Black 1% Spanish 2% Total	Mondale 35% Reagan 65%	ADA- 70 ACLU- 64 COPE- 80 AV= 71.3
Gibbons, (D) FL, 7th Dist.	1962	13% Black 11% Spanish 1% Asian 25% Total	Mondale 37% Reagan 63%	ADA- 50 ACLU- 42 COPE- 54 AV= 48.6
Gilman, (R) NY, 22nd Dist.	1972	6% Black 4% Spanish 1% Asian 11% Total	Mondale 38% Reagan 61%	ADA- 40 ACLU- 45 COPE- 72 AV= 52.3
Gingrich, (R) GA, 6th Dist.	1978	14% Black 1% Spanish 15% Total	Mondale 31% Reagan 69%	ADA- 0 ACLU- 10 COPE- 8 AV= 6

Glickman, (D) KS, 4th Dist.	1976	6% Black 2% Spanish 1% Asian 1% Am Ind 10% Total	Mondale 35% Reagan 63%	ADA- 55 ACLU- 70 COPE- 61 AV= 62
Goodling, (R) PA, 19th Dist.	1974	2% Black 1% Spanish 3% Total	Mondale 32% Reagan 67%	ADA- 25 ACLU- 20 COPE- 26 AV= 23.6
Gray, (D) IL, 22nd Dist.	1984	6% Black 1% Spanish 7% Total	Mondale 42% Reagan 56%	ADA- 5 ACLU- 66 COPE- 91 AV= 54
Gray, (D) PA, 2nd Dist.	1978	76% Black 1% Asian 1% Spanish 78% Total	Mondale 90% Reagan 10%	ADA- 80 ACLU- 90 COPE- 96 AV= 88.6
Green, (R) NY, 15th Dist.	1978	12% Spanish 9% Asian 5% Black 26% Total	Mondale 34% Reagan 66%	ADA- 15 ACLU- 5 COPE- 24 AV= 14.6
Gunderson, (R) WI, 3rd Dist.	1980	0% Total	Mondale 45% Reagan 55%	ADA- 40 ACLU- 20 COPE- 26 AV= 28.6
Hamilton, (D) IN, 9th Dist.	1964	2% Black 1% Spanish 3% Total	Mondale 39% Reagan 60%	ADA- 55 ACLU- 75 COPE- 67 AV= 65.6
Hatcher, (D) GA, 2nd Dist.	1980	32% Black 1% Spanish 33% Total	Mondale 42% Reagan 58%	ADA- 25 ACLU- 25 COPE- 46 AV= 32
Hefner, (D) NC, 8th Dist.	1974	18% Black 1% Am Ind 1% Spanish 20% Total	Mondale 34% Reagan 66%	ADA- 50 ACLU- 58 COPE- 51 AV= 53

Henry, (R) MI, 5th Dist.	1984	5% Black 2% Spanish 7% Total	Mondale 31% Reagan 68%	ADA- 40 ACLU- 20 COPE- 32 AV= 30.6
Hillis, (R) IN, 5th Dist.	1970	2% Black 1% Spanish 3% Total	Mondale 31% Reagan 69%	ADA- 5 ACLU- 18 COPE- 32 AV= 18.3
Howard, (D) NJ, 3rd Dist.	1964	7% Black 2% Spanish 1% Asian 10% Total	Mondale 33% Reagan 77%	ADA- 85 ACLU- 75 COPE- 94 AV= 84.6
Hoyer, (D) MD, 5th Dist.	1981	31% Black 2% Asian 2% Spanish 35% Total	Mondale 57% Reagan 42%	ADA-75 ACLU- 95 COPE- 92 AV= 87.3
Huckaby, (D) LA, 5th Dist.	1976	28% Black 1% Spanish 29% Total	Mondale 32% Reagan 66%	ADA- 20 ACLU- 12 COPE- 28 AV= 20
Hutto, (D) FL, 1st Dist.	1978	12% Black 2% Black 1% Am Ind 1% Asian 16% Total	Mondale 24% Reagan 76%	ADA-5 ACLU- 5 COPE- 35 AV= 15
Ireland, (R) FL, 10th Dist.	1976	11% Black 3% Spanish 14% Total	Mondale 29% Reagan 71%	ADA- 0 ACLU- 0 COPE- 15 AV= 5
Jeffords, (R) VT, 1st Dist.	1974	1% Spanish 1% Total	Mondale 41% Reagan 58%	ADA- 60 ACLU- 68 COPE- 48 AV= 58.6
Johnson, (D) CT, 6th Dist.	1982	2% Black 2% Spanish 4% Total	Mondale 37% Reagan 63%	ADA- 67 ACLU- 42 COPE- 52 AV= 53.6

Kanjorski, (D) PA, 11th Dist.	1984	1% Black 1% Total	Mondale 44% Reagan 55%	ADA- 65 ACLU- 40 COPE- 84 AV= 63
Kasich, (R) OH, 12th Dist.	1982	14% Black 1% Spanish 15% Total	Mondale 33% Reagan 65%	ADA- 10 ACLU- 0 COPE- 16 AV= 8.6
Kastenmeier, (D) WI, 2nd Dist.	1958	1% Black 1% Asian 1% Spanish 3% Total	Mondale 51% Reagan 49%	ADA- 100 ACLU- 95 COPE- 89 AV= 94.6
Kennelly, (D) CT, 1st Dist.	1982	10% Black % Spanish 1% Asian 16% Total	Mondale 47% Reagan 53%	ADA- 85 ACLU- 84 COPE- 89 AV= 86
Kildee, (D) MI, 7th Dist.	1976	14% Black 1% Spanish 15% Total	Mondale 45% Reagan 54%	ADA- 95 ACLU- 89 COPE- 94 AV= 92.6
Kostmayer, (D) PA, 8th Dist.	1982	2% Black 1% Spanish 1% Asian 4% Total	Mondale 36% Reagan 6%	ADA- 90 ACLU- 95 COPE- 87 AV= 90.6
LaFalce, (D) NY, 32nd Dist.	1974	7% Black 1% Am Ind 1% Spanish 9% Total	Mondale 45% Reagan 55%	ADA- 85 ACLU- 63 COPE- 83 AV= 77
Lagomarsino, (R) CA, 11th Dist.	1974	21% Spanish 3% Asian 3% Black 1% Am Ind 28% Total	Mondale 37% Reagan 62%	ADA- 5 ACLU- 15 COPE- 12 AV= 10.6
Lantos, (D) CA, 11th Dist.	1980	12% Spanish 9% Asian 6% Black 27% Total	Mondale 49% Reagan 50%	ADA- 70 ACLU- 65 COPE- 93 AV= 76

Leach, (R) IA, 1st Dist.	1976	2% Black 1% Spanish 3% Total	Mondale 47% Reagan 52%	ADA- 55 ACLU- 80 COPE- 31 AV= 55.3
Lehman, (D) CA, 18th Dist.	1982	21% Spanish 6% Black 4% Asian 1% Am Ind 32% Total	Mondale 48% Reagan 51%	ADA- 75 ACLU- 73 COPE- 91 AV= 79.6
Lehman, (D) FL, 17th Dist.	1972	24% Spanish 22% Black 1% Asian 47% Total	Mondale 54% Reagan 46%	ADA- 100 ACLU- 95 COPE- 87 AV= 94
Levin, (D) MI, 17th Dist.	1982	10% Black 1% Asian 1% Black 12% Total	Mondale 46% Reagan 54%	ADA- 85 ACLU- 85 COPE- 92 AV= 87.3
Levine, (D) CA, 27th Dist.	1982	12% Spanish 9% Black 5% Asian 1% Am Ind 27% Total	Mondale 46% Reagan 52%	ADA- 85 ACLU- 94 COPE- 94 AV= 91
Lewis, (R) CA, 35th Dist.	1978	12% Spanish 3% Black 2% Asian 1% Am Ind 18% Total	Mondale 28% Reagan 71%	ADA- 0 ACLU- 5 COPE- 14 AV= 6.3
Lightfoot, (R) IA, 5th Dist.	1984	1% Spanish 1% Total	Mondale 42% Reagan 57%	ADA- 10 ACLU- 10 COPE- 19 AV= 13
Lipinski, (D) IL, 5th Dist.	1982	21% Spanish 3% Black 2% Asian 26% Total	Mondale 42% Reagan 58%	ADA- 45 ACLU- 26 COPE- 90 AV= 53.6
Livingston, (R) LA, 1st Dist.	1977	9% Black 4% Spanish 1% Asian 14% Total	Mondale 22% Reagan 77%	ADA- 0 ACLU- 0 COPE- 11 AV= 3.6

Lott, (R) MA, 5th Dist.	1972	17% Black 1% Asian 1% Spanish 19% Total	Mondale 26% Reagan 74%	ADA- 5 ACLU- 0 COPE- 14 AV= 6.3
Lowery, (R) CA, 41st Dist.	1980	6% Spanish 4% Asian 2% Black 12% Total	Mondale 35% Reagan 64%	ADA- 5 ACLU- 10 COPE- 5 AV= 6.6
Lowry, (D) WA, 7th Dist.	1978	8% Black 7% Asian 2% Spanish 1% Am Ind 18% Total	Mondale 58% Reagan 41%	ADA- 95 ACLU- 100 COPE- 81 AV= 92
Luken, (D) OH, 1st Dist.	1976	14% Black 1% Spanish 15% Total	Mondale 35% Reagan 65%	ADA- 80 ACLU- 68 COPE- 77 AV= 75
Lungren, (R) CA, 42nd Dist.	1978	6% Spanish 5% Asian 1% Am Ind 1% Black 13% Total	Mondale 27% Reagan 72%	ADA- 0 ACLU- 15 COPE- 5 AV= 6.6
MacKay, (D) FL, 6th Dist.	1982	12% Black 2% Spanish 14% Total	Mondale 36% Reagan 64%	ADA- 55 ACLU- 35 COPE- 48 AV= 46
Manton, (D) NY, 9th Dist.	1984	15% Spanish 5% Asian 3% Black 23% Total	Mondale 43% Reagan 57%	ADA- 75 ACLU- 65 COPE- 90 AV= 76.6
Markey, (D) MA, 7th Dist.	1976	1% Asian 1% Black 1% Spanish 3% Total	Mondale 49% Reagan 50%	ADA- 95 ACLU- 93 COPE- 89 AV= 92.3
Martin, (R) IL, 16th Dist.	1980	4% Black 2% Spanish 6% Total	Mondale 37% Reagan 63%	ADA- 15 ACLU- 31 COPE- 30 AV= 25.3

Matsui, (D) CA, 3rd Dist.	1978	8% Spanish 7% Black 6% Asian 1% Am Ind 22% Total	Mondale 44% Reagan 55%	ADA- 95 ACLU- 90 COPE- 90 AV= 91.6
Mavroules, (D) MA, 6th Dist.	1978	1% Black 1% Spanish 2% Total	Mondale 44% Reagan 55%	ADA- 85 ACLU- 55 COPE- 92 AV= 77.3
Mazzoli, (D) KY, 3rd Dist.	1970	18% Black 1% Spanish 19% Total	Mondale 48% Reagan 52%	ADA- 50 ACLU- 50 COPE- 66 AV= 55.3
McCandless, (R) CA, 37th Dist.	1982	15% Spanish 3% Black 1% Am Ind 1% Asian 20% Total	Mondale 34% Reagan 65%	ADA- 5 ACLU- 15 COPE- 2 AV= 7.3
Mc Closkey, (D) IN, 8th Dist.	1982	2% Black 2% Total	Mondale 39% Reagan 60%	ADA- 55 ACLU- 57 COPE- 85 AV= 65.6
McCollum, (R) FL, 5th Dist.	1980	14% Black 3% Spanish 1% Asian 18% Total	Mondale 28% Reagan 71%	ADA- 0 ACLU- 5 COPE- 7 AV= 4
McCurdy, (D) OH, 4th Dist.	1980	6% Black 3% Am Ind 3% Spanish 1% Asian 13% Total	Mondale 30% Reagan 69%	ADA- 35 ACLU- 40 COPE- 42 AV= 39
McDade, (R) PA, 10th Dist.	1962	0% Total	Mondale 38% Reagan 61%	ADA- 45 ACLU- 18 COPE- 68 AV= 43.6
McHugh, (D) NY, 28th Dist.	1974	3% Black 2% Spanish 1% Asian 6% Total	Mondale 39% Reagan 61%	ADA- 80 ACLU- 75 COPE- 81 AV= 78.6

McKernan, (R) ME, 1st Dist.	1982	0% Total	Mondale 40% Reagan 60%	ADA- 55 ACLU- 65 COPE- 27 AV= 49
McKinney, (D) CT, 4th Dist.	1970	9% Black 6% Spanish 1% Asian 16% Total	Mondale 36% Reagan 63%	ADA- 50 ACLU- 73 COPE- 60 AV= 61
McMillan, (R) NC, 9th Dist.	1984	21% Black 1% Asian 1% Spanish 23% Total	Mondale 36% Reagan 64%	ADA- 10 ACLU- 0 COPE- 19 AV- 9.6
Mica, (D) FL, 14th Dist.	1978	4% Spanish 3% Black 7% Total	Mondale 39% Reagan 61%	ADA- 55 ACLU- 27 COPE- 56 AV= 46
Michel, (R) IL, 18th Dist.	1956	4% Black 1% Spanish 5% Total	Mondale 38% Reagan 62%	ADA- 5 ACLU- 10 COPE- 11 AV= 8.6
Milkulski, (D) MD, 3rd Dist.	1976	14% Black 1% Spanish 1% Asian 16% Total	Mondale 49% Reagan 50%	ADA-85 ACLU- 88 COPE- 90 AV= 87.6
Miller, (D) CA, 7th Dist.	1974	10% Black 8% Spanish 4% Asian 22% Total	Mondale 47% Reagan 52%	ADA- 90 ACLU- 94 COPE- 89 AV= 91
Miller, (R) WA, 1st Dist.	1984	3% Asian 1% Am Ind 1% Black 1% Spanish 6% Total	Mondale 42% Reagan 57%	ADA- 40 ACLU- 40 COPE- 29 AV= 36.3
Mitchell, (D) MD, 7th Dist.	1970	70% Black 1% Asian 1% Spanish 72% Total	Mondale 82% Reagan 18%	ADA- 90 ACLU- 98 COPE- 94 AV= 94

Moakley, (D) MA, 9th Dist.	1972	14% Black 4% Spanish 1% Asian 19% Total	Mondale 51% Reagan 48%	ADA- 95 ACLU- 65 COPE- 92 AV= 84
Mollohan, (D) WV, 1st Dist.	1982	2% Black 1% Spanish 3% Total	Mondale 43% Reagan 57%	ADA- 50 ACLU- 40 COPE- 90 AV= 60
Monson, (R) UT, 2nd Dist.	1984	4% Spanish 1% Am Ind 1% Asian 1% Spanish 7% Total	Mondale 31% Reagan 68%	ADA- N/A ACLU-N/A COPE-N/A AV= N/A
Montgomery, (D) MI, 3rd Dist.	1966	28% Black 1% Am Ind 1% Spanish 30% Total	Mondale 35% Reagan 65%	ADA- 5 ACLU- 5 COPE- 13 AV= 7.6
Moody, (D) WI, 5th Dist.	1982	22% Black 2% Spanish 1% Asian 25% Total	Mondale 60% Reagan 40%	ADA- 90 ACLU- 94 COPE- 90 AV= 91.3
Moorhead, (R) CA, 22nd Dist.	1972	11% Spanish 4% Asian 2% Black 1% Am Ind 18% Total	Mondale 26% Reagan 72%	ADA- 0 ACLU- 5 COPE- 8 AV= 4.3
Morrison, (D) CT, 3rd Dist.	1982	9% Black 2% Spanish 1% Asian 12% Total	Mondale 41% Reagan 59%	ADA- 80 ACLU- 95 COPE- 86 AV= 87
Morrison, (R) WA, 4th Dist.	1980	7% Spanish 2% Am Ind 1% Asian 1% Black 11% Total	Mondale 35% Reagan 63%	ADA- 25 ACLU- 40 COPE- 24 AV= 29.6
Mrazek, (D) NY, 3 rd Dist.	1982	3% Black 2% Spanish 1% Asian 6% Total	Mondale 35% Reagan 64%	ADA- 80 ACLU- 95 COPE- 86 AV= 87

Murtha, (D) PA, 12th Dist.	1974	1% Black 1% Total	Mondale 50% Reagan 50%	ADA- 40 ACLU- 42 COPE- 84 AV= 55.3
Natcher, (D) KY, 2nd Dist.	1953	6% Black 1% Spanish 7% Total	Mondale 36% Reagan 63%	ADA- 65 ACLU- 50 COPE- 72 AV= 62.3
Nelson, (D) FL, 11th Dist.	1978	6% Black 3% Spanish 1% Asian 10% Total	Mondale 26% Reagan 74%	ADA- 15 ACLU- 11 COPE- 38 AV= 21.3
Neilson, (R) UT, 3rd Dist.	1982	3% Spanish 2% Am Ind 1% Asian 6% Total	Mondale 22% Reagan 77%	ADA- 5 ACLU- 15 COPE- 7 AV= 9
Nowak, (D) NY, 33rd Dist.	1974	17% Black 2% Spanish 19% Total	Mondale 63% Reagan 37%	ADA- 95 ACLU- 75 COPE- 91 AV= 87
Oberstar, (DFL) MN, 8th Dist.	1974	1% Am Ind 1% Total	Mondale 59% Reagan 40%	ADA- 85 ACLU- 75 COPE- 93 AV= 84.3
Obey, (D) WI, 7th Dist.	1982	1% Am Ind 1% Total	Mondale 47% Reagan 53%	ADA- 85 ACLU- 94 COPE- 86 AV= 88.3
Ortiz, (D) TX, 27th Dist.	1982	55% Spanish 3% Black 58% Total	Mondale 47% Reagan 53%	ADA- 45 ACLU- 42 COPE- 87 AV= 58
Owens, (D) NY, 12th Dist.	1982	78% Black 9% Spanish 2% Asian 89% Total	Mondale 85% Reagan 14%	ADA- 95 ACLU- 88 COPE- 98 AV= 93.6

Oxley, (R) OH, 4th Dist.	1981	3% Black 1% Spanish 4% Total	Mondale 26% Reagan 74%	ADA- 0 ACLU- 10 COPE- 7 AV= 5.6
Packard, (R) CA, 43rd Dist.	1982	11% Spanish 2% Asian 2% Black 1% Am Ind 16% Total	Mondale 25% Reagan 74%	ADA- 5 ACLU- 10 COPE- 5 AV= 6.6
Panetta, (D) CA, 16th Dist.	1976	18% Spanish 5% Asian 4% Black 1% Am Ind 28% Total	Mondale 46% Reagan 53%	ADA- 85 ACLU- 84 COPE- 72 AV= 80.3
Pashayan, (R) CA, 17th Dist.	1978	23% Spanish 3% Asian 2% Black 1% Am Ind 29% Total	Mondale 36% Reagan 63%	ADA- 25 ACLU- 15 COPE- 28 AV= 22.6
Pease, (D) OH, 13th Dist.	1976	5% Black 2% Spanish 7% Total	Mondale 40% Reagan 58%	ADA- 75 ACLU- 80 COPE- 82 AV= 79
Penny, (DFL) MN, 1st Dist.	1982	1% Spanish 1% Total	Mondale 44% Reagan 55%	ADA- 75 ACLU- 65 COPE- 55 AV= 65
Pepper, (D) FL, 18th Dist.	1962	50% Spanish 13% Black 1% Asian 64% Total	Mondale 40% Reagan 60%	ADA- 70 ACLU- 68 COPE- 94 AV= 77.3
Perkins, (D) KY, 7th Dist.	1984	1% Black 1% Spanish 2% Total	Mondale 51% Reagan 49%	ADA- 80 ACLU- 75 COPE- 90 AV= 81.6
Pickle, (D) TX, 10th Dist.	1963	15% Spanish 9% Black 1% Asian 25% Total	Mondale 42% Reagan 58%	ADA- 40 ACLU- 65 COPE- 52 AV= 52.3

Price, (D) IL, 21st Dist.	1944	12% Black 1% Spanish 13% Total	Mondale 47% Reagan 53%	ADA- 65 ACLU- 65 COPE- 96 AV= 75.3
Quillen, (R) TN, 1st Dist.	1962	2% Black 2% Total	Mondale 28% Reagan 71%	ADA- 20 ACLU- 10 COPE- 16 AV= 15.3
Rahall, (D) WV, 4th Dist.	1976	6% Black 1% Spanish 7% Total	Mondale 50% Reagan 49%	ADA- 90 ACLU- 65 COPE- 86 AV= 80.3
Richardson, (D) NM, 3rd Dist.	1982	37% Spanish 17% Am Ind 1% Black 55% Total	Mondale 46% Reagan 53%	ADA- 75 ACLU- 75 COPE- 90 AV= 80
Ridge, (R) PA, 21st Dist.	1982	3% Black 3% Total	Mondale 46% Reagan 53%	ADA- 35 ACLU- 35 COPE- 49 AV= 39.6
Rodino, (D) NJ, 10th Dist.	1948	54% Black 12% Spanish 1% Asian 67% Total	Mondale 75% Reagan 25%	ADA- 100 ACLU- 100 COPE- 95 AV= 98.3
Roe, (D) NJ, 8th Dist.	1969	12% Black 10% Spanish 1% Asian 23% Total	Mondale 42% Reagan 58%	ADA- 75 ACLU- 50 COPE- 91 AV= 72
Rogers, (R) KY, 5th Dist.	1980	2% Black 1% Spanish 3% Total	Mondale 30% Reagan 69%	ADA- 10 ACLU- 0 COPE- 29 AV= 13
Rose, (D) NC, 7th Dist.	1972	25% Black 7% Am Ind 2% Spanish 1% Asian 35% Total	Mondale 43% Reagan 57%	ADA- 55 ACLU- 66 COPE- 62 AV= 61

Rostenkowski, (D) IL, 8th Dist.	1958	25% Spanish 3% Black 2% Asian 30% Total	Mondale 49% Reagan 51%	ADA- 65 ACLU- 63 COPE- 87 AV= 71.6
Roth, (R) WI, 8th Dist.	1978	2% Am Ind 2% Total	Mondale 37% Reagan 63%	ADA- 0 ACLU- 0 COPE- 14 AV= 4.6
Rowland, (D) GA, 8th Dist.	1982	32% Black 1% Spanish 33% Total	Mondale 48% Reagan 52%	ADA- 40 ACLU- 25 COPE- 45 AV= 36.6
Sabo, (DFL) MN, 5th Dist.	1978	5% Black 1% Am Ind 1% Asian 7% Total	Mondale 62% Reagan 38%	ADA- 95 ACLU- 95 COPE- 90 AV= 93.3
Schaefer, (R) CO, 6th Dist.	1983	4% Spanish 2% Black 1% Asian 7% Total	Mondale 31% Reagan 69%	ADA- 0 ACLU- 5 COPE- 11 AV= 5.3
Scheuer, (D) NY, 8th Dist.	1974	12% Spanish 9% Black 4% Asian 25% Total	Mondale 53% Reagan 47%	ADA- 95 ACLU- 85 COPE- 92 AV= 90.6
Schneider, (R) RH, 2nd Dist.	1980	3% Black 2% Spanish 1% Asian 6% Total	Mondale 47% Reagan 53%	ADA- 80 ACLU- 78 COPE- 71 AV= 76.3
Schulze, (R) PA, 5th Dist.	1974	10% Black 1% Asian 1% Black 12% Total	Mondale 33% Reagan 66%	ADA- 15 ACLU- 0 COPE- 20 AV= 11.6
Schumer, (D) NY, 10th Dist.	1980	7% Spanish 4% Black 2% Asian 13% Total	Mondale 51% Reagan 49%	ADA- 85 ACLU- 90 COPE- 93 AV= 89.3

Seiberling, (D) OH, 14th Dist.	1970	10% Black 10% Total	Mondale 49% Reagan 51%	ADA- 95 ACLU- 83 COPE- 89 AV= 89
Sharp, (D) IN, 2nd Dist.	1974	2% Black 1% Spanish 3% Total	Mondale 32% Reagan 68%	ADA- 65 ACLU- 80 COPE- 72 AV= 72.3
Shaw, (R) FL, 15th Dist.	1980	13% Black 3% Spanish 16% Total	Mondale 41% Reagan 59%	ADA- 5 ACLU- 0 COPE- 8 AV= 4.3
Shumway, (R) CA, 14th Dist.	1978	7% Spanish 2% Asian 1% Am Ind 1% Black 11% Total	Mondale 34% Reagan 64%	ADA- 0 ACLU- 5 COPE- 7 AV= 4
Sikorski, (DFL) MN, 6th Dist.	1982	1% Asian 1% Spanish 2% Total	Mondale 47% Reagan 52%	ADA- 85 ACLU- 73 COPE- 94 AV= 84
Sisisky, (D) VA, 4th Dist.	1982	37% Black 1% Spanish 1% Asian 39% Total	Mondale 43% Reagan 56%	ADA- 45 ACLU- 55 COPE- 61 AV= 53.6
Slattery, (D) KS, 2nd Dist.	1982	7% Black 3% Spanish 1% Asian 1% Am Ind 12% Total	Mondale 35% Reagan 64%	ADA- 45 ACLU- 60 COPE- 56 AV= 53.6
Smith, (R) NJ, 4th Dist.	1980	12% Black 2% Spanish 1% Asian 15% Total	Mondale 41% Reagan 59%	ADA- 45 ACLU- 35 COPE- 60 AV= 46.6
Smith, (D) FL, 16th Dist.	1982	20% Spanish 4% Black 1% Asian 25% Total	Mondale 39% Reagan 61%	ADA- 65 ACLU- 50 COPE- 93 AV= 69.3

Smith, (D) IA, 4th Dist.	1958	3% Black 1% Asian 1% Spanish 5% Total	Mondale 50% Reagan 49%	ADA- 70 ACLU- 75 COPE- 79 AV= 74.6
Smith, (R) NE, 3rd Dist.	1974	2% Spanish 2% Total	Mondale 22% Reagan 78%	ADA- 10 ACLU- 11 COPE- 10 AV= 10.3
Snowe, (R) ME, 2nd Dist.	1978	0% Total	Mondale 37% Reagan 62%	ADA- 50 ACLU- 50 COPE- 44 AV= 48
Solarz, (D) NY, 13th Dist.	1974	13% Spanish 6% Black 2% Asian 21% Total	Mondale 53% Reagan 47%	ADA- 90 ACLU- 87 COPE- 89 AV= 88.6
Spratt, (D) SC, 5th Dist.	1982	29% Black 1% Spanish 30% Total	Mondale 38% Reagan 62%	ADA- 60 ACLU- 70 COPE- 54 AV= 61.3
Stallings, (D) SC, 2nd Dist.	1984	4% Spanish 1% Am Ind 1% Asian 6% Total	Mondale 23% Reagan 76%	ADA- 45 ACLU- 35 COPE- 33 AV= 37.6
Stangeland, (R) MN, 7th Dist.	1977	1% Am Ind 1% Total	Mondale 43% Reagan 57%	ADA- 10 ACLU- 15 COPE- 10 AV= 11.6
Stark, (D) CA, 9th Dist.	1972	12% Spanish 10% Black 6% Asian 1% Am Ind 29% Total	Mondale 49% Reagan 50%	ADA- 95 ACLU- 85 COPE- 93 AV= 91
Stokes, (D) OH, 21st Dist.	1968	58% Black 1% Asian 1% Black 60% Total	Mondale 78% Reagan 21%	ADA- 100 ACLU- 100 COPE- 94 AV= 98

Strang, (R) CO, 3rd Dist.	1986	15% Spanish 1% Am Ind 1% Black 17% Total	Mondale 37% Reagan 63%	ADA- N/A ACLU- N/A COPE- N/A AV= N/A
Studds, (D) MA, 10th Dist.	1972	1% Black 1% Spanish 2% Total	Mondale 45% Reagan 55%	ADA- 95 ACLU- 95 COPE- 89 AV= 93
Swift, (D) WA, 2nd Dist.	1978	2% Am Ind 1% Asian 1% Spanish 4% Total	Mondale 44% Reagan 55%	ADA- 90 ACLU- 90 COPE- 82 AV= 87.3
Synar, (D) OK, 2nd Dist.	1978	10% Am Ind 4% Black 1% Spanish 15% Total	Mondale 35% Reagan 64%	ADA- 70 ACLU- 88 COPE- 58 AV= 72
Tauke, (R) IA, 2nd Dist.	1978	1% Black 1% Total	Mondale 46% Reagan 53%	ADA- 30 ACLU- 37 COPE- 18 AV= 28.3
Thomas, (D) GA, 1st Dist.	1982	30% Black 1% Asian 1% Black 32% Total	Mondale 41% Reagan 59%	ADA- 25 ACLU- 25 COPE- 46 AV= 32
Thomas, (R) CA, 20th Dist.	1978	12% Spanish 4% Black 2% Am Ind 2% Asian 20% Total	Mondale 30% Reagan 69%	ADA- 10 ACLU- 25 COPE- 10 AV= 15
Torres, (D) CA, 34th Dist.	1982	42% Spanish 4% Asian 2% Black 1% Am Ind 49% Total	Mondale 40% Reagan 59%	ADA- 90 ACLU- 84 COPE- 97 AV= 90.3
Torricelli, (D) NJ, 9th Dist.	1982	5% Black 4% Spanish 2% Asian 11% Total	Mondale 41% Reagan 59%	ADA- 70 ACLU- 61 COPE- 93 AV= 74.6

Traxler, (D) MI, 8th Dist.	1974	6% Black 3% Spanish 9% Total	Mondale 39% Reagan 60%	ADA- 80 ACLU- 73 COPE- 86 AV= 79.6
Udall, (D) AZ, 2nd Dist.	1961	30% Spanish 5% Black 4% Am Ind 1% Asian 40% Total	Mondale 48% Reagan 51%	ADA- 85 ACLU- 95 COPE- 86 AV= 88.6
Vento, (DFL) MN, 4th Dist.	1976	2% Black 2% Spanish 1% Asian 5% Total	Mondale 59% Reagan 40%	ADA- 90 ACLU- 84 COPE- 92 AV= 88.6
Volkmer, (D) MO, 9th Dist.	1980	3% Black 3% Total	Mondale 36% Reagan 64%	ADA- 55 ACLU- 30 COPE- 68 AV= 51
Vucanovich, (R) NV, 2nd Dist.	1982	5% Spanish 2% Am Ind 2% Asian 2% Black 11% Total	Mondale 29% Reagan 69%	ADA- 0 ACLU- 0 COPE- 7 AV= 2.3
Waldon, (D) NY, 6th Dist.	1986	47% Black 8% Spanish 1% Asian 56% Total	Mondale 67% Reagan 33%	ADA- N/A ACLU- N/A COPE- N/A AV= N/A
Walgren, (D) PA, 18th Dist.	1976	2% Black 1% Asian 3% Total	Mondale 41% Reagan 58%	ADA- 85 ACLU- 73 COPE- 83 AV= 80.3
Walker, (R) PA, 16th Dist.	1976	2% Black 2% Spanish 4% Total	Mondale 26% Reagan 74%	ADA- 0 ACLU- 5 COPE- 16 AV= 7
Waxman, (D) CA, 24th Dist.	1974	22% Spanish 11% Asian 6% Black 39% Total	Mondale 55% Reagan 44%	ADA- 95 ACLU- 88 COPE- 88 AV= 90.3

Weber, (R) MN, 2nd Dist.	1980	0% Total	Mondale 43% Reagan 57%	ADA- 15 ACLU- 20 COPE- 9 AV= 14.6
Wheat, (D) MO, 5th Dist.	1982	20% Black 2% Spanish 1% Asian 23% Total	Mondale 54% Reagan 46%	ADA- 95 ACLU- 100 COPE- 95 AV= 96.6
Whitehurst, (R) VA. 2nd Dist.	1968	21% Black 2% Asian 2% Black 25% Total	Mondale 37% Reagan 63%	ADA- 10 ACLU- 15 COPE- 15 AV= 13.3
Williams, (D) MT, 1st Dist.	1978	3% Am Ind 1% Spanish 4% Total	Mondale 40% Reagan 58%	ADA- 85 ACLU- 95 COPE- 88 AV= 89.3
Wilson, (D) TX, 2nd Dist.	1972	14% Black 3% Spanish 17% Total	Mondale 41% Reagan 58%	ADA- 35 ACLU- 23 COPE- 65 AV= 41
Wise, (D) WV, 3rd Dist.	1982	3% Black 1% Spanish 4% Total	Mondale 44% Reagan 56%	ADA- 75 ACLU- 70 COPE- 88 AV= 77.6
Wolf, (R) VA, 10th Dist.	1980	6% Black 4% Asian 4% Spanish 14% Total	Mondale 41% Reagan 59%	ADA- 0 ACLU- 0 COPE- 16 AV= 5.3
Wolpe, (D) MI, 3rd Dist.	1978	8% Black 2% Spanish 10% Total	Mondale 36% Reagan 63%	ADA- 90 ACLU- 95 COPE- 90 AV= 91.6
Wortley, (R) NY, 27th Dist.	1980	5% Black 1% Am Ind 1% Asian 1% Black 8% Total	Mondale 39% Reagan 60%	ADA- 20 ACLU- 12 COPE- 26 AV= 19.3

Wright, (D) TX, 12th Dist.	1954	15% Black 9% Spanish 24% Total	Mondale 41% Reagan 58%	ADA- 80 ACLU- 81 COPE- 76 AV= 79
Wyden, (D) OR, 3rd Dist.	1980	5% Black 2% Asian 2% Spanish 1% Am Ind 10% Total	Mondale 53% Reagan 47%	ADA- 80 ACLU- 75 COPE- 80 AV= 78.3
Wylie, (R) OH, 15th Dist.	1966	10% Black 1% Asian 1% Spanish 12% Total	Mondale 31% Reagan 66%	ADA- 15 ACLU- 5 COPE- 23 AV= 12.6
Yates, (D) IL, 9th Dist.	1964	9% Black 8% Spanish 5% Asian 22% Total	Mondale 55% Reagan 45%	ADA- 90 ACLU- 94 COPE- 92 AV= 92
Young, (D) MO, 2nd Dist.	1976	5% Black 1% Asian 1% Spanish 7% Total	Mondale 34% Reagan 66%	ADA- 55 ACLU- 55 COPE- 77 AV= 62.3
Zschau, (R) CA, 12th Dist.	1982	8% Spanish 6% Asian 2% Black 16% Total	Mondale 41% Reagan 57%	ADA- 40 ACLU- 65 COPE- 10 AV= 38.3

Source: Barone, Michael, and Grant Ujifusa. 1987. The Almanac of American Politics, 1986. Washington, D.C.: National Journal Inc.

Barone, Michael, and Grant Ujifusa. 1987. The Almanac of American Politics, 1988. Washington, D.C.: National Journal Inc.

Appendix I

Senate Roll Call Votes on IRCA Senators Voting Against IRCA: (24)

Abdnor, (R)	Garn, (R)	Kennedy, (D)
Armstrong, (R)	Gramm, (R)	McClure, (R)
Bumpers, (D)	Hatch, (R)	Mitchell, (D)
Cochran, (R)	Hecht, (R)	Nickles, (R)
Cohen, (R)	Heflin, (D)	Pressler, (R)
Denton, (R)	Helms, (R)	Riegle, (D)
Domenici, (R)	Humphrey, (R)	Rudman, (R)
Ford, (D)	Inouye, (D)	Zorinsky, (D)

Source: Congressional Record-Senate, 17 October 1986, S16915. State and party designations from National Journal, various issues.

Appendix M

Senate Roll Call Vote on IRCA Senators Voting For IRCA: (63)

Andrews, (R)	Harkin, (D)	Proxmire, (D)
Baucus, (D)	Hatfield, (R)	Pryor, (D)
Bentsen, (D)	Hawkins, (R)	Quayle, (R)
Biden, (D)	Heinz, (R)	Rockefeller, (D)
Bingaman, (D)	Hollings, (D)	Roth, (R)
Boschwitz, (R)	Johnston, (D)	Sarbanes, (D)
Bradley, (D)	Levin, (D)	Sasser, (D)
Burdick, (D)	Long, (D)	Simon, (D)
D'Amato, (R)	Lugar, (R)	Simpson, (R)
Danforth, (R)	Matsunaga, (D)	Specter, (R)
Dixon, (R)	Mattingly, (R)	Stafford, (R)
Dodd, (D)	McConnell, (R)	Stevens, (R)
Dole, (R)	Melcher, (D)	Thurmond, (R)
Durenberger, (R)	Metzenbaum, (D)	Trible, (R)
Eagleton, (D)	Moynihan, (D)	Wallop, (R)
Exon, (D)	Nunn, (D)	Warner, (R)
Gore, (D)	Packwood, (R)	Weicker, (R)
Grassley, (R)	Pell, (D)	Wilson, (R)

Source: Congressional Record-Senate, 17 October 1986,
S16915. State and party designations from
National Journal, various issues.

Appendix N

Senate Roll Call Vote on IRCA Senators Not Voting: (13)

Boren, (D)	Goldwater, (R)	Murkowski, (R)
Broyhill, (R)	Gorton, (R)	Stennis, (D)
DeConcini, (D)	Laxalt, (R)	Symms, (R)
Evans, (D)	Leahy, (D)	
Glenn, (D)	Mathias, (R)	

Source: Congressional Record-Senate, 17 October 1986,
S16915. State and party designations from
National Journal, various issues.

Appendix O

Analysis of Senate Vote on IRCA Senators Who Voted Against IRCA, 1986

Member Name	Year Elected	%Minority Population	Pres. Vote	Liberalism Index
Abdnor, (R) SD	1980	5% Am Ind 5% Total	Mondale 63% Reagan 37%	ADA- 15 ACLU- 4 COPE- 26 AV= 15
Armstrong, (R) CO	1978	10% Spanish 3% Black 1% Am Ind 1% Asian 15% Total	Mondale 35% Reagan 63%	ADA- 0 ACLU- 7 COPE- 1 AV= 2.6
Bumpers, (D) AR	1974	14% Black 1% Spanish 15% Total	Mondale 38% Reagan 60%	ADA- 70 ACLU- 64 COPE- 65 AV= 66.3
Cochran, (R) MS	1978	31% Black 1% Spanish 32% Total	Mondale 37% Reagan 62%	ADA- 5 ACLU- 21 COPE- 13 AV= 13
Cohen, (R) ME	1978	0% Total	Mondale 39% Reagan 61%	ADA- 50 ACLU- 64 COPE- 37 AV= 50.3
Denton, (R) AL	1980	23% Black 1% Spanish 24% Total	Mondale 38% Reagan 61%	ADA- 0 ACLU- 6 COPE- 7 AV= 4.3
Domenici, (R) NM	1972	33% Spanish 7% Am Ind 2% Black 1% Asian 43% Total	Mondale 39% Reagan 60%	ADA- 5 ACLU- 21 COPE- 22 AV= 16

Ford, (D) KY	1974	7% Black 1% Spanish 8% Total	Mondale 39% Reagan 60%	ADA- 55 ACLU- 21 COPE- 73 AV= 49.6
Garn, (R) UT	1974	4% Spanish 1% Am Ind 1% Asian 1% Black 7% Total	Mondale 25% Reagan 75%	ADA- 0 ACLU- 7 COPE- 10 AV= 5.6
Gramm, (R) TX	1984	18% Spanish 11% Black 1% Asian 30% Total	Mondale 36% Reagan 64%	ADA- 45 ACLU- 30 COPE- 50 AV= 41.6
Hatch, (R) UT	1976	4% Spanish 1% Am Ind 1% Asian 1% Black 7% Total	Mondale 25% Reagan 75%	ADA- 5 ACLU- 14 COPE- 11 AV= 10
Hecht, (R) NV	1982	6% Spanish 5% Black 2% Asian 1% Am Ind 14% Total	Mondale 32% Reagan 66%	ADA- 0 ACLU- 0 COPE- 3 AV= 1
Heflin, (D) AL	1978	23% Black 1% Spanish 24% Total	Mondale 38% Reagan 61%	ADA- 25 ACLU- 28 COPE- 59 AV= 37.3
Helms, (R) NC	1972	20% Black 1% Am Ind 1% Spanish 22% Total	Mondale 38% Reagan 62%	ADA- 0 ACLU- 7 COPE- 7 AV= 4.6
Humphrey, (R) NH	1978	1% Spanish 1% Total	Mondale 31% Reagan 69%	ADA- 0 ACLU- 14 COPE- 6 AV= 6.6
Inouye, (D) HI	1962	60% Asian 6% Spanish 2% Black 68% Total	Mondale 44% Reagan 55%	ADA- 90 ACLU- 100 COPE- 89 AV= 93

Kennedy, (D) MA	1962	3% Black 2% Spanish 1% Asian 6% Total	Mondale 48% Reagan 51%	ADA- 80 ACLU- 100 COPE- 93 AV= 91
McClure, (R) IA	1972	3% Spanish 1% Am Ind 1% Asian 5% Total	Mondale 26% Reagan 72%	ADA- 0 ACLU- 7 COPE- 9 AV= 5.3
Mitchell, (D) ME	1980	0% Total	Mondale 39% Reagan 61%	ADA- 85 ACLU- 78 COPE- 86 AV= 83
Nickles, (R) OK	1980	6% Black 5% Am Ind 2% Spanish 1% Asian 14% Total	Mondale 31% Reagan 69%	ADA- 0 ACLU- 0 COPE- 2 AV= .67
Riegle, (D) MI	1976	12% Black 1% Asian 1% Spanish 14% Total	Mondale 40% Reagan 59%	ADA- 95 ACLU- 85 COPE- 94 AV= 91.3
Rudman, (R) NH	1980	1% Spanish 1% Total	Mondale 31% Reagan 69%	ADA- 10 ACLU- 35 COPE- 17 AV= 20.6
Zorinsky, (D) NE	1976	3% Black 1% Spanish 4% Total	Mondale 29% Reagan 71%	ADA- 10 ACLU- 24 COPE- 33 AV- 22.3

Source: Barone, Michael, and Grant Ujifusa. 1985 The Almanac of American Politics, 1986.
Washington, D.C: National Journal Inc.

Barone, Michael, and Grant Ujifusa. 1987. The Almanac of American Politics, 1988.
Washington, D.C.: National Journal Inc.

Appendix P

Analysis of Senate Vote on IRCA Senators Who Voted For IRCA, 1986

Member Name	Year Elected	%Minority Population	Pres. Vote	Liberalism Index
Andrews, (R) ND	1980	2% Am Ind 2% Total	Mondale 34% Reagan 65%	ADA- 55 ACLU- 44 COPE- 42 AV= 47
Baucus, (D) MT	1978	4% Am Ind 1% Spanish 5% Total	Mondale 38% Reagan 60	ADA- 80 ACLU- 78 COPE- 74 AV= 77.3
Bentsen, (D) TX	1970	18% Spanish 11% Black 1% Asian 30% Total	Mondale 36% Reagan 64%	ADA- 45 ACLU- 30 COPE- 50 AV= 41.6
Biden, (D) DE	1972	14% Black 1% Asian 1% Spanish 16% Total	Mondale 40% Reagan 60%	ADA- 15 ACLU- 21 COPE- 18 AV= 18
Bingaman, (D) NM	1982	33% Spanish 7% Am Ind 2% Black 1% Asian 43% Total	Mondale 39% Reagan 60%	ADA- 65 ACLU- 92 COPE- 84 AV= 80.3
Boschwitz, (R) MN	1978	1% Am Ind 1% Asian 1% Black 1% Spanish 4% Total	Mondale 50% Reagan 50%	ADA- 15 ACLU- 21 COPE- 17 AV= 17.6
Bradley, (D) NJ	1978	11% Black 6% Spanish 1% Asian 18% Total	Mondale 39% Reagan 60%	ADA- 85 ACLU- 78 COPE- 86 AV= 83

Burdick, (D) ND	1960	2% Am Ind 2% Total	Mondale 34% Reagan 65%	ADA- 100 ACLU- 92 COPE- 85 AV= 92.3
Byrd, (D) WV	1958	3% Black 1% Spanish 4% Total	Mondale 45% Reagan 55%	ADA- 75 ACLU- 57 COPE- 72 AV= 68
Chafee, (R) RI	1976	2% Black 2% Spanish 1% Asian 5% Total	Mondale 48% reagan 52%	ADA- 60 ACLU- 71 COPE- 45 AV= 58.6
Chiles, (D) FL	1970	11% Black 9% Spanish 1% Asian 21% Total	Mondale 35% Reagan 65%	ADA- 40 ACLU- 42 COPE- 53 AV= 45
Cranston, (D) CA	1968	16% Spanish 7% Black 5% Asian 1% Am Ind 29% Total	Mondale 41% Reagan 58%	ADA- 95 ACLU- 92 COPE- 91 AV= 92.6
D'Amato, (R) NY	1980	12% Black 8% Spanish 2% Asian 22% Total	Mondale 46% Reagan 54%	ADA- 35 ACLU- 7 COPE- 42 AV= 28
Danforth, (R) MO	1976	9% Black 1% Spanish 10% Total	Mondale 40% Reagan 60%	ADA- 30 ACLU- 23 COPE- 28 AV= 27
Dixon, (D) IL	1980	13% Black 5% Spanish 1% Asian 19% Total	Mondale 43% Reagan 56%	ADA- 65 ACLU- 42 COPE- 78 AV= 61.6
Dodd, (D) CT	1980	6% Black 3% Spanish 1% Asian 10% Total	Mondale 39% Reagan 61%	ADA- 85 ACLU- 85 COPE- 98 AV= 89.3

Dole, (R) KS	1968	5% Black 2% Spanish 1% Am Ind 8% Total	Mondale 33% Reagan 66%	ADA- 0 ACLU- 7 COPE- 16 AV= 7.6
Durenberger, (R) MN	1978	1% Am Ind 1% Asian 1% Black 1% Black 4% Total	Mondale 50% Reagan 50%	ADA- 40 ACLU- 38 COPE- 40 AV= 39.3
Eagleton, (D) MO	1968	9% Black 1% Spanish 10% Total	Mondale 40% Reagan 60%	ADA- 90 ACLU- 60 COPE- 87 AV= 79
Exon, (D) NE	1978	3% Black 1% Spanish 4% Total	Mondale 29% Reagan 71%	ADA- 35 ACLU- 35 COPE- 40 AV= 36.6
Gore, (D) TN	1984	14% Black 1% Spanish 15% Total	Mondale 42% Reagan 58%	ADA- 70 ACLU- 78 COPE- 86 AV= 78
Grassley, (R) IA	1980	1% Black 1% Spanish 2% Total	Mondale 46% Reagan 53%	ADA- 18 ACLU- 7 COPE- 11 AV= 12
Harkin, (D) IA	1984	1% Black 1% Spanish 2% Total	Mondale 46% Reagan 53%	ADA- 90 ACLU- 92 COPE- 92 AV= 91.3
Hatfield, (R) OR	1966	2% Spanish 1% Am Ind 1% Asian 1% Black 5% Total	Mondale 44% Reagan 56%	ADA- 75 ACLU- 75 COPE- 50 AV= 66.6
Hawkins, (R) FL	1980	11% Black 9% Spanish 1% Asian 21% Total	Mondale 35% Reagan 65%	ADA- 25 ACLU- 10 COPE- 30 AV= 21.6

Heinz, (R) PA	1976	8% Black 1% Spanish 9% Total	Mondale 46% Reagan 53%	ADA- 35 ACLU- 38 COPE- 63
Hollings, (D) SC	1966	27% Black 1% Spanish 28% Total	Mondale 36% Reagan 64%	ADA- 35 ACLU- 28 COPE- 56 AV= 39.6
Johnston, (D) LA	1972	27% Black 2% Spanish 1% Asian 30% Total	Mondale 38% Reagan 61%	ADA- 50 ACLU- 23 COPE- 47 AV= 40
Kassebaum, (R) KS	1978	5% Black 2% Spanish 1% Am Ind 1% Asian 9% Total	Mondale 33% Reagan 66%	ADA- 45 ACLU- 28 COPE- 21 AV= 31.3
Kasten, (R) WI	1980	3% Black 1% Am Ind 1% Spanish 5% Total	Mondale 45% Reagan 54%	ADA- 15 ACLU- 7 COPE- 21 AV= 14.3
Kerry, (D) MA	1984	3% Black 2% Spanish 1% Asian 6% Total	Mondale 51% Reagan 48%	ADA- 85 ACLU- 100 COPE- 94 AV= 93
Lautenberg, (D) NJ	1982	11% Black 6% Spanish 1% Asian 18% Total	Mondale 39% Reagan 60%	ADA- 85 ACLU- 92 COPE- 95 AV= 90.6
Levin, (D) MI	1982	10% Black 1% Asian 1% Spanish 12% Total	Mondale 46% Reagan 54%	ADA- 85 ACLU- 85 COPE- 92 AV= 87.3
Long, (D) LA	1948	27% Black 2% Spanish 1% Asian 30% Total	Mondale 38% Reagan 61%	ADA- 35 ACLU- 18 COPE- 50 AV= 34.3

Lugar, (R) IN	1976	7% Black 1% Spanish 8% Total	Mondale 38% Reagan 62%	ADA- 10 ACLU- 21 COPE- 10 AV= 13.6
Matsunaga, (D) HI	1976	60% Asian 6% Spanish 2% Black 68% Total	Mondale 44% Reagan 55%	ADA- 85 ACLU- 92 COPE- 84 AV= 87
Mattingly, (R) GA	1980	24% Black 1% Spanish 25% Total	Mondale 40% Reagan 60%	ADA- 5 ACLU- 4 COPE- 7 AV= 5.3
McConnell, (R) KY	1984	7% Black 1% Spanish 8% Total	Mondale 39% Reagan 60%	ADA- 8 ACLU- 0 COPE- 73 AV= 27
Melcher, (D) MT	1976	4% Am Ind 1% Spanish 5% Total	Mondale 38% Reagan 60%	ADA- 90 ACLU- 71 COPE- 82 AV= 81
Metzenbaum, (D) OH	1976	9% Black 1% Spanish 10% Total	Mondale 40% Reagan 59%	ADA- 65 ACLU- 78 COPE- 80 AV= 74.3
Moynihan, (D) NY	1976	12% Black 8% Spanish 2% Asian 22% Total	Mondale 46% Reagan 54%	ADA- 85 ACLU- 85 COPE- 91 AV= 87
Nunn, (D) GA	1972	24% Black 1% Spanish 25% Total	Mondale 40% Reagan 60%	ADA- 30 ACLU- 35 COPE- 38 AV= 34.3
Packwood, (R) OR	1968	2% Spanish 1% Am Ind 1% Asian 1% Black 5% Total	Mondale 44% Reagan 56%	ADA- 60 ACLU- 69 COPE- 44 AV= 57.6

Pell, (D) RI	1960	2% Black 2% Spanish 1% Asian 5% Total	Mondale 48% Reagan 52%	ADA- 80 ACLU- 85 COPE- 92 AV= 64.3
Proxmire, (D) WI	1957	3% Black 1% Am Ind 1% Spanish 5% Total	Mondale 45% Reagan 54%	ADA- 60 ACLU- 64 COPE- 66 AV= 63.3
Pryor, (D) AR	1978	14% Black 1% Spanish 15% Total	Mondale 38% Reagan 60%	ADA- 60 ACLU- 76 COPE- 58 AV= 64.6
Quayle, (R) IN	1980	7% Black 1% Spanish 8% Total	Mondale 38% Reagan 62%	ADA- 5 ACLU- 7 COPE- 8 AV= 6.6
Rockerfeller, (D) WV	1984	3% Black 1% Spanish 4% Total	Mondale 45% Reagan 55%	ADA- 75 ACLU- 75 COPE- 92 AV= 80.6
Roth, (R) DE	1970	14% Black 1% Spanish 1% Asian 16% Total	Mondale 40% Reagan 60%	ADA- 15 ACLU- 21 COPE- 18 AV= 18
Sarbanes, (D) MD	1976	21% Black 1% Asian 1% Spanish 23% Total	Mondale 47% Reagan 53%	ADA- 100 ACLU- 92 COPE- 98 AV= 96.6
Sasser, (D) TN	1976	14% Black 1% Spanish 15% Total	Mondale 42% Reagan 58%	ADA- 70 ACLU- 57 COPE- 79 AV= 68.6
Simon, (D) IL	1984	13% Black 5% Spanish 1% Asian 19% Total	Mondale 43% Reagan 56%	ADA- 89 ACLU- 100 COPE- 89 AV= 92.6

Simpson, (R) WY	1978	4% Spanish 1% Am Ind 1% Black 6% Total	Mondale 28% Reagan 71%	ADA- 10 ACLU- 28 COPE- 6 AV= 14.6
Specter, (R) PA	1980	8% Black 1% Spanish 9% Total	Mondale 46% Reagan 53%	ADA- 60 ACLU- 76 COPE- 57 AV= 68.6
Stafford, (R) VT	1971	1% Spanish 1% Total	Mondale 41% Reagan 58%	ADA- 60 ACLU- 76 COPE- 57 AV= 64.3
Stevens, (R) AK	1970	14% Am Ind 3% Black 2% Asian 2% Spanish 21% Total	Mondale 30% Reagan 67%	ADA- 15 ACLU- 30 COPE- 42 AV= 29
Thurmond, (R) SC	1956	27% Black 1% Spanish 28% Total	Mondale 36% Reagan 64%	ADA- 5 ACLU- 0 COPE- 10 AV= 5
Trible, (R) VA	1982	17% Black 1% Asian 1% Spanish 19% Total	Mondale 37% Reagan 62%	ADA- 5 ACLU- 0 COPE- 11 AV= 5.3
Wallop, (R) WY	1976	4% Spanish 1% Am Ind 1% Black 6% Total	Mondale 28% Reagan 71%	ADA- 0 ACLU- 0 COPE- 8 AV= 2.6
Warner, (R) VA	1978	17% Black 1% Asian 1% Spanish 19% Total	Mondale 37% Reagan 62%	ADA- 5 ACLU- 21 COPE- 13 AV= 13
Weicker, (R) CT	1970	6% Black 3% Spanish 1% Asian 10% Total	Mondale 39% Reagan 61%	ADA- 80 ACLU- 85 COPE- 64 AV= 76.3

Wilson, (R)	1982	16% Spanish	Mondale	41%	ADA-	5
CA		7% Black	Reagan	58%	ACLU-	21
		5% Asian			COPE-	8
		1% Am Ind			AV=	11.3
		29% Total				

Source: Barone, Michael, and Grant Ujifusa. 1985. The Almanac of American Politics, 1986.
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ENDNOTES

1. For an in-depth discussion on the successes and failures of IRCA see: Mehlman, Ira, 1994, "Its Back." National Review 46 (6): 25-26; and Perotti, Rosanna, 1990, "IRCA's Antidiscrimination Provisions: What Went Wrong?" International Migration Review 26 (3): 739-753.
2. A critical review of Proposition 187 is done by Schine, Eric. 1994. "Proposition 187 Isn't Just Cruel, It's Hypocritical." Business Week 3392-3405, 14 November: 37.
3. League of Latin American Citizens et al. V. Pete Wilson et. al. 908 F-Supp. 755: 1995.
4. See, for example, such press coverage of these recent developments as: Berke, Richard, "Politicians Discovering an Issue: Immigration," The New York Times, Wednesday, March 8, 1994, A-19; Brinkley, Joel, "Two in Congress Who Fought to Improve Immigration Policy," The New York Times, Friday September 15, 1994, A-18; Holmes, Steven, "House Republicans May Split Immigration Bill to Keep it From Bogging Down," The New York Times, Thursday, November 2, 1995, B-10; Holmes, Steven, "Immigration Panel Proposes Fee for Bringing In Foreign Workers," The New York Times, Thursday, September 13, 1995, A-20; Kang, Connie, "Proposed Rules Clouds Couple's 6-Year Dream," The Los Angeles Times, Monday, August 7, 1995, B-1; Pear Robert, "Change of Policy on U.S. Immigrants Is Urged by Panel," The New York Times, Monday, June 5, 1995, A-1, B-7.
5. LeMay, Michael C. 1989. From Open Door to Dutch Door: The Reform of Contemporary American Immigration Law. Westport, CT: Praeger Press.
6. For a general discussion of political and economic policy on immigration reform see, Briggs, Vernon, 1991, "Immigration Policy: Political or Economic?," Challenge, 34 (5): 12-19.

7. This section relies heavily from an excellent paper by McDonnell and Hill 1989, 5-6; 9-25; and Bean, Vernez, and Keeley 1989.
8. Lowell, Lindsay, and Zhongren Jing. 1994 "Unauthorized Workers and Immigration Reform: What Can We Ascertain from Employers?" International Migration Review, 28 (3): 427-448.
9. General Accounting Office. 1990. "Immigration Reform: Employer Sanctions and the Question of Discrimination: Report to the Congress," GAO/GGD-90-62. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.

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